

The Resilience Pattern of the International Tourist Arrivals Resulting from Bali Bombings I & II

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Abstract | Indonesia's tourism sector is highly fixated on Bali Island for its central tourism representation. Unfortunately, standing as the most compelling attraction for international tourists, Bali as an icon was disturbed by terrorism like the Bali bombings I & II. By employing the descriptive statistical method, this research forms a resilience pattern of international tourists arrivals to Bali after the Bali bombings I & II. This research has identified that the international tourist arrivals' resilience due to the attacks took 11 months. Also, the number of victims and property damage generated by those two terrorism incidents directly affects international tourists' potential losses.

Keywords | Bali, international tourist arrivals, resilience, terrorism

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1. Introduction

The tourism sector is influenced by many unpredictable factors, such as terrorism, pandemic, and natural disasters (Hajibaba et al., 2015; Kuo et al., 2008; Mylonopoulos et al., 2016). Hence, security and safety are essential for tourism development. The World Economic Forum (WEF), in its report on global tourism competitiveness in The Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report (TTCR), included security and safety indicators as important pillars (Calderwood & Soshkin, 2019). Security is considered vital because it affects tourists' perceptions of destination quality and the decision to visit (Sarman et al., 2016). As a result, issues related to security and safety will directly influence the development of tourism itself.

Apart from functioning as a catalyst for economic growth and national development, the tourism sector supports local welfare (Jarvis et al., 2016; Mendola & Volo, 2017; Srihadi et al., 2016). Indonesia puts tourism as one of the leading sectors to stimulate the economy (Maulana, 2019), and fortunately, Indonesia's tourism growth in the last few years has always shown a positive inclination. The tourism sector has great potential as a significant foreign exchange root by acting as the third-greater contributor in foreign exchange after palm oil and coal (Bank Indonesia, 2018). Tourism foreign exchange is influenced by international tourists spending during their visit. Therefore, the international tourist arrivals is an essential indicator in tourism, especially in earning foreign exchange (Asthu, 2020; Mariyono, 2017; Marrocu et al., 2015).

Any event that causes instability in the tourism industry will significantly impact destinations (Gurtner, 2016). Disruptive incidents will raise perceptions of danger among tourists and have a substantial adverse impact on market interest (Seabra et al., 2020). Terrorism incidents are frightening issues that can fluster instability, peace, and create a perception of risk. Terrorism is a

worldwide challenge that dramatically affects the tourism industry (Song et al., 2019; Walters et al., 2018). The severity of terrorism attacks depends on the attack's character, economic resilience, and security level (Ruiz Estrada & Koutronas, 2016). The anthropological theory asserts that terrorists threaten tourists' confidence toward the concerned country's credibility (Korstanje, 2018). Terrorism is defined as an actor appearing as threats and violence, carried out intentionally by entities affiliated with non-state organizations (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2020). One's feeling in danger due to terrorism is the most obvious point that distracts tourists' perceptions of the destination (Sheppard & Williams, 2016). Therefore, addressing terrorism as a study focus on the tourism sector related to security and safety indicators is deemed necessary.

Indonesian tourism relies upon Bali for the international tourist number. Bali maximizes tourism as the primary source of income (Nugroho et al., 2017) and is the highest contributor to Indonesia's international tourist arrivals. In 2019, international tourist arrivals through Ngurah Rai International Airport were recorded at 6.2 million, contributing 38.7% of Indonesia's total international tourist arrivals (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2020).

One of the most significant troubles that disturbed Bali's security and safety was the Bali bombings, categorized as terrorism in 2002 and 2005, known as the Bali bombings I and Bali bombings II. There have been many studies related to the impact of these two disasters on tourism. However, no study has conducted research related to Bali's resilience patterns in normalizing the tourism sector, primarily covering indicators of international market demand/international tourist arrivals. Resilience is the ability to recover and find new stability after a traumatic event (Netten, 2018).

