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Editorial

Created in 2017, ÍMPAR is a biannual publication whose objective is to disseminate the knowledge production in the field of Artistic Research. With this issue, the journal concludes its 3rd year of activity with a golden key. The editorial board of ÍMPAR invited three outstanding researchers from the field of Artistic Research to submit articles that would address at least one of the fracturing issues within this area of knowledge. It was with great satisfaction that we received immediate confirmation from all the invited researchers accepting our challenge: Professor Darla Crispin, Norwegian Academy of Music, Oslo, Norway; Professor Stefan Östersjö, Piteå School of Music, Luleå University of Technolog, Sweden; and Professor Rui Penha, School of Music and Performing Arts, Polytechnic Institute of Porto, Portugal.

The choice of subjects addressed by each of these researchers resulted naturally from their background, their research interests, their expertise. In a long article that both the reviewers of the journal and the Editorial Board thought it would be better not to cut - since the article is built like an arch that can only be held if all its parts are kept -, Rui Penha discusses the ontological assumptions that can ground the production of knowledge in AR by identifying a mode of reality inaccessible to science - the subjective ontological, the experience as it is lived by the artist through her medium's particular scope: *the artworks should create opportunities for us to experience what it is like to be a person, living in this world and at this point in time*. This article makes a clear distinction between the epistemological fields of art and science and defines a specific territory for art and for Artistic Research, but it is a territory that has to be created in each project, since the process of artistic creation is a process of clarification in itself, not merely a process of communicating a previously clarified idea. A point of honor in this article is the determination that in a process of evaluation in AR one can do without everything but the experience of the work of art in its entirety.

Darla Crispin's article addresses questions related to defining a territory for AR using Deleuze & Guattari's metaphorical concepts of territorialization and reterritorialization. After looking at each of the five territories identified for AR, discussing and analyzing them individually for better and for worse - weighing their strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats as if applying a SWOT analysis - many are the issues and problems that have emerged everywhere, demanding urgent responses and causing deep discomfort, as for example: *it is actually invariably the case that artistic research work can enhance the quality, merit and relevance of art-making itself?* Darla Crispin concludes by proposing a model where the five territories are connected rhizomatically consolidating a Rhizomatic Pentagon. This model represents that *the nature of their 'saturated connectedness' is as crucial to an understanding of artistic research as is a proper comprehension of the separate identities of the territories themselves*.

Stefan Östersjö took the complex task of discussing the evaluation of AR results, which is naturally related to the need to evaluate/appreciate the quality of the artistic intervention in its specificity and in its context. Recurring to four different examples it is suggested how artistic research projects should be relevant to the art world, as well as to the Academia, and it is argued that *artistic knowledge takes shape both in the materiality of an artwork and as performative knowledge embodied by the artist*. Further, Östersjö discusses processes in

which performative and material artistic knowledge are articulated and concludes by emphasizing the necessity of involving the art world in the process of assessing the artistic quality of artistic research projects.

Jorge Salgado Correia

On the reality clarified by art

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Abstract: In this article, I propose that there is a reality that can be clarified by art. This mode of reality — the ontologically subjective — is *by definition* inaccessible to science. Artistic creation hence stands as the academic endeavour which is better equipped to provide a suitable ground for its clarification, here understood as providing the means for a shared comprehension of such reality. However, not all artistic creation aims to do that and, if misdirected — as when it follows research methods and procedures borrowed from science —, it can't help but fail to do so. We thus face the challenge of defining a focus that is specific to artistic creation and that can help art to accomplish its full potential within the academy.
Keywords: artistic research; artistic creation; philosophy of art

I am a newcomer to the problem of artistic research. In fact, I completed a PhD in Music (more specifically in Composition) in 2014 without ever seriously considering the problem. Right after completing it, and after several years of teaching at art schools, I joined a faculty of engineering to teach at a Master and a PhD in Digital Media.[2] Though initially overwhelmed by the confidence that my engineering colleagues had in the soundness of their methods, I quickly realised that such methods were inadequate for the problems that some of my students and I were looking to address. Hopeless to help the students that came from artistic backgrounds, who were increasingly expressing how lost they felt regarding the choice of methods and validation procedures they were presented with, I first dwelled into the literature on artistic research.

I will not attempt to do a full review of such literature here,[3] but it was very frustrating to realise that none of the proposals that I found could help solve my problems, which included the difficulty of conveying the relevance and particularities of artistic research to my science and engineering colleagues. As it is common (even if often unsaid) in research, my problem only became fully defined when I thought about why these existing answers failed to appease my urge. A significant part of the literature that I found was focused on bringing forward the *research* element of artistic creation by proposing methodologies and validation procedures, whilst I quickly realised that I even had a problem with the expression *artistic research*. It stroke me as an oxymoron, but at first I wondered if that impression was due to my experience of the sharp dissimilarities between, on one hand, my by then affiliation with a rather orthodox engineering institution and, on the other, my many years of training in somewhat conservative music schools.

Traditionally, in art schools, we could witness a noticeable gap between the activities related to the theory of art and the activities related to the craft of art, i.e. the ones that look at art from a downstream perspective versus the ones that look at art from an upstream perspective. The former could be pursued as research (earning one a PhD and, hopefully, a subsequent academic career), the latter had to be evaluated solely by the aesthetic reception of the finished products, ideally by people who could claim to represent a relevant branch of the *Artworld* (Danto, 1964).

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[2] I have since left said Faculty of Engineering and I am, since November 2018, back in a School of Music and Performing Arts, teaching mainly musical composition.
[3] Though I can recommend some: for a state of art overview (Almeida, 2015a), for an interesting statement of the problem (Coessens et al., 2009), and for a particularly good analysis of the problem (Almeida, 2105b).

Nowadays, we witness a growing demand for PhD programs that allow one to pursue artistic creation *as* research. This is first and foremost a battle for the legitimacy of artistic creation — and, with it, a battle for the careers of artists within academia —, and associating it with the *pathos* of research might seem like a good solution in the short run. Artistic creation does often imply research, as scientific research does often imply creation. But focusing on the research aspect of artistic creation can be as misleading, in regard to its goals, as it would be to focus on the creative aspect of scientific research by calling it *scientific creation*. Artistic creation is a highly specialised activity, one that involves a lot of research-like activities and a thorough acquaintance with a relevant state-of-the-art. But, strictly speaking, it is not research[4] — in the sense that it does not strive to abstract theory from systematically observable phenomena —, and also not development — in the sense that it does not seek to come up with generalisable solutions for a given technical problems. Quite the opposite, in fact: when original, artistic creation struggles for the concretisation of singularities.

Academic research, with all of its many flaws,[5] is a scrupulous collective effort that, as such, becomes ineluctably conservative. On the other hand, artistic creation is an endeavour that thrives on the eccentricities of individuals who learn how to trust their own singularities over the consensus-forming force of the group. How do we combine the two without overthrowing either? How do we make a convincing case for the importance of hosting artistic creation within academia, one that aims to have an outreaching contribution, as opposed to further segregating the academic silos? And how do we create artistic graduate programs that don't stifle the individualisation of students?

It is easy to claim that any artistic creation makes a contribution — the artwork — and that each artwork is somewhat original. Thus, it is particularly easy for artistic creation to claim to fulfil two out of three parts of the sacrosanct triad "original contribution to knowledge". But what kind of knowledge can artistic creation provide? And, most importantly, is that particular type of knowledge exclusive to — or at least better attained by — artistic creation? If we do not provide a convincing answer to these questions, we will have a hard time persuading the academy at large that artistic creation deserves more than a role in the training of future professionals, or that it can seriously claim to be more than a creative embellishment of other, more serious, endeavours.

We can obviously abstract propositional knowledge — the know-that — from artworks and artistic practices. In fact, we have been successfully doing so for centuries in the philosophy of art, anthropology of art, sciences of the arts and related areas where art serves as a topic or object of study. As important as the theory of art is — e.g., for the training of artists and for our understanding of art as a human practice —, it does not set the ground for artistic creation, since it looks at art exclusively after the fact. We cannot deduce artworks from art theory, even if we often do it as a training strategy, naming the results *exercises* as opposed to *artworks*. This does not mean that theory is not important to artistic creation, it simply means that there is more to this creation than the simple application of theory. If the absence

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[4] A similar point has been made by John Croft (2015), in an article that raises some relevant issues regarding the problem of formulating artistic creation as research. Croft's article triggered an interesting thread of discussion in the following issues of the same journal.

[5] Flaws that are quite possibly increasing in an age that favours external signs of productivity over scrupulous commitment.

of propositional knowledge can hinder artistic creation, its mere presence does not provide any guarantee as to the artistic relevance of the outcomes.

We also cannot credit artists for the theoretical knowledge lifted from their artworks: that work should be (as it usually is) credited to the person doing the research on the artworks. Demanding from the artist an analysis of her[6] artworks as a requisite to confer to her activity the status of an academic endeavour can seriously undermine the quality and reach of such artworks, since it induces a shift of focus from the process of artistic creation into the methods of theoretical abstraction. Proper theoretical analysis requires a detachment from the artwork that its creator can never have, hence this shift of focus encourages not a reasonable induction of universals from the observation of particular artworks, but an undesirable design of artworks so that they can stand as good examples of the universals that the artist needs to claim to have induced from them. We are very likely to end up with a theory that only explains a small number of artworks that, in turn, owe their entire existence to their standing as examples of said theory: a paradigmatic example of circular reasoning.

There is also a great deal of procedural knowledge — the know-how — involved in artistic creation and art schools have become, even if only in relatively recent times, the place to develop that skill. It is rather difficult, however, to convey that know-how to another person. Since it is procedural and not propositional knowledge, we have no option other than helping that person acquire it herself by slowly guiding her on a one-to-one basis. For this reason, the fact that an artwork can display a significant amount of skill does not imply that it can make that know-how accessible to anyone else simply by being displayed.[7] In other words, the artwork can be an original contribution and it can clearly display a high degree of procedural knowledge — knowledge that has the potential of being slowly passed on to others via individual lessons with the creator of the artwork —, but the artwork is not a contribution to procedural knowledge *per se*. The newly acquired procedural knowledge remains with the artist, and whilst it is certainly good for her to master a given skill, it is only good *because* she can put that skill to use. It is only when she actually uses it that the results can be evaluated, and any skill can be used for both good and bad purposes alike.

The problem does not change whether we focus the development of skill on achieving a high standard of craft or on seeking novel skills. They are obviously not mutually exclusive, but different focuses nevertheless. We should expect academic artists to develop their skills to a very high standard, including for pedagogical reasons, since only a highly skilled artist can help students to achieve a similar standard of embodied knowledge. Nevertheless, the simple pursue of a high standard of skill without any novelty does not form an original contribution. And while novel skills can open new paths for artistic creation, they are important only insofar as they actually open those new paths, with their relevance and scope being the ones of the new artworks that they enable. A skill is interesting not merely because it is new — and certainly not solely because it is difficult to achieve, even if we can admire

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[6] I take gender-neutral language to be an important issue. I am, however, unaware of any solution that does not compromise the fluidity of reading, either because of the use of extraneous characters (e.g., s/he) or due to strange grammatical formulations (e.g., singular they). I therefore decided to use feminine pronouns whenever the gender is not determined by other elements of the discourse. Whilst obviously not gender-neutral, it contradicts the century-old tradition of using masculine pronouns to refer to abstract persons.

[7] E.g., hours of appreciation of the results of Glenn Gould's virtuosity does not make one any closer to being capable of playing the piano like him. Believe me, I've tried…

that as an athletic feat — but because it comes pregnant with novel and relevant artistic practices. Hence when we evaluate the artwork, we are evaluating the experience that the artist's skill affords, along with her criteria in developing and using it for the sake of that experience, not the skill *in itself.*

An art school surely needs people well-versed in theory and artists that are proficient in the specific techniques of each medium. But one can admittedly be both an eloquent thinker and a mediocre artist, and vice-versa. We are certainly also all familiar with cases of stellar technical accomplishments that are artistically sterile, as we are with ground-breaking artworks that seem — even if only after the fact — disarmingly simple in terms of skill. This suggests that putting the emphasis on either the know-that or the know-how as outcomes of artistic creation — or even in both, as it is increasingly the case in recent artistic research programs — does not offer us any assurance as to the quality and relevance of the artistic outcomes.[8] In fact, I believe that this emphasis can even inhibit, or at the very least deflect, the struggle for excellence in artistic creation. We nevertheless need to identify the possibility for meaningful and original contributions that go beyond the mere caprices of the artist and the contingencies of context, ones that we can evaluate as the outcome of art as an academic endeavour. The alternative that I propose — that artistic creation is the key to sharing the *know-what-it-is-like*, or experiential knowledge — is the main topic of this article.

I will begin by outlining my view over what art is, or at least over what it can be. As difficult as it is to deal with that subject, I believe that no take on artistic research would be complete without such positional statement. Every proposal for artistic research is built on implicit stances regarding both *art* and *research*, and we can only benefit by making them explicit. Hence, in section 2, I will claim that a complete view of art cannot stand on an analysis of neither the artwork as an object, nor of art as a social phenomenon, nor even on a combination of the two. As it happens with many other things that we also have trouble defining, art has first and foremost a subjective ontology that consists on the relationship established between an individual and an artwork. I will try to show that the subjective nature of this relationship does not render art incapable of escaping solipsism or subjectivism.

In sections 3 and 4, I will strive to clarify what is experiential knowledge and how artworks are designed to convey it. In section 3, I will delve on the question of the vividness of an experience as something that transcends the facts about the same experience. I will try to show why the propositional knowledge thrives on the stripping away of the vividness of experience and, conversely, why experiential knowledge can prosper from the divergence from facts. In section 4, I will examine how artists shape their materials into conveying a vivid experience, using the metaphor as an example. Moreover, I will strive to show how the process of materialisation is actually a process of clarification in itself, as opposed to a process of conveying ideas that exist *a priori*.

In sections 5 and 6, I will situate artistic creation in the academic context at large. In section 5, I will try to show that art deals with realities that lay beyond the scope of science, and that

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[8] Or, even worse, placing the emphasis on the institutional validation of the artistic outcomes. I shall not discuss here what I believe to be the inherent problems of the institutional theory of art (Dickie, 1969), even if I hope that they will become obvious to the reader after reading this article. However, the simple reliance on the validation by institutions that are external to academia — and thus authorities that cannot be placed under direct peer scrutiny — constitutes *in itself* a problem for academic evaluation.

science is as incapable of dealing with these realities as art would be of describing the ones that fall within the scope of science. Finally, in section 6, I will take a more practical approach, using an admittedly strict take on scientific research to provide both a contrast in purpose and a benchmark of earnestness for artistic creation within academia. The conclusion will point out to some future work, including a small first take on the ethics of academic artistic creation.

The artistic object and the artistic phenomenon as misconceptions

One popular misconception is to think about artworks as objects, i.e. to think that we should be able to find in the materialisation of a given object the characteristics that make it into an artwork. Most philosophy of art has long abandoned such idea, replacing it with variations of the idea of art as a social phenomenon that is built around these objects we call artworks. Both perspectives have an element of truth to them: our contact with an artwork is usually established through objects[9] and art is obviously part of human culture and, as such, a social phenomenon. Notwithstanding, either one of these perspectives, if taken exclusively, can be extraordinarily misleading. Not only because they can exclude one another, but mainly because they both exclude the personal relationship that each one of us establishes with particular artworks. Art is also — in fact I am convinced that it is mostly — the name we give to the personal relationships that each individual subject can establish with objects we call artworks. These objects have the particular ability to sustain such relationships, due to their material characteristics and the social context of each encounter, but they are not art unless someone actually establishes such relationship. For the sake of comparison, let us look at another word that we use to name a similar kind of relationship: a *friendship*.[10]

If I say that "Hannah is *a* friend", you do not understand what I mean by looking at Hannah as a particular object that you should agree to also call a friend. Instead, you take that as a testimony that I have established a particular kind of relationship with her, one that is somewhat similar to relationships that you have established with other persons. If you and I have something in common, you might feel inclined to try to befriend Hannah, but it would be silly to observe her objective characteristics striving to find what makes her *a* friend. You could, at some point, befriend her and also begin to call her *a* friend — as opposed to *Rui's friend Hannah* —, but that would not imply that we would share the exact same relationship with her, as only half of that interrelation would be the same. Despite that, we would be referring to the same person, and we could even argue about what Hannah felt, thought or intended in a given situation. We would do so by referring to observed actions and contexts as support, whilst comparing our interpretations of them: in short, our knowledge of Hannah as *a* friend would be complementary.

We could say that Hannah has the *affordance* of becoming a friend, but that would be applicable to every single person on earth. And despite what present day social networks seem to imply, we certainly do not maintain real friendships with every human being we have ever encountered: even if we would like to — and we certainly would not —, that would be

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[9] Which can include the material manifestation of sounds, movements, etc.

[10] Friendship is a concept whose importance to philosophy — brought to prominence by the presence of the element *philos* (friend) in the word *philosophy* — stands in contrast with the comparative lack of prevalence in the canonic literature. For a very interesting short review, I highly recommend an article entitled *Friendship*, by Giorgio Agamben (2004). What I will attempt to do here, notwithstanding, is an analysis based on the common use of the word.

utterly impossible, not to mention exhausting! Knowing Hannah as a friend provides me with a knowledge of her that is entirely different from what I could get from, e.g., a careful inspection of her whole-body MRI[11] or a thorough study of her context and behaviours. In fact, I think that most people — even hardcore materialists, committed (post-)structuralists or devout behaviourists — would have no trouble recognising that sustaining a long and fruitful friendship with Hannah is, in a sense, the only way of *truly knowing her*. This is, however, a knowledge that I can claim to have, but that I cannot pass on to others using solely propositional statements.

A friendship is a relation that can only be established by nourishing a first-person perspective over a second-person. I cannot befriend a third-person: even if I can mention a friend in the third-person, I am always referring to a bond that was established by interacting with a second-person. Some people are *friendlier* than others — which means that their affordance as friends is more outwardly evident —, but that usually means that it is easier to establish a friendly relationship with them, implying nothing about the profoundness and significance of such relationship. It is commonly easier to establish a friendship with a person that we can more effortlessly understand, i.e. a person that we have less trouble forming a *theory of mind of*. That might be because we share the same culture, the same set of beliefs and similar goals in life; or simply because we are currently enduring the same hardship. However, the more profoundly reshaping friendships are perhaps the ones that we establish with persons who are somewhat different from us: they can be life-changing precisely because they imply that, in order to have them, we had to conjure a theory of mind that enabled us to attain a new perspective over the world.