This study aims to identify the resilience patterns of international demand/international tourist arrivals to Bali after the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005. By providing a resilience overview of

international tourism demand on security and safety aspects, this research could act as feedback for stakeholders forming policies for accelerating resilience after a security and safety crisis security and safety will directly influence the development of tourism itself.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Security and Safety in Tourism

Security and safety are pillars of tourism competitiveness and greatly influence tourists' motives for traveling (Liu & Pratt, 2017; Oliveira & Costa, 2017; Seabra et al., 2020; Teoman, 2017). Since safety and security are essential in tourism, its success depends on destinations' capacity to provide a safe and reliable environment. Although those values seem to affect tourists' satisfaction in traveling indirectly, both are the guarantee that entails immense responsibility. The feeling of being safe and peaceful is needed by tourists when they are situated in one place different from their home ecosystem.

Risk in every decision is inevitable. Hence, there should be anticipation to minimize the impact of the decisions taken, including traveling. Decision-making will be different when terrorist events that threaten safety exist. The probability of injury and death affects the destination's representation, and sensitivity to the terrorism risk is powerful in revamping travel decisions. Indeed, tourists may change their travel plans when they are aware of a possible threat (Seabra et al., 2020; Song et al., 2019; Walters et al., 2018) and choose other locations with a safety guarantee (Albu, 2016).

It is difficult for destinations to win potential tourist's trust after terrorism happened. Saha and Yap (2013) in their research found that political instability has an adverse effect on tourism at any

level of terrorist threat. Stigma and cruel labels will automatically be attached to the affected destination for some time after the event. Terrorism affects the representation, attractiveness, reputation, and travelers' perceptions of destinations (Karl & Schmude, 2017; Wolff & Larsen, 2017; Yousaf et al., 2018). According to Li et al. (2018), the representation of a destination as a product will affect the number of tourists visiting destinations, and this idea conforms to the basic principles of economics on supply and demand. The need for strategies in post-attack security and safety countermeasures denotes an emergency that must be addressed so that no long-run impact remains.

2.2. The Impact of Terrorism on International Tourists Arrivals

Up to now, the definition of terrorism is debatable (Seabra et al., 2020). Acts of terrorism have been considered closely related to the ideology of specific entities. For example, the attack on mosques in New Zealand in 2019 was not categorized as terrorism because the main actors were not affiliated with any movement or organization (extremists). At that time, global citizens condemned and believed the attack was terrorism, resulting in the perpetrator being charged with terrorism laws (bbc.com, 2019).

Terrorism could ignite from political instability (Isaac & Velden, 2018; Liu & Pratt, 2017; Van Neste et al., 2017), a sense of distrust of the leader, frustration, poverty, and hatred (Korstanje, 2018). The inability to manage the feeling of skepticism eventually channeled into committing acts of violence that can happen anytime and anywhere as long as the entity feels the target deserves misfortune. Such a situation agrees with Veréb et al. (2018) stated that terrorism is a constant risk that can occur anywhere and anytime.

Terrorism is not solely aimed at one victim at one incident, but can also be targeted at a more

extended group in order to grasp large-scale political and social attention (Albu, 2016; Korstanje, 2018; Liu & Pratt, 2017; Mohamed & Aseyoufi, 2018; Samitas et al., 2018; Vanneste et al., 2017). However, according to Winter (2017), one goal that terrorists always target is the media's role. They expect the media to be a medium broadcasting their operations so that the global community consumes the threats.

The social and cultural environment influences the perspective of seeing terrorism. Tourists from the Middle East and Asia define terrorism somehow broadly. They describe terrorism as an attack that violates human rights and creates fear individually and in groups. Meanwhile, tourists from western countries see terrorism as linked to international travel. They believe that terrorism will not occur in their home country or be directed personally against them unless it happens involuntarily (Teoman, 2017; Veréb et al., 2018).

The effects of terrorism on tourist psychology are troublesome. In some cases, terrorism can change consumer behavior, especially when a terrorist incident is ingrained (Baumert et al., 2019), which significantly reduces the desire to travel (Garg, 2015; Morakabati & Kapuściński, 2016; Walters et al., 2018). Apart from impacting the affected region, the impact of terrorism also affects the neighboring areas. Seabra et al. (2020) stated that tourists assume incidents that occur in certain countries will affect neighboring countries.