There are many ways in which prejudices can interfere in the establishment of *true* friendships. Sometimes we identify so strongly with a given set of beliefs that the mere fact that we recognise the same creed in someone else makes us immediately connect with, and perhaps even befriend, that person. Or the other way around: we can simply be unable to befriend someone whose creed or culture stands in direct opposition to our own system of belief. In other situations, we can be so absorbed by the impression we want to cause on others, or by the norms that govern the behaviour to be expected in a given setting, that we simply silence any action that could convey what we are truly thinking or experiencing. We thus act inauthentically and consequently prevent the establishment of meaningful relationships, which is something that could happen even whilst being *friendly*. Establishing a friendship with someone we deeply admire but only know superficially (e.g., a celebrity) can be very difficult because of all of the expectations we bring to the table. Conversely, being someone who is expected to always behave according to strict external expectations (as is the case in some professions) can seriously undermine our capacity to establish sincere friendships. *True* friendships are solely the ones that are based on an authentic and free encounter between two individual persons that face each other as such. This is what Hannah Arendt, when she responds to Gershom Scholem's accusation of displaying no trace of "love for the Jewish people", eloquently conveys with these words:

> How right you are that I have no such love, and for two reasons: first, I have never in my life "loved" some nation or collective — not the German, French, or American nation, or the working class, or whatever else there might be in this price range of loyalties. The fact

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[11] Magnetic Resonance Imaging.

is that I love only my friends and am quite incapable of any other sort of love. Second, this kind of love for the Jews would seem suspect to me, since I am Jewish myself. I don't love myself or anything I know that belongs to the substance of my being. (Arendt & Sholem, 2017, p. 202)

Imagine that I try as hard as I can to provide a description of what friendship *is*. No matter how detailed I got, that description would remain powerless to convey the *what it is like* of having a friend and it would always seem incomplete to anyone who read it.[12] We cannot strip away what is subjective and singular about each particular friendship to abstract a consensus without entirely missing the target, since a friendship *consists* primarily on the ineffable subjective experience of *having a friend*. There is an emotional aspect to friendship that can be stated as a necessity, but never described in its specificity. Nevertheless, the fact that we cannot satisfactorily describe friendship does not mean that we do not know what it is. Our personal friendships, each with its own idiosyncrasies, establish the scope and profundity of our own first-person understanding of *what it is like* to have a friend. And even if we cannot reach a consensus on how to describe friendship, we can recognise one when we experience it and even when we witness it unfolding in others. It is important to note, however, that a friendship is not a static entity, but a flux that is constantly *becoming* (which of course also includes *unbecoming*) by manifesting itself as interactions in the social realm. Crystallising what a friendship happens to be at any given point in time will hinder its natural motion and render it inauthentic. Yet at each moment it either has a subjective existence — i.e. I *feel* that Hannah and I are friends and consequently also believe that to be true —, or it doesn't exist at all, even if I manifest behaviours that seem to attest otherwise.

A very interesting attribute of friendship is the fact that, despite consisting mostly on a subjective, first-person perspective, it is never solipsistic. As an example, I can easily feel self-centredly detached whilst interacting with a group of acquaintances, but I rarely do when I am silently drinking a cup of tea with a good friend. In fact, understanding another as a friend stands at the very foundation of the interrelation of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. As Giorgio Agamben puts it:

> The friend is not another I, but an otherness immanent in selfness, a becoming other of the self. At the point at which I perceive my existence as pleasant, my perception is traversed by a concurrent perception that dislocates it and deports it towards the friend, towards the other self. Friendship is this de-subjectivization at the very heart of the most intimate perception of self. (Agamben, 2004, p. 6)

Whilst I can only know that *I* love Hannah, for the friendship to work I have to somehow *trust* that she also loves me. This trust does not hang solely on her statements or actions, but instead on the confidence that I place on the theory of mind that helps me to conjure plausible intentions with which to explain such acts. In other words, this trust does not hinge on the observable characteristics of such acts, but on the confidence I have in my interpretation of them. In a sense, we could say that my friend is not Hannah, but my *theory of mind of Hannah*. The wider the scope and the better the consistency between the two, working also from Hannah towards me, the more profound will the friendship be at a given time.

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[12] What I am attempting to do here is to analyse some properties of friendship, not describing what it is.

Having an earnest theory of mind of Hannah, together with observing her actions towards a world in which I am included, allows me to observe the world and myself through a perspective that I now have privileged access to — after all, it is *my* theory of mind. But it is one which is not entirely mine, as it continuously strives to correspond to an alien subjective reality to which I will never have direct access: Hannah's own mind. The more foreign her perspective is in regard to my own, the more difficult it will be for me to embrace it, but the more beneficial it can be in expanding my own worldview and self-knowledge.

Strangely enough, the authenticity of a friendship is independent from its existence as a fact. As we've seen, the existence of a friendship does not depend on a correspondence to an outside, observable reality: since it has a subjective ontology, it *is* real for as long as I feel it. But it can be inauthentic if my theory of mind lacks correspondence with Hannah's intentions: if its' becoming, at any moment, is based on false assumptions, on forged intentions or on misinterpreted actions. This does not have to imply Hannah's intent to deceive me,[13] as it can be the consequence of, e.g., a theory of mind based on superficial affinities or the result of an unresolved misunderstanding. Or even simply because we both underwent significant changes of worldview without having an opportunity to update our respective theories of mind, as it is often made painfully clear when we run into friends who were once a significant part of our life. A friendship can exist and be inauthentic (or even damaging) at the same time. The earnestness and care with which I strive to observe the world and myself through Hannah's perspective whilst providing her with the opportunity to do the same through mine — together with the crucial maintenance of (and respect for) the individuality of such perspectives — are therefore critical components of an authentic friendship.

I went to great length in this analysis of friendship, a concept which at first sight might seem alien to the purpose of this article, because I am convinced that what we call art is entirely related. Art is the name of a relationship — perhaps we should call it an *artship* — that we can establish with a given object: the artwork. This object is special because it was intentionally made for us to take it as a materialisation of an action of a fellow human being,[14] giving us the opportunity to form a theory of mind — i.e. to conjure in us a perspective — that helps to explain such action. We have seen that the unfolding in time of a friendship:

1. happens only through direct experience of the other as an individual person;
2. is entirely dependent on its subjective ontology — I either feel it, thus being certain of its existence, or it doesn't exist;
3. provides a knowledge of the other that is entirely unique for each combination of two persons, but that can be complementary for two friends that share a friendship with a third person;
4. depends as much on the other as it depends on me;
5. can be inauthentic, even when existing as fact, if based on false or superficial assumptions;
6. is more difficult — but also potentially more meaningful and life-changing — when it requires me to adopt an unfamiliar perspective.

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[13] The intent to deceive can be well-meaning, when it is born, e.g., from a genuine care about the other's feelings. However, it cannot prevent but to create a gap in the correspondence between the mind of one and the theory of mind of the other, particularly when it is successful.

[14] I have argued, together with Miguel Carvalhais, that we will always anthropomorphise — and thus misunderstand — artworks made by other species of intelligence in (Penha & Carvalhais, 2018).

Similarly, the unfolding in time of an artship:

1. happens only through direct experience of an artwork which is understood as a materialisation of a human action;
2. is entirely dependent on its subjective ontology — I either feel it, thus being certain of its existence, or it doesn't exist;
3. provides a knowledge of the artwork that is entirely unique for each combination of a person and an artwork, but that can be complementary for two persons that develop an artship with the same artwork;
4. depends as much on the characteristics of the artwork as it depends on me;
5. can be inauthentic, even when existing as fact, if based on false or superficial assumptions;
6. is more difficult — but also potentially more meaningful and life-changing — when it requires me to adopt an unfamiliar perspective.

Due to the limited scope of an artwork as a materialised action, the theory of mind I evolve through this artship will not be one of a complete person. Nor will it correspond to the one I could establish if I befriended the author. Far from a limitation, that is actually what allows artworks to be more focused on the particular perspective they were designed to convey. In fact, details from the artists' life that are unrelated to the perspective materialised in a given artwork are not only irrelevant, but actually potentially intrusive in the establishment of an artship. The ones that are relevant, however, can take that artship to a deeper level, and should be chosen precisely for that reason. Facts and commentary about artworks and their creators, either provided by the author or by someone else, are only adequate companions to the experience of the artwork insofar as they contribute to deepen the immediacy and authenticity of such experience. As Susan Sontag puts is:

> Our task is not to find the maximum amount of content in a work of art, much less squeeze more content out of the work than is already there. Our task is to cut back content so that we can see the thing at all.
> The aim of all commentary on art now should be to make works of art — and, by analogy, our own experience — more, rather than less, real to us. The function of criticism should be to show how it is what it is, even that it is what it is, rather than to show what it means. In place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art. (Sontag, 1966, p. 14)

When an artwork is totally unintelligible to us, we should not call it art just because someone else in power says that it is. If I can't establish a meaningful artship with it, it is not art *to me*, even if it has the potential to become so. An artwork is thus an object that was purposely designed to *afford* the establishment of artships. But I can establish artships with objects that were not built to be artworks. If I believe something to be an expression of an intentional action of another being, I can establish a relationship with it and interpret it as an artwork (or even as a person): after all, animism, teleology and imaginary friendships all have long traditions in human history. But, as it happens with friendships, the fact that an artship exists does not imply that it is an authentic artship. And if the theory of mind that allows me to understand an artwork can be shown to be implausible, then my artship is inauthentic. Artists too can establish inauthentic relationships with their own artworks, if they are not earnest and candid with themselves about the reasons for their artistic decisions. And just as I cannot

establish an authentic friendship with someone who acts inauthentically, I cannot establish an authentic artship with an artwork made by someone I do not trust to be behaving earnestly and authentically. I will highlight the focal point of this earnestness in the next section.

I can appreciate an object by what it does *for* me, by judging how well it fulfils a particular need or desire. As I can appreciate an interaction with someone without establishing a friendship, e.g., when that interaction is an agreeable fulfilment of a social need. This usefulness can go beyond the satisfaction of basic pragmatic needs and extend well into necessities such as, e.g., entertainment, hedonism, group bonding or even class distinction. And when I witness people from my community manifesting similar behaviours in response to matching objects, that certainly goes a great length in bringing about social cohesion, even if it can ultimately also have the reverse effect of excluding the other. There is an undeniable place in our culture for the creation of well executed artefacts that express our values and bond our communities, and this *poiesis* often requires a high degree of craftsmanship. The very best of these artefacts are perhaps more striking and enduring examples of our cultures than most of our artworks. As Ortega y Gasset puts it:

> At every moment we can find poetic voices around us, some of which are full and harmonious, or at least correct; but very few of them are original lyrical cries. Let's not be too harsh with the lack of originality; let us apply to works of art that do not aim at a new style an appropriate criticism. Let us demand of them fullness, harmony, or at least correction — the virtues of eternity. 15

When I establish an artship, however, I am mainly empathising with the intentions I ascribe to the author *through* my contact with the artwork. Please note that I didn't write the intentions *of* the author, as these can be entirely dissimilar from the former for a great number of reasons. It is scarcely surprising that, e.g., when we are only able to form an understanding of an artwork as a mockery of something that we care about, the result can be an uneasy feeling of being insulted by the proposal. It is also not surprising that the beliefs we come to hold about a specific work of art, such as that of being a forgery or an imitation, can significantly change the way we relate to it.16 After all, the intent to deceive or imitate is very different from that to express something original. Just as when a friend being dismissive can be seen in better light once we become aware that she was doing so in order not to ruin our birthday surprise, gathering contextual information before jumping to conclusions about other peoples' actions — in art as in life — can enable us to better relate to their intentions. As John Dewey puts it:

> For to perceive, a beholder must create his own experience. And his creation must include relations comparable to those which the original producer underwent. They are not the same in any literal sense. But with the perceiver, as with the artist, there must be an ordering of the elements of the whole that is in form, although not in details, the same as the process of organisation the creator of the work consciously experienced. Without an act of recreation the object is not perceived as a work of art. The artist selected,

15 Translated from the original in Spanish: "En todo instante pueblan el aire poéticas voces de las cuales son algunas plenas y armoniosas, por lo menos correctas; pero muy pocas de ellas son gritos líricos originales. No seamos demasiado duros con la falta de originalidad; apliquemos a las obras de arte donde no se intenta un estilo nuevo, una crítica apropiada. Exijámosles plenitud, armonía, por lo menos corrección—las virtudes de eternidad." (Ortega y Gasset, 1964, p. 247).
16 For a thorough analysis of examples, I recommend (Winner, 2019).

> simplified, clarified, abridged and condensed according to his interest. The beholder must go through these operations according to his point of view and interest. In both, an act of abstraction, that is of extraction of what is significant, takes place. In both, there is comprehension in its literal signification — that is, a gathering together of details and particulars physically scattered into an experienced whole. There is work done on the part of the percipient as there is on the part of the artist. The one who is too lazy, idle, or indurated in convention to perform this work will not see or hear. His "appreciation" will be a mixture of scraps of learning with conformity to norms of conventional admiration and with a confused, even if genuine, emotional excitation. (Dewey, 2005, p. 56)

As with my friend Hannah, what an artwork is *to me* will not be the exact same thing that it is *to you*. The establishment of artships depends on our individual capability of understanding the perspective of others through their actions as artworks and, perhaps even more significantly, on the rare chance of finding a fertile artwork at the right moment and with a suitable state of mind. Our perspectives can be complementary if they are based on plausible readings, but either (or both) of them can be wrong if they stand on misinterpretations, false information or on intersubjective prejudice — which certainly includes having the artwork presented from the start as a masterpiece. When we form beliefs about someone based on superficial evidence and failing to interact with them as individual *persons*, we are exercising prejudice, something that is unacceptable even when happening with a positive bias. The exact same thing happens with artworks.

I will go out of my way to present a friend to another friend if I know both well enough to anticipate that they will share something that can trigger a fruitful relationship. If I care about someone, I will do my best to make her aware of what I believe to be an inauthentic friendship that she naively maintains, gently presenting my best arguments to support that opinion. Perhaps we should do the same about artships: presenting new artworks to friends only when we think that they will be able to relate to them, sparing no efforts to introduce them to the appropriate background information and context; alerting friends about inauthentic artships that they maintain, providing good arguments to support that claim and being ready to change our own minds if that need arises. But we should keep in mind that it is about caring for one another and never about exercising authority.

As we have seen, all friendships are different, even when one of the persons is the same, and they can be inauthentic even when existing as a fact. It would be foolish, however, to use that as an excuse to dismiss the importance that friends have in establishing the very foundations of our self-knowledge and worldview. No amount of propositional knowledge could ever be a remotely adequate replacement for that. Both friendships and artships are fundamentally important for those who have experienced them. My life would be as incomplete without true friendships as it would be without true artships, and the deepness of the perspectives that they both enabled in me played — as they still play today — *the* instrumental role in the construction of my worldview and, above all, of my own self-image. In short, they helped shaping who I am and who do I aim to be, they were the catalysts of my becoming.

If friends have an edge for being actual persons — and that is obviously a very important upper hand —, artworks have the advantage of being more focused, less erratic and more easily accessible in similar terms to a broader range of people. Whereas persons act differently according to who they are facing at any given time, most artworks diligently remain

undisturbed whilst conveying the human actions that they carry. As opposed to what happens with friendships, artships are not bidirectional and hence provide a more stable vertex for the triangulation of the complementary knowledge of multiple artships.[17] As a result, their impact might be frailer than that of our closest friends, but they provide a much wider common ground for discussion with others. Also, when I interact with the same artwork repeatedly over the years what gets highlighted is, above all, what has changed in myself and not in the artwork.

The unsurpassed role that friends play in each of our own lives as individuals can be played by artworks in our existence as a culture, providing we do establish individual artships with them and freely discuss those artships amongst us. Still, how do we materialise human actions as artworks so that they can enable the establishment of artships? What is the difference between the knowledge that they convey and the knowledge that is best conveyed by standard propositions? How do we shape matter into being capable of conveying a human perspective?

Being truthful to the vividness of experience

David Hume might not be a household name as well-known as, e.g., Aristotle, Descartes or Kant, but his influence in shaping our culture is certainly at least as extensive as that of any of the three.[18] One of his most famous ideas deals with the difference between perception, memory and imagination:

> Every one will readily allow that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to its memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment. (Hume, 2007, p. 17)

One might read these words as suggesting that we store no memory of the vividness of perception, but in fact we need to somehow keep a memory of that vividness to realise that what we latter retrieve or imagine cannot reach such vividness, or to be able to recognise a similar vividness when we experience it again. We merely seem unable to recall that vividness without external help. The same external help, however, will elicit different vividnesses in different people with different states of mind. But what is the nature of such vividness? Is it an additional fact about the experience that we can selectively sense but not retain? Is entirely dependent on our own mind? Or is it something that emerges from the encounter between the facts of the experience and our attention?

The attention we give to an event, as well as the focus of such attention, certainly seems to play a key role in the vividness of the experience of such event. Let us imagine a trivial example: the experience of a sunset by the ocean. The vividness of the experience of that same sunset will be greater for the person focusing her attention on the intense saturation of

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[17] This triangulation will be explored in section 5.
[18] Recently, a famous philosophy podcast asked 57 contemporary philosophers to name their favourite philosopher, and David Hume came out in first place. He got 12 votes, well ahead of Immanuel Kant's second place with 7, being praised as "wonderful to read" and "keen to understand exactly how humans work" (Bartlett, 2013).

colours, the gentle salty breeze and the serene beach soundscape — even if she is not looking directly at the sunset — than it will be for her friend who spends the same time striving to get better signal reception on her smartphone — even if she states that she *is* experiencing the sunset with her friend. It is also important that the attention is given to how the particularities of the event arouse our senses and imagination, as opposed to their standing as a somewhat blemished version of a given ideal. In short, we need erotic rather than platonic attention.

This suggests that there is a gap between the vividness of a given experience and the facts that we can abstract from the same experience. I can state that I am seeing a red tomato — and even measure the average wavelength of that red — without implying anything about the vividness of such experience, i.e. about my experience of its redness. The intent to describe the facts is, in most cases, directly opposed to the intent to convey the vividness. The former implies detachment from my personal perspective and consequent annihilation of the subjective vividness:

> The colour of the *Solanum lycopersicum* fruit is derived from the cells within the fleshy tissue, which encloses between 50 and 200 small seeds in gelatinous membranes inside bilocular or multilocular cavities.

whilst the latter implies the narrowing of focus on my subjective perspective and thus on elements that might not be accessible to others:

> This tomato reminds me of the ones we ate during those long summer vacations at my grandmothers', remember? Straight from the bush and with nothing but salt and a little sip of olive oil: I will never forget that taste!