Because terrorist attacks affected public perceptions of security and the destination's image, many negative consequences harmed the tourism industry in the knockout locations (Isaac & Velden, 2018; Suharto, 2016; VOVK, 2015). Terrorism can decrease the number of international and domestic tourists (Corbet et al., 2019; Hamarneh et al., 2018; Liu & Pratt, 2017; Samitas et al., 2018; Song et al., 2019). Although the long-term impression of terrorism on the international tourists market (Baumert et al., 2019; Liu & Pratt, 2017) seems unpowerful, its effect is haphazardly

longer than the political issues (Dragičević et al., 2018; Lanouar & Goaid, 2019).

In addition to its impact on international tourists' psychology and behavior, terrorism also badly disrupts airlines, hotels, catering, and supply chain management (VOVK, 2015; Walters et al., 2018). From policymaker and investor perspectives, areas prone to terrorist attacks tend to be more sensitive in all courses (Morakabati & Kapuściński, 2016).

Generally, when terrorism is non-recurring (once only), it takes 6-12 months for the tourism sector to recover (Walters et al., 2018). However, in 2001, the Americas recorded the slowest recovery of international tourist arrivals. If world tourism recovered after 14 months, it took 42 months for the Americas to recover their foreign tourist arrivals after 9/11 (World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), 2020, pp. 30–31). In this case, the tourism industry is the most vulnerable segment for absolute destruction due to terrorist attacks (Walters et al., 2018).

2.3. Tourism Resilience

Resolutions that can increase resilience by tourism business actors include 1) the spirit of surviving over change and uncertainty, 2) efforts to continue reorganizing and reforming, 3) the ability to practice various knowledge, and 4) the opportunity to always improving (Sheppard & Williams, 2016). For urban communities, resilience is seen as the process of governance on a day-to-day basis. Resilience barriers can come from organizational and psychological aspects that hinder resilience-oriented goals (Shamsuddin, 2020).

Resilience is a multidimensional, sociotechnical phenomenon that addresses how people, as individuals or groups, manage uncertainty (Lee et al., 2013). Resilience competencies collectively help frame perceptions and capacities in formulating mutual resilience (Sheppard & Williams, 2016). Resilience can be facilitated and strengthened th-

rough international and regional collaboration. For that reason, countries should work together by exchanging experiences and giving assistance in developing proper evacuation plans (ESCAP, 2017).

The resilience of tourism organizations is an emergent area of scholarship (Orchiston et al., 2016). In terrorism studies, the resilience concept is popularly used to define the recovery status through efforts to resolve threats (Jore, 2020). Tourism's ability to recover and manage risks is called resilience (Delaplace et al., 2018), and it depends on adaptability and innovation (Fabry & Zeghni, 2019).

2.4. Previous Studies

Several studies have examined the impact of terrorism on tourist arrivals based on its effects: the number of terrorism incidents (Radić & Dragičević, 2018; Sumardewi, 2014; Teoman, 2017); the number of casualties (Buigut et al., 2017; Buigut & Amendah, 2016; Masinde et al., 2016; Radić & Dragičević, 2018; Santana-gallego et al., 2016; Vanneste et al., 2017); the number of injuries (Barbe et al., 2018; Ghaderi et al., 2017; Vanneste et al., 2017); property damage (Bildirici & Gokmenoglu, 2020; Corbet et al., 2019; Tichý, 2019).

Besides, several studies regarding the Bali bombings I and II related to their impact on the tourism sector have also been carried out: the threat of terrorism in changing tourist decisions and international tourist's number (Dahles & Susilowati, 2015; Fennell, 2017; Hajibaba et al., 2015, 2016; Morakabati & Beavis, 2017; Pambudi et al., 2009; Sugiyarto et al., 2003); travel patterns changes in Indonesia and some neighboring countries (Athanasopoulos & Hyndman, 2008; Dahles & Susilowati, 2015; Deng & Athanasopoulos, 2011); the role of local government in dealing with terrorism and its influence on the confidence of international tourists and the government of inbound

countries (Gurtner, 2016; Prideaux et al., 2003; Rosenthal, 2003); terrorism as one of the roots of tourism to fragile (Strickland-Munro et al., 2010); terrorism affects the direction of security technology development (Lin et al., 2007).