This first example conveys useful information, but it is not *interesting*, in the sense that it does not arouse any sensorial or emotional attachment, even if it can satisfy a curiosity of a previously triggered interest. The second example reveals an interest of the speaker, but it is unlikely to convey that interest to anyone who does not share the particular experience it is referring to. In short, it conveys the existence of an interest, but not the interest itself: we would need something more for that to happen, as we will see below. Children seem to have a capability of paying attention to particularities of the here and now of their experience that is vastly more profound than that of most adults, and that is certainly not solely because they lack previous experience to leverage a detached abstraction. Rather, it is mostly because they still know *how* to focus their full attention and imagination on the singularities of each unique experience, also understanding that one can't postpone an opportunity to have one.

Interestingly, we don't need to segregate our attention over a given element in order for it to be a relevant component of the vividness of the whole experience. Going back to the sunset by the ocean, it is easy to see that it can be capable of intensifying the vividness of, e.g., an otherwise unrelated conversation between friends simply by providing a welcoming environment of vivid colours. Even if the friends are mostly focusing their attention on the interaction between them, the warm sunset by the sea provides an environment that endows the conversation with a vividness that is greater than it would be if it was happening in a comparatively duller setting. But can the light from the sun somehow carry the vividness of the sunset? That sure seems unlikely. Is it, on the other hand, merely a cultural convention?

We might come to associate the colour saturation of a sunset by the beach to an idea of "vividness of experience" and, e.g., deploy it as a colour filter that conveys such idea on an advertisement for beer. But vividness, as Hume argued, is not an idea that we can articulate, but a passenger — perhaps even the driver — in the vehicle of experience. And *recognising* an experience is not the same thing as *having* one. Nor is recognising which experience we are supposed to be having and displaying, even if unconsciously, the consequent appropriate behaviours. That would be an inauthentic experience, which can only be a vivid experience of that inauthenticity. In order to have a vivid experience, we need to be focusing our full attention to our sensibility, including our inner one, without excluding any element of it: even to the ones that we might not consciously notice.

In fact, we cannot divide our attention without undermining the vividness of the whole experience: e.g., a severe pain will ruin an otherwise great concert experience or a cellphone constantly calling for attention will ruin the chances of having a great meal. Actively trying to pay less attention to the things that are not positively contributing to the vividness of experience might, at first sight, seem like a good idea, but paying less attention to our senses seems to always entail a reduction of the vividness of experience. What we want is instead to make sure that everything around us — as well as inside of us — is helping us to focus our attention, as opposed to competing for it. John Dewey — whose chapter "Having an Experience" is perhaps the best companion for this section — calls this the *unity* of experience:

> An experience has a unity that gives it its name, that meal, that storm, that rupture of friendship. The existence of this unity is constituted by a single quality that pervades the entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts. (Dewey, 2005, p. 38)

Artists need to be particularly trained into always being aware of what is catalysing and what is intruding in the vividness of each experience. They need to be conscious of all of the elements of an experience and of the role that they play in it. If they want to converge their complete attention into a unified experience, they need to be able to quickly understand what they should eliminate, change, introduce or reinforce in their environment and in themselves to make sure that their experience is as vivid and as focused as it can possibly be at any given time. This acute awareness is the exact skill that allows them to also shape artworks that convey vivid experiences for others, because they first and foremost create them as vehicles for their own vividness of experience. This is a very important point for artistic creation: to convey the vividness of an experience, an artist cannot simply *describe* the experience, nor merely *point* to the experience. The vividness of experience cannot be represented, only *summoned*. As the famous Mark Rothko adage goes, "a painting is not a picture of an experience; it is an experience." (Winner, 2019, chap. 1) To convey an experience with vividness, the artist has to find a way to summon the experience in a holistic and narrowly focused way, first in herself and then in others. She has to provide the right context and focus to the experience, using all the resources she can in order to make sure that the recipient has the best opportunity to actually summon the experience within herself.

If the recipient resists having the experience, or if she is unable to relate to it for some reason — including an ill-suited state of mind —, then that particular artship will fail and the experience will not be a vivid experience of the kind the artist intended, even if it can be a

particularly vivid experience of discomfort or even torment. Also, if the artist looses the focus on the experience at hand, that artwork is doomed to fail.[19] Leo Tolstoy, unsurprisingly, expresses this in a much simpler way than I am capable of:

> If a man infects another or others directly by his look or by the sounds he produces at the moment he experiences a feeling […], this is not yet art. […] Art begins when a man, with the purpose of communicating to other people a feeling he once experienced, calls it up again within himself and expresses it by certain external signs. (Tolstoy, 1995, chap. V)

The better control one has over how these external signs work to convey experiences, the better one will be able to use them to communicate. But this control does not equate with *proper use*, instead being closer to *more effective use*. But how does one know that it is effective? The man does not call the experience within himself in its entirety before expressing it, referring to it as an ideal form to which the expression should aim. Instead, the man calls it up again within himself *by* expressing it. He surely has to remember the experience, and remember that it was a particularly vivid one, in order to start conveying it. In fact, he probably has to crave the opportunity to relive that vividness in order to be stimulated to find a way to do so. He has to be in an appropriate state of mind to express it correctly and that might require some preparation. But he is listening to the story as much as his listeners are, and he is doing it at the same time, experiencing himself the vividness which he is able to invoke. His reference point is not the memory of the facts of the experience, nor his ideas about the experience, but mainly his will to relieve the vividness of the experience itself. A memory that has the peculiarity of only being retrievable by repeated exposure to experience. As Susan Sontag puts it:

> For we are what we are able to see (hear, taste, smell, fell) even more powerfully and profoundly than we are what furniture of ideas we have stocked in our heads. […] A great work of art is never simply (or even mainly) a vehicle of ideas or moral sentiments. It is, first of all, an object modifying our consciousness and sensibility, changing the composition, however slightly, of the humus that nourishes all specific ideas and sentiments. (Sontag, 1966, p. 300)

Tolstoy's man wants to remain truthful to his experience, but it is not as vivid in his memory as it was when he actually lived it. Merely describing the facts does not help in any way. In fact, it would be unsettling to witness someone describing an event that we would expect to entail a vivid experience by sticking to an enumeration of the facts in strictly declarative, detached terms. As with Elliot, António Damásio's famous patient, that always "[…] seemed to approach life on the same neutral note." During his time of working with this patient, Damásio "never saw a tinge of emotion in […] many hours of conversation with him: no sadness, no impatience, no frustration with [Damásio's] incessant and repetitious questioning" (Damásio, 1995, p. 45). The same Elliot that remained extraordinarily intelligent, perfectly able to reason and aware of how social conventions applied to the problems, but who had lost his emotional abilities. Without them, he could not listen to music, lead a

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[19] Which can happen for a great number of reasons: for lack of deep, first-hand experiences of the world and of relevant cultural references; because of poor skill to manipulate the material; due to a shift of focus as a response to peer pressure; owing to an excessive reliance on factual truths; because of the distance brought in by platitudes or conventions; etc. This statement should not be understood as an advocation of, e.g., expressionism or minimalism. As to the former, our experience of, e.g., visual forms or ideas can certainly *be* vivid experiences. As to the latter, a long, intricate and unresolved ambiguity can often be the best way to convey a particular kind of vivid experience.

balanced life or even reason properly, as he could not assign "different values to different options" and as "his mental landscape [was] too shifty and unsustained for the time required to make response selections" (Damásio, 1995, p. 51).

By the very nature of the vividness of experience, it can never be described to others, as it cannot be detached from particular experience. Words are powerless to describe the most vivid experiences, even if they can perfectly detail the facts about such experiences. The vividness of experience *is* the subjective, emotional attachment to experience, and that can only be summoned, not described. We call the experience of being left without words *the ineffable*. However, being left without words is not the same thing as being unable to find the right ones. In other words, we don't experience the ineffable when we can't find the adequate vocabulary to describe the facts about an experience. In that case — and particularly when speaking a foreign language — we might spend some time searching for the right word, but the feeling is that the word is just there, inside our minds and impatient to get out — even if only in our native language. We do not feel impotent to express something, we feel impotent to retrieve the right word to do so. When we find the one we were looking for we feel instantly gratified, not settling for a lesser one, nor longing for a more effective one. If we can't find the right word, we point to the thing or describe it until the other person gets what we want to say, a point in which that person might even utter the word that we were longing for. Either way, we find ourselves pacified once a correspondence with a thing or fact is established. Even if we might latter find a better word (or formula) to describe that fact, our current need is appeased with the one we know now.

The ineffable vividness of experience, on the other hand, is more contemplative than impatient, as its object cannot stand in memory as an ideal reference towards which the words should aim. Instead, it has to be again recalled, which Tolstoy's man does by *experiencing himself expressing it*. The ineffable is not beyond description because it consists in memories that we can recall and still remain unable to express. In other words, we do not walk around carrying some things that we can say and another things that we cannot. We are left without words when we want to refer to an experience and find ourselves unable to convey it, to others *as to ourselves*, with an appropriate vividness. We resort to every expression we know, to every language we speak, to terms used in other realms of experience and we still find that the vividness is not there, on our experience of listening to ourselves. But we cannot point at it, as it is not out there to be pointed at. The difficulty to express the ineffable *is* the difficulty to summon the experience in ourselves in the first place.

Until, at some point, we listen to a poet uttering a metaphor that brings about a vividness that we recognise. And we are immediately engulfed by the experience, as if we were smelling a distinctive perfume lost in the memories of our childhood. From that point forward, we can use that very metaphor to summon that experience in us and to convey it to others. We can use it to triangulate with others a vividness of experience that would otherwise remain not only in the privacy of our experience, but also hidden in an otherwise unretrievable section of our memories. We value a description by the correspondence it displays with a given reality as it appears detached from particular experience, but we value a metaphor by the vividness of the experience it summons in us. Hence the Aristotelian idea that "it is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air, and it cannot be learnt from anyone else" (Aristotle, 1926, 1405a). We of course have other ways to convey experiences besides

metaphors: in fact, any strategy that can be effective in convening in us an authentic, non-alienating, vivid and focused experience can be used in art. As T. S. Elliot wrote:

> […] music heard so deeply
> That it is not heard at all, but you are the music
> While the music lasts. [...] (Eliot, 1971)

It is by summing in myself the vividness of experience *through* its expression that I can make things that have a subjective ontology memorisable, recallable, comparable, articulable and used to form the basis of further private and public thought. By providing others with the means to actually have a vivid experience, the poet is enabling them with a point of reference that can help them relive aspects of previous experiences and inform future ones. By using the limits of her *poiesis* to make that experience as holistic and focused as possible, she is establishing the basis for a shared comprehension and articulation of a unified *what it is like*: in short, she is creating an opportunity for experiential knowledge. Whether that experiential knowledge is original and relevant is, of course, another matter. Nevertheless, artworks enable us to summon vivid experiences that can serve as references for our other experiences, both in art as in life — or in art as a chapter of life. Even if it is important to keep in mind that, despite their convenient focus, artworks can set unreasonable standards that may hamper authentic real-life experiences. As Patrícia Portela puts it, "one cannot love without reading Marguerite Duras; and one never loves enough after reading Marguerite Duras."[20]

This is certainly not because Duras' lovers claim that their love is greater than any other, nor because we will never experience the exact same facts described in her love stories. It is the vividness of the experience that she conveys in her love stories that may seem beyond reach, and the vividness of experience is not contingent upon the facts of such experience. In fact, demanding a correspondence of facts as a requisite to attain a given vividness is nothing short of fetishism. And as much as clinging to the subjective nature of experience can undermine a description of facts, sticking to a correct and detached description of facts can ruin the opportunity to convey the vividness of experience.

Going back to Tolstoy's description of the beginning of art, we are now presented with a boy who is expressing the fear he felt on an encounter with a wolf. Tolstoy remarks that art begins when this boy, "as he tells the story", "relives the feeling he experienced, infects his listeners, makes them relive all that the [he] lived through." In order to do so, Tolstoy claims, his best option might be to actually depart from factual truth:

> Even if the boy had not seen a wolf, but had often been afraid of seeing one, and, wishing to call up in others the feeling he experienced, invented the encounter with the wolf, telling it in such a way that through his narrative he called up in his listeners the same feeling he experienced in imagining the wolf – this, too, is art. (Tolstoy, 1995, chap. V)

Being truthful and honest in art has nothing to do with the factual characteristics of the means we use, but on the experiential ends that they serve. In other words, the earnestness and authenticity in art is due to the experience and not to the facts. As Bertolt Brecht puts it:

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[20] Translated from the original in Portuguese: "Não se pode amar sem ler Marguerite Duras. E nunca se ama o suficiente depois de ler Marguerite Duras" (Portela, 2017).

> The actors may not use make-up — or hardly any — and claim to be 'absolutely natural' and yet the whole thing can be a swindle; and they can wear masks of a grotesque kind and present the truth. It is hardly open to debate that the means must be questioned about the ends they serve. (Brecht, 2007, p. 83)

Being truthful to the experience means conveying the experience as it *is*, i.e. as we experience it, not as factual truth. If the boy's experience of fear of a wolf is best summoned by referring to a wolf that never actually existed, that is in no way dishonest. In fact, stating that some facts about a narrative or an artwork are false is as pointless as stating that illusionists are not doing "actual magic": we know and we do not care, but stating it out loud can divert our attention and thus ruin the experience. As a magician, an artist should refrain from discriminating the real from the illusion.

We can nevertheless be dishonest as artists, and that happens when we claim a perspective that we are not experiencing ourselves. If the boy was afraid of seeing a wolf, he can earnestly tell the story of when he ran away from a pack of red-eyed, salivating wolves in order to convey that fear. But if he is not afraid of a wolf and is only trying to, e.g., have fun by terrifying his little brother, he is not being honest about the experience. In order to be in earnest as an artist,[21] he has to believe in what he is telling not because the story is true or even credible, but because he is able to summon in himself the vividness of the experience *as* he is conveying it. As Jorge Luís Borges puts it:

> When I write something, I think of it not as being factually true (mere fact is a web of circumstances and accidents), but as being true to something deeper. When I write a story, I write it because somehow I believe in it — not as one believes in mere history, but rather as one believes in a dream or in an idea. (Borges, 2000, pp. 110-111)

Art thrives on this earnestness and commitment regarding experience, beyond the earnestness regarding facts and the commitment towards the display of novelty for novelty's sake. Experimentation in art is, first and foremost, about providing novel *experiences* rather than performing novel *experiments*: as we have seen in the introduction, a new skill in art is relevant only insofar as it opens relevant doors for new, vivid and hopefully focused experiences. But this novelty does not refer to mere difference from previous materialisations: as we will see in the next section, entirely different materialisations can easily convey very similar experiences (and vice versa). Originality in art is thus much less about finding new materialisations that summon familiar experiences and much more about finding ways that successfully summon novel experiences. As Susan Sontag puts it:

> The basic unit for contemporary art is not the idea, but the analysis of and extension of sensations. (Or if it is an "idea," it is about the form of sensibility.) Rilke described the artist as someone who works "toward an extension of the regions of the individual senses"; McLuhan calls artists "experts in sensory awareness." And the most interesting works of contemporary art (one can begin at least as far back as French symbolist poetry) are adventures in sensation, new "sensory mixes." Such art is, in principle, experimental — not out of an elitist disdain for what is accessible to the majority, but precisely in the sense that science is experimental. (Sontag, 1966, p. 300).

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[21] Which is obviously much more than we should ask from a little boy, but I will stick to Tolstoy's example for the sake of discourse.

Whenever I solve an artistic problem according to a tradition — however recent that tradition may be and regardless of the material novelty of the particular solution —, I am merely displaying my education: in short, I am being well mannered. Which is fine if the experience I want to convey is that of belonging to a particular group, of being well-behaved or even, and depending on further context, of being ironic. It is the artistic equivalent of using

> clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardised codes of expression and conduct [that] have the socially recognised function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence. (Arendt, 1981, Introduction)

If, on the other hand, I vow to reject any previously explored artistic resource, I will almost surely be rendered unable to summon a focused experience in anyone, including in myself. It is the artistic equivalent of mumbling gibberish. There is an intricate balance between tradition and novelty behind our ability to make novel experiences vivid and unified. To stand a chance of understanding originality — both as a receiver and as creator, who is the first receiver — we first of all have to be fully aware of what is already out there and of how others have dealt with related problems. As artists, we need to finely train our ability to summon experiences in ourselves as well as in others, which we can do by learning the traditional ways of doing it until we can eloquently and effortlessly use them. But that training is not enough to push the boundaries of what can be successfully summoned.

The expansion of the scope of art requires each artist to bring forward the perspectives that she — as a singular individual living in a singular context — is in a privileged position to attain outside of that tradition. The experience summoned by an artwork can lay beyond what was previously attainable and, hence, be inexistent without that artwork. But the artist has to first recognise the vivid qualities of an experience before using her *poiesis* to provide it with further focus and unity. In other words, the experience brought by that materialisation can be novel, but it has to be earnestly understood by the artist *as* experiential knowledge in the first place in order for her to then be able to shape it into a successful artwork. The limits of my experiential knowledge thus set the range of my artistic capabilities. Similarly, the scope of my experiential knowledge sets the scope of my artistic capabilities. If all my vivid experiences come from a limited pool of somewhat similar artworks, what can I bring to art besides a reiteration of that tradition?