3. Methods

This study employs descriptive-statistical methods. Secondary data used is the number of international tourist arrivals to Indonesia passed through Bali's Ngurah Rai International Airport. The data sourced from the BPS-Statistics Indonesia (<https://www.bps.go.id>). This study uses all available data for the period 2000 to 2007 in which terrorism occurred. In order to look at the resilience pattern, data from four months before and after the Bali bombings I (October 2002) and Bali bombing II (October 2005) were used; 0 is used as the base-point month. Later, the comparison of arrivals of the same month in the previous year was carried out.

It is assumed that the pattern of international tourist arrivals varies each month. Therefore, the data comparisons of the same month using data from two years before the terrorism incident happened were carried out. Those data comparisons were used to determine changes in the number of international tourist arrivals, the required recovery time, and potential loss due to terrorism incidents (Bali bombings I and Bali bombings II). The outbreak point and the investigation interval are presented in Table 1 below.

Table 1 | Outbreak Point and Investigation Period

Interval (month)	Annotation
-1 up to -12	A year before the attacks
0	The attacks
1 up to P_n	Normalization period
P_n up to P_{n+12}	A year after normalization

Source: Own elaboration

Pattern computations were carried out based on the following formulations:

First. The growth of Month-on-Month (M-o-M) (P_n) international tourist arrivals was obtained by comparing the number of monthly arrivals with the same monthly arrivals but in the previous year.

$$P_n = \left(\frac{x_n}{x_{n-s}} - 1 \right) \times 100\% \dots \dots \dots (1)$$

P_n is the growth at the n -month; x_n is the number of visits at the n -month; x_{n-s} is the number of visits in the same month but previous year. If the value of $P_n > 0\%$, it is assumed that international tourist numbers have returned to normal (recovered).

Second. Calculation of potential loss was done by comparing tourist arrival numbers (before and after the incidents) with the number of visits in the same month but in the previous year.

$$PL_n = x_n - x_{n-s} \dots \dots \dots (2)$$

PL_n is the potential loss in the n -month; x_n is the number of visits in the n -month; x_{n-s} is the number of visits in the same month but previous year.

Third. Compare the effect of the Bali bombings I & II based on P_n and PL_n results. This comparison was made to determine the significant effect of terrorism events, especially terrors committed in tourism areas.

Although only focusing on the number of visits and their growth, this approach will be able to describe the potential impact of terrorism on international tourist arrivals and identify the time required for the observed destinations to recover after the bombing. The World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) (2020) has also taken the same approach to identify the recovery time of a destination from crises such as SARS, the economic crisis, and 9/11.

4. Results

4.1. Bali bombings I & II in the Global Terrorism Database

Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is a site that provides information related to terrorism. On their web, GTD provides data on terrorism incidents from 1970 to 2018, covering more than 190,000 cases worldwide. Each event and information is supplemented by the date, location, the weapon used, the target, the number of victims, and the identification of the engaged group (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2020).

Data for the Bali bombings I & II are available in the appendix 1. On October 12, 2002, a bomb in a car parked outside the Sari Club Bar in Kuta, Bali, exploded and damaged the venue up to a radius of 500 meters away. At the same time, another bomb exploded at Paddy's Bar opposite the Sari Club. A total of 202 people were killed, and 300 others were seriously injured due to the two attacks collectively. More than 80% of the victims were foreigners who were traveling in Bali. The main perpetrator of the attack was the Jemaah Islamiyah Group, but Al-Qaeda claimed it was part of their allies in Southeast Asia.

In the GTD by The Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2020), the Bali bombings I was categorized as a terrorist attack using a bomb/explosion successfully targeting a business hub that many international tourists visited. The effect of the attack determines the success of a terrorist attack. A successful bombing is characterized by a bomb exploding and destroying property and/or killing the victim. Meanwhile, bombings that fail are bombs that are found, defused, detonated earlier, or kill terrorists. The estimated property losses resulting from the Bali bombings I were more sumptuous than *US1millionbutlessthanUS* 1 billion. The damage falls into the major category and scores two

out of four (one is the highest and four is the lowest).

The Bali bombings I detonated with the help of a car as a storage medium. Detailed information on the explosion stated that "a suicide bomber detonated his backpack in a nightclub and another one detonated a car while people were escaping from the club". This incident was categorized as a suicide bomb attack affiliated with a particular organization with a terrorist series event. Based on its criteria, this incident is classified in criteria 1, 2, and 3 by the GDT: (1) this attack was motivated/represented particular political, economic, religious, and social group objectives that the perpetrator believes; (2) aimed to gain world attention/audience by spreading psychic intimidation; (3) it is believed that their acts were outside the parameters of international humanitarian law. The total number of terrorists was seven, and five of them were successfully arrested and sentenced.