These experiences can be of anything: e.g., of a particular soundscape, of an yet unnamed colour, of the impotence to change something in world, of a glimpse of order within the chaos. *Qualia*, emotions, feelings, ideas: everything that a person can experience has a *what-it-is-like* to experience it which is not exclusively dependent neither on the thing in itself, nor on the cultural context around it. It has to include an authentic, subjective, first-person perspective or it does not exist. This is the realm of art. Each art form has a somewhat limited scope of experiences it can effectively convey, even if it can do it with a virtually unlimited depth. Each artist becomes a specialist in vividly experiencing the world through her medium's particular scope. But I believe that it is important to keep this focus outward looking: there is a certain degenerescence when art becomes solely about the *what it is like to experience art*. The experiences an artist has over the years — in art as well as in life — constitutes both her raw material and her critical stance. As James Baldwin puts it:

One writes out of one thing only — one's own experience. Everything depends on how relentlessly one forces from this experience the last drop, sweet or bitter, it can possibly give. This is the only real concern of the artist, to recreate out of the disorder of life that order which is art. (Baldwin, 2012, Autobiographical Notes)

Relaying the ineffable: the case of metaphors

Jorge Luis Borges understood, perhaps better than anyone, how artworks completely transcend their material existence by standing as tokens of very specific human intentions. In his short story *Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote* (Borges, 1999, pp. 88-95), the narrator is a literary reviewer who presents Pierre Menard, a French writer from the early 20th-century that wrote a word-by-word rendition of Miguel de Cervantes' *Don Quijote de la Mancha* in the original language. This is not, however, a copy of Cervantes' book, but the result of a laborious process of summoning in him the capability of writing the original book, from scratch and exactly as the original. Of course that it is completely different to write such book in the early 17th-century or in Menard's context. At some point, e.g., the reviewer highlights how one passage in Cervantes' work is just a "rhetorical praise of history" written by someone "who employs the Spanish of his time with complete naturalness", as opposed to how the exact same passage in Menard's work is a "staggering" idea written by "a con-temporary of William James" who writes in a "somewhat affected", "archaic style" (Borges, 1999, p. 94).

The only difference between the passages is, of course, what we came to believe about their different contexts of creation. Those beliefs enable us to infer entirely different theories of mind that we use to explain the manifest intentions of the two authors. It is worth noting the great length to which Borges went to impart the colossal scale of Menard's effort. After all, if we believed that this was a mere copy of Cervantes' text, that would lead us to form an entirely different (and utterly uninteresting) theory of mind behind his *Quixote*. We would have the exact same handwriting and the exact same words on the exact same paper, written in the exact same external context. But an entirely different intention and, hence, an entirely different artwork. In fact, this one would be an inauthentic one. We would remain powerless to see the difference, however, if we refused to look beyond the words.

And this is the crucial part: Borges is not merely declaring that Menard's text is not a copy. Instead, he undertook a great deal of effort to write a biography of his fictitious character, to detail his previous works and to provide a testimony that allows us to conjure a theory of mind of Menard that supports the earnestness of his endeavour. It is this theory of mind that enables us to understand the staggering idea that two identical texts can in fact be very different artworks. And we experience an understanding of that idea through our reading of Borges' text that is more profoundly clear and vivid than it would be through any declarative formulation that anyone, including Borges, could write. That is why we call it a work of art.

Of course that a significant part of our interpretation of this artwork is due to a cultural context that we still share with Borges. At some point in the future — or in a culture that has, e.g., a different concept of authorship —, the significance of this text might be entirely lost. As it will be for someone who reads it whilst clinging to an *a priori* notion that "if it has the same

material characteristics, it is the same artwork". Again we see how the successfulness of an artship depends as much on the artwork as it depends on each receiver.

If we do understand *Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote*, we wouldn't need to refer to any further or preceding theory, nor to any analysis of the merit of Borges' skill, to recognise that it is in itself deserving of the status of an original contribution to human knowledge. It reveals a given reality with, as far as I can tell, an unsurpassed clarity and vividness. The fact that, more than half a century after being written, it is still often quoted and analysed when discussing that very reality, shows how much it withstands as a token of the experience it conveys — and as one of our major human achievements at that. It would make a fine example of an outcome of *artistic research* or, as I prefer to call it, *artistic creation*.

The short summary I gave above is, of course, not even a remotely adequate substitute for the original text. As none of its analyses are, even if they can help us to better understand it. But I actually first read the text in a Portuguese translation and latter, when I was preparing this article, in both the original Spanish and in an English translation. The Portuguese translation is closer to the original in Spanish, for obvious reasons, but both translations are entirely different from the original text. Here, we face the opposite problem of Menard's: how can entirely different texts still be identified as the same artwork? Let us look at what John Berger has to say about translation:

> Most translations today are technical, whereas I'm referring to literary translations. The translation of texts which concern individual human experience.
> The convencional view of translation involves studying the words on one page in one language, then rendering them into another language on another page. This involves a so-called word-for-word translation, then an adaption to respect and incorporate the linguistic traditions and rules of the second language, and finally another working-over to recreate the equivalent of the 'voice' of the original text. Many, perhaps most, translations follow this procedure and the results are worthy but second-rate.
> Why? Because true translation is not a binary affair between two languages but a triangular affair. The third point of the triangle being what lay behind the words of the original text before it was written. True translation demands a return to the pre-verbal. (Berger, 2016, p. 4)

I would say that the first step of the technical translation is also a triangular affair, but one that looks for the socially agreed correspondence between words in the original language and both the objective and intersubjective realities that they refer to, in order to replace them by words that, in the final language, refer to equivalent realities. It only seems binary because we, like computers, usually use dictionaries that have done this triangulation for us. Nevertheless, the triangulation of the literary translation — or, as Berger calls it, *true translation* — involves something more: it requires an understanding the original text as an act that uses words to convey an intention that lays beyond their literal meaning. And two different texts that convey the same intention — as in a literary translation — can be regarded as instantiations of the same artwork, whereas two identical texts that convey different intentions — as in Cervantes' and Menard's *Quixote* — can be entirely different ones.[22] This is of course only applicable to literary texts, i.e. the ones that concern, using Berger's own words, *individual human experience*.

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[22] Even if the actual artwork, in the last case, is obviously Borges' text *about* Menard's *Quixote*.

If I say that "the sun is a star", that is fairly easy to translate *technically* because my intention refers only to things that are *out there*. In this case, I am merely stating that the object we can point to and that we have agreed to call *sun* is a particular element of an universal that we have abstracted from objects that share a given set of observable characteristics and that we have agreed to name *stars*. It would only be difficult if I was trying to translate that phrase to a language that originated from a culture that, e.g., didn't abstract particulars into universals or had never experienced the object we call *sun*.

However, if I say that "Juliet is the sun", as Shakespeare's Romeo, I am obviously not pointing to "object" Juliet and implying that it has a similar ontology as the incandescent body we call *sun*. Even if I can, in this particular case, translate word-by-word to, e.g., Portuguese[23] and still convey a similar meaning, the triangulation that this phrase implies is with an intent that does not point to a reality that exists *out there*, but to the inner, subjective reality of experience. Romeo, through Shakespeare's writing, is trying to tell us something not about Juliet, but about the vividness with which he experiences her. Since there is no shared reality that we can point in reference to *Romeo's feelings towards Juliet* — as, by the very definition of a subjective ontology, it is only accessible to the subject in question —, and since we cannot all love Juliet in the exact same way as Romeo does, Shakespeare has to resort to the relationships he expects we all have established with other things in order to fulfil his intent to convey this reality.

Hence, Juliet is not a massive incandescent body floating in the same Universe that Romeo also inhabits, but instead the person that shines light into his otherwise dark life, the person that warms his body with the mere touch of the light that she emanates, and, most importantly, the person that bestows him with the becoming of his very existence. He is not referring to *the sun*, but to *the vivid experience of the sun*: amongst others, to the overwhelming light that reveals the redness of our tightly closed eyelids, to the glowing warmth on our face, to the explosion of life around us in the early spring and to the majestic magnificence of summer sunsets by the ocean.[24] All this, and perhaps much more, can be understood from four simple words — "Juliet is the sun" — with a clarity and vividness that no "I very much love Juliet" could ever have. We call it a metaphor.

To understand declarative sentences, I merely have to be able to decode them, they don't require any further involvement on my part. To understand experiential expressions such as metaphors, however, I need to do something that appears to be much more complex than to merely decode them: I need to be able to summon in myself the appropriate experiences to be able to grasp their meaning.[25] Yet metaphors, as Aristotle claimed, actually provide a much simpler way to understand complex things. This suggests that they ask us to do something more complex not for the sake of complexity itself, but actually because we don't know a simpler way of doing it.

If we look closely, the process of decoding declarative sentences is actually quite complex, since it requires a significant acquaintance with a given culture and with symbols that

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[23] "Julieta é o sol."
[24] This one is very localised, I know, but, having grown up living a few hundred meters away from the Atlantic Ocean in Portugal, I can't help but to picture sunsets this way.
[25] For a very relevant contemporary approach to metaphor — one that takes a similar starting point but arrives at different conclusions —, I recommend chapter 2 of (Harman, 2018).

abstract the elements of our empirical experience, forcing us to use logic and empirical data to verify the claims that they carry. Comparatively, the act of using simple means at our disposal — e.g., gestures, inflections and non-literal use of words — to put actions into the world until one of them reinforces the vividness of our state of mind seems as simple as smiling when we feel happy. And, as with an authentic smile, it can be contagious simply by means of empathy. In this sense, metaphors are not more elaborate than declarative sentences, they are simply less dependent on symbolic culture, logic and empirical data to be understood: they speak the much more fundamental language of experiential knowledge. That is perhaps why children are so prone to coming up with astonishing metaphors that relate their new experiences with peculiar details of older ones: it is their way of coming to terms with new experiential knowledge, by relating it to the vivid details of their previous experiences.