Like the Bali bombings I, on October 1, 2005, two simultaneous incidents were initiated by the Azhari Husin and Muhammad Noordin gangs. The Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2020) mentioned that bombing incident as the Bali bombings II. The attacker blew himself up on the second floor of the Raja Restaurant in Kuta, and another attack occurred in Jimbaran City on the same day. The explosion that occurred in Jimbaran killed 13 people and injured 50 people. Meanwhile, the incident in Kuta killed 12 people and injured 50 people. Although the local government suspected that the Jemaah Islamiyah leader was behind both attacks, the clarifications had never appeared.

The Bali bombings II was also considered a successful terrorist attack using a bomb/explosion. Like the Bali bombings I, this attack targeted the center of business activity attended by many international tourists. This attack resulted in minor property damage of less than US\$ 1 million. This incident falls into criteria 1, 2, and 3, which means that (1) this attack was motivated or represented

the political, economic, religious, and social objectives of the perpetrator, (2) aimed to attract world attention/audience by spreading psychological intimidation, and (3) it is believed that their activities fell outside the parameters of international humanitarian law. According to GTD, that terror purpose was damaging political, economic, religious, or social sectors. This attack was also categorized as an intimidation act and met the criteria for the attacker's intentionality carried out by the three principal perpetrators.

4.2. The Resilience Pattern of the International Tourism Market Demand after the Bali bombings I & II

By comparing the tourists' growth (before, during, and after the incidents), the results are as presented in Table 2.

From Table 2, it can be understood that the Bali bombings I & II both happened in October but different years. International tourist arrivals to Bali in October have been affected adversely, characterized by a drastic decline. There was a reduction of 16.0% in October 2002, and a decrease in October 2005 was 37.2%. Variations influenced different drops in the disaster period; the Bali bombings I happened in the middle of the month (October 12, 2002), while the Bali bombings II happened at the beginning of the month (October 1, 2005).

From this illustration, it was known that the Bali bombings I had the potential to lose a higher number of international tourist arrivals than the Bali bombings II. Based on the previous description, differences in tourists' drops occurred because the Bali bombings I caused major damage, while the Bali bombings II's damage was classified as minor-level.

Table 2 | Resilience Patterns of Potential Losses based on International Tourists Arrivals

Period	Growth		Monthly Average	
	Pattern-1	Pattern -2	Pattern-1	Pattern -2
Oct	-12	-25.7%	33.1%	
Nov	-11	-33.9%	33.1%	
Dec	-10	-12.6%	34.5%	
Jan	-9	-20.1%	-2.8%	
Feb	-8	-2.8%	18.3%	
Mar	-7	-2.1%	16.4%	
Apr	-6	-10.3%	3.9%	114,053 128,044
May	-5	7.4%	-1.3%	
Jun	-4	1.4%	2.6%	
Jul	-3	6.4%	6.1%	
Aug	-2	10.4%	0.6%	
Sep	-1	12.8%	13.2%	
Oct	0	-16.0%	-37.2%	
Nov	1	-56.7%	-43.6%	
Dec	2	-29.1%	-39.9%	
Jan	3	-30.1%	-21.7%	
Feb	4	-29.9%	-27.5%	
Mar	5	-36.0%	-28.2%	74,480 94,400
Apr	6	-48.8%	-10.7%	
May	7	-59.9%	-12.7%	
Jun	8	-37.8%	-19.6%	
Jul	9	-24.0%	-22.9%	
Aug	10	-28.0%	-24.8%	
Sep	11	-29.2%	-27.0%	
Oct	12	20.1%	38.8%	
Nov	13	166.2%	81.4%	
Dec	14	48.6%	61.8%	
Jan	15	72.8%	37.3%	
Feb	16	26.3%	62.1%	
Mar	17	38.8%	41.8%	114,978 131,885
Apr	18	108.8%	20.5%	
May	19	147.4%	26.6%	
Jun	20	63.7%	32.5%	
Jul	21	33.8%	34.9%	
Aug	22	35.6%	41.0%	
Sep	23	34.3%	28.9%	
Loss Assumption				74,480 94,400

Source: Own elaboration

Figure 1 shows that the Bali bombings I & II had the same resilience time. Both show that the normalization of international tourists' arrivals to Bali occurred in the 12th month after the terrorist attacks hit, implying that Bali took at least 11 months to recover and gain confidence on the international stage.

One year before the Bali bombings I, the average monthly arrival of international tourists to Bali was 114,053. By the time the Bali bombings I struck (with a normalization period of 11 months), the average number of international tourists' arrivals per month to Bali was recorded at 74,480 (the

potential loss of international tourist arrivals per month was 39,573 or decreased by 34.70%). One year after the normalization passed, the average number of international tourists' arrivals to Bali was 114,978 (increased by 53.13% compared to the normalization period and increased by 0.80% compared to one year before the attack.)

One year before the Bali bombings II, the average monthly arrivals of international tourists to Bali was 128,044. By the time the Bali bombings II hit (with a normalization period of 11 months), the average number of international tourists' arrivals per month was 94,400 (the potential loss of




Figure 1 | The Resilience Pattern of International Tourist Arrivals after the Bali bombings I & II

international tourist arrivals per month was 33,644 or decreased by 26.28%.) Later, the average international tourist arrivals to Bali one year after normalization was recorded at 131,885, raised by 39.17% compared to the normalization period and advanced by 2.91% compared to one year before the attack.

Following the data published by GTD in the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2020), Bali bombings I and II targeted tourist activity hubs as main areas. The difference between the two disasters lies in property/physical losses. The Bali bombings I was categorized as major with a total loss of more than US\$ 1 million, while the Bali bombings II was categorized as minor with a total loss of less than US\$ 1 million. In terms of victims, the Bali bombings I resulted in 202 deaths with 300 others injured; meanwhile, 25 death tolls and 100 others injured occurred due to the Bali bombings II. Thus, it can be recognized that the same type of attack requires identical time resilience. The difference between the two events also happens in the matter of loss. Furthermore, the more property damage and casualties (death and injuries), the greater the loss of international tourist arrivals.

Baumert et al. (2019) stated that terrorism would have a psychological effect and change tou-

rists' behavior, especially if it becomes an experience. It could be deadlier if the attacks repeatedly occur because the recovery period takes longer. Since there is a similar pattern of the first and second disasters, the two incidents have the same resilience pattern based on the recovery timespan. The present study's findings are also supported by (Walters et al., 2018) demonstrating that the tourism sector took 6-12 months to recover from unrepeatable terrorist attacks.

4.3 The Shifts in Travel Trends

The Bali bombings I & II were provoked by terrorist motives to kill tourists and destroy the tourism industry. International attention on victims was further strengthened by media coverage that massively disseminates the incidents (Vanneste et al., 2017). In many situations, the media negatively broadcasting the severity of terrorist incidents could alter the representation of the destination and cause decisions dilemmas that lead tourist arrivals to decrease (Dahles & Susilowati, 2015; Fennell, 2017; Garg, 2015; Hajibaba et al., 2015; Korstanje, 2017; Liu & Pratt, 2017; Morakabati & Beavis, 2017; Morakabati & Kapuściński, 2016; Pambudi et al., 2009; Sugiyarto et al., 2003;

Walters et al., 2018). Exposure to media coverage affects public perceptions. The majority of international tourists stated that they would avoid a destination if cultural differences were intolerable and no protection guarantee from the host country (Veréb et al., 2018).

The terror causing tourist arrivals to decline will affect tourist destinations' representation (Li et al., 2018). For illustration, the Bali bombings I & II changed international and domestic tourists' travel patterns, and leading tourists prefer destinations other than Bali, such as Jakarta and Jogjakarta (Dahles & Susilowati, 2015). Australia as a neighbor was also affected; Australians preferred to travel domestically and visit family/relatives due to Bali bombings I & II (Athanasopoulos & Hyndman, 2008; Deng & Athanasopoulos, 2011).

The decrease in tourist numbers and travel pattern changes are shreds of evidence proving that tourism is vulnerable to numerous circumstances, including terrorism (Strickland-Munro et al., 2010). Government intervention in dealing with terrorism greatly determines the confidence of international guests. Comparably, tourist confidence is influenced by government steps in post-disaster response in various sectors, primarily in the tourism sector (Gurtner, 2016; Prideaux et al., 2003; Rosenthal, 2003). Silver lining speaking, it is undoubtedly true that terrorism in the past, including 9/11, Bali bombings I, and Bali bombings II, influenced the development of security technology (Lin et al., 2007) like the advancement of metal detectors in several vibrant areas (airports, business complex, and shopping centers).

5. Conclusion

This research has identified the resilience pattern of international tourists' arrivals due to terrorist attacks. The resilience of the two bombing incidents in Bali took 11 months each. The first

Bali bombings had a more significant impact than the second one in terms of arrivals decline. Moreover, the first incident has a more significant score regarding casualties and property damage from several incident indicators.

Tourism is a typical business that is exceptionally vulnerable to issues related to security. Therefore, destination managers must be able to reduce any risk over this problem. The better the management of a destination in dealing with security issues, the better the destination standpoint could be presented. A decent destination image will persuade tourists' trust positively and encourage them to visit. The key to building the right tourism destination is by ensuring peace, safety, and security. Therefore, every tourist has the right to get a guarantee over any uncertainty. Safety assurance is a responsibility that must continue to be actualized in tourist destinations. Therefore, a particular system is needed to regulate and implement safety in tourism.

Terrorism has the frightening potential to affect tourist arrivals. From the government's perspective, the enforcement of stringent regulations (rather than before the incident happened) can cause tourist arrivals to drop pointedly. From a tourist viewpoint, terrorism can change consumer behavior in the short-term, but it does not make them overlook their plans to continue traveling to their desired destinations. The mass media has an essential role in building the perception of potential tourists. Media coverage incessantly disseminating terrorism information will frighten and harm destination representation if the information was not appropriately sounded.

The return of tourists has a positive-stabilizing effect and increases the confidence of the affected countries. Although some countries might experience adverse effects due to terrorism, some neighboring countries with low-risk splashed by the affected country have received an increase in international tourist arrivals. Resilience from a crisis is an essential element that must be maintained by

a country. The more democratic a country is facing a crisis, the lower the terrorism impact on the tourism sector will be.

This study has limitations since its scope only focuses on international tourist arrivals due to the Bali bombings I and Bali bombings II. Therefore, the authors encourage other researchers to determine the resilience patterns of each terrorist incident in some other parts of Indonesia and worldwide with broader research aspirations. Hopefully, those patterns can later become constructive inputs for all stakeholders to mitigate and handle issues related to security, especially terrorism.

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Appendix

Appendix 1 | TBali bombings I & II according to the Global Terrorism Database

Data	Bali bombings I	Bali bombings II
GTD Information		
Code	200210120004; 200210120005	200510010001, 200510010002
Time	October 12, 2002	October 1, 2005
Attack information		
Attack type	Bomb/Explosion	Bomb/Explosion
Was the attack successful?	Yes	Yes
Target information		
Target venue	Paddy's Bar & Sari Club	Restaurant in Jimbaran & Raja Restaurant
Target by category	International Tourists	International Tourists
Target by country	Multinational	Multinational
Additional information (attack and target)		
Hostage	No	No
Ransom	No	No
Property damage	Yes	Yes
Property damage level	Major	Minor
Property damage worth	Unspecified	Unspecified
Weapons used		
Type	Car bombs	Car bombs
Additional information on attack types		
Suicide attack?	Yes	Yes
Part of multiple attacks?	Yes	Yes
Triggered/represented by particular objectives (political, economic, religious, or social group)	Yes	Yes
Caught the global attention?	Yes	Yes
Act other than war	Yes	Yes
Was uncertain as terrorism	No	No
The perpetrator group information		
Group name	Al-Qaeda	Jemaah Islamiyah
Attack claims	Yes	No
Perpetrator statistics		
Number of people involved	7	3
Number of perpetrators caught	5	0
Victim information		
Number of victims	101 deaths/150 injuries	13 deaths/50 injuries
Number of deaths	101	13
Number of dead perpetrators	1	3
Number of injuries	150	50
Number of injured perpetrators	0	0