We find metaphors particularly clarifying because we understand them as an act of another mind asking us not to articulate symbols that refer to external realities, but instead to summon relationships that we can find within ourselves. As we have seen, they do not deal with symbols, relations or contracts: they convey experience.[26] If I don't remember exposing myself to the warmth of the sun just for the sake of it, or if I've never loved anyone intensely, I will not truly get the appropriate experience from "Juliet is the sun", even if, through acculturation, I can know "what it means". Fortunately, we were all children and youths at some point in our lives. The problem is that our classificatory impetus, the ever-growing myriad of handed-down *a priori*, the illusion that knowing many things *about* the world equates with having experienced *the* world, the fetishism of longing for particulars to resemble idealised universals, etc., all tirelessly work *against* the vividness of experience. This vividness of experience — the ontologically subjective *what it is like* — is the field of art. We become responsible adults when we redirect the eagerness of knowing *what the world feels like* for the prevalence of knowing *how the world works*. Artists cannot afford to let that happen to them.

Unsurprisingly, Jorge Luis Borges often stated his interest in the strange ability of metaphors to manifest things that greatly transcend what is apparent in the words that carry them, doing so in a way that defies analytical approaches. In a lecture titled "The Metaphor" (Borges, 2000, p. 21-41), Borges makes the case for Leopoldo Lugones' idea that all words are death metaphors. He shows how, in order for those words to emerge in their new symbolic vests, we need to subdue our awareness of their metaphorical "misuse": e.g., the *arm* of a chair is only effective as a symbol once we forget that chairs don't have actual *arms*. But something is lost in this emergence, namely the relation with the object that the living metaphor conveyed. And we certainly feel somehow enlightened when we become aware of the metaphorical etymology behind our everyday words. As Ralph Waldo Emerson puts it:

> The poets made all the words, and therefore language is the archives of history, and, if we must say it, a sort of tomb of the muses. For, though the origin of most of our words is

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[26] I have serious issues with the use of the symbolic in art. The use of existing symbols for their common symbolic value calls for intellectual recognition rather than experience, which can make interpreting the artwork easier, but at the significant cost of making it more distant and superficial. The invention of symbols by the artist — the stereotypical "this symbolises such and such" — always strikes me as a misunderstanding of how the establishment of cultural symbolic relationships work: an artwork can certainly become a symbol, but that is a process that happens slowly and independently of the artist's will. And I do not know if it can remain an artwork that affords the establishment of authentic artships in the end of that process.

forgotten, each word was at first a stroke of genius, and obtained currency, because for the moment it symbolised the world to the first speaker and to the hearer. The etymologist finds the deadest word to have been once a brilliant picture. Language is fossil poetry. As the limestone of the continent consists of infinite masses of the shells of animalcules, so language is made up of images, or tropes, which now, in their secondary use, have long ceased to remind us of their poetic origin. But the poet names the thing because he sees it, or comes one step nearer to it than any other. This expression, or naming, is not art, but a second nature, grown out of the first, as a leaf out of a tree. (Emerson, 2004, The Poet)

Borges then looks at the apparently reduced number of "stock patterns of metaphor" (Borges, 2000, p. 23), giving us two examples of metaphors that relate the eyes and the stars (my numbering):

(1) I wish I were the night, so that I might watch your sleep with a thousand eyes.
(2) The stars look down. (Borges, 2000, p. 24)

to which I will add a variation of my own writing:

(3) The stars are like eyes that look down.

Borges asserts that, regarding (1) and (2), "if we take logical thinking seriously, we have the same metaphor." You might correctly point out that (3) is not a metaphor, but actually a simile. There is thus a sense in which (1) and (2) can be regarded as equivalent, but in which (2) and (3) are entirely different. "Yet the effect on our imagination is quite different," Borges points out regarding (1) and (2). And I would claim that (3) is just a second-rate version of (2).

If I ask you which one is better — (1) or (2), let us forget (3) from this point onwards —, what would you reply? That certainly depends on the perspective we take. Logically, we could say that they establish the same relationship between eyes and stars. Theoretically, we could say that they are both correctly phrased but, as metaphors, neither has a correspondence to factual reality. We could say that they have very different styles, and we could analyse those styles and compare them to other examples, but an evaluation would require external criteria. In terms of poetic craft, one person might feel inclined to prefer the grandiloquent style of the first and another the comparatively clean style of the second. In the end, and taken in isolation, it would boil things down to personal taste. Both perspectives, that of theory and that of craft, would be inconclusive without the context provided by intention.

What if I was writing a poem about successive generations of slaves, forced to serve successive generations of cruel, greedy and conniving princes whilst experiencing the great indifference of the universe?[27] In this case, the "tenderness" of (1) would clearly not be as adequate as the "lofty indifference" (Borges, 2000, p. 24) of (2). And hence the evaluation becomes easy. In order to appreciate artworks, it is not enough to look at the theory that we can extract from them, nor it is enough to look at the craft involved. It is not enough to search for the beautiful, for the impressive or for the stylistic affiliation. Instead, we have to look for

[27] My poetic abilities are not good enough to suggest an adequate poetic context, so this example is a mix between the image suggested by Borges and *Retrato de uma princesa desconhecida*, a poem by Sophia de Mello Breyner Andresen (translated to English by Richard Zenith as *Portrait of an unknown princess*).

the end intentionally served by the craft, i.e. we have to search for the unity, focus, relevance and vividness of the experience it conveys.

It is possible to craft graceful metaphors just for the sake of conveying the experience of graceful metaphors. Someone well versed in the *poiesis* of poetic writing can certainly take one of the many "stock patterns of metaphor" and craft new formulations that stimulate our imagination. Similarly, an artist can take a mundane idea and use her skill to make it look more complicated, more "poetic". Or even take something that she wants us to relate to in very specific terms — e.g., a moral statement about something, or a product that she was commissioned to boost sales of — and use her artistic craft to varnish those things with a vividness of experience that makes them easier to memorise and relate to. But those are all examples of manipulative and inauthentic use of artistic skill, of not being truthful to the vividness of the experience lived by the artist. As James Baldwin puts it:

> Sentimentality, the ostentatious parading of excessive and spurious emotion, is the mark of dishonesty, the inability to feel; the wet eyes of the sentimentalist betray his aversion to experience, his fear of life, his arid heart; and it is always, therefore, the signal of secret and violent inhumanity, the mask of cruelty. (Baldwin, 2012, Everybody's Protest Novel)

Art does not prescribe how I *should* relate to this or value that. Art gives me a perspective with which I can relate to this or that, so that I can enlarge the scope of my reference points and, using those, improve my chance of making informed decisions on what to value. This is how I interpret Herman Hesse's well-know aphorism "the morality of artists is replaced by aesthetics."[28] Experience, rather than prescription.

Also, artworks should not be made any more complicated than they need to be to convey the experience at hand. Quite the contrary, in fact, as anything that diverts our attention contributes to defocus the experience and, consequently, to numb the artship at hand. Most of the things that art deals with, however, are incredibly complex and difficult to convey. Consequently, many artworks have no option but to be incredibly complex and difficult to relate to. Any detail that can contribute to the vividness of experience should be included and appropriately articulated with all the others, and often that entails exquisitely crafting what might seem like an overwhelming web of elements. That complexity is acceptable when it is the result of a sincere and focused quest for an unattainable simplicity. It is not acceptable when it is the result of varnishing with complexity what would otherwise be an absence of authentic experience. If we earnestly look beyond the surface and deep into the human intentions materialised in an artwork — if, in Berger's words, we turn it into a triangular affair, a return to the pre-verbal — that difference becomes immediately apparent.

Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective

I can't overstate the importance that the ideas of both Thomas Nagel and Donald Davidson had in shaping my own view on epistemology. In an article titled "Three Varieties of Knowledge" (Davidson, 2001, p. 205-220), Davidson presents what he considers to be the three kinds of knowledge that are irreducible to one another: *subjective*, as knowledge of our own minds; *intersubjective*, as knowledge of other minds; *objective*, as knowledge of an

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[28] Several sources — Hesse's biographies, short biographical notes in other books, etc — trace this aphorism to a letter from Hesse to his parents. I was unable, however, to find the original source.

external reality. Davidson is of course well aware that all propositional knowledge is intersubjective. As he points out, "the source of the concept of objective truth is interpersonal communication; thought depends on communication" (Davidson, 2001, p. 209). Hence his *objective knowledge* — our most common aim when we speak of epistemology — does not entail something that transcends humanity, even if it can transcend any given individual. Quite the contrary, in fact: his claim is that these "three sorts of knowledge form a tripod: if any leg were lost, no part would stand" (Davidson, 2001, p. 220). The best that we can aim in terms of our knowledge of the outside world is to, using this tripod, arrive at a provisional, and always cultural, "view from nowhere" (Nagel, 1986).

Subjective knowledge is self-evident and attainable without appeal to external evidence, but objective knowledge depends on our senses and perception, which gives birth to an epistemic chasm of dreaded uncertainty that we have been for centuries seeking to bridge. However, this "logical or epistemic barrier between the mind and nature […] not only prevents us from seeing out; it also blocks a view from outside in" (Davidson, 2001, p. 207). This is a very interesting but often overlooked fact: unless we are prepared to let go of the idea that there is an epistemic barrier between the subjective and the objective — and fortunately very few people are, at least in academic circles —, we cannot assume that there is no epistemic barrier between the objective and the subjective — and here, unfortunately, I cannot say the same. This has very important implications regarding experiential knowledge, even if they seem to be often ignored. My experiences *are* the *what it is like to have them* — or, in other words, they *are* the way they appear to me —, something that only I have full access to. As Thomas Nagel puts it:

> Very little work has been done on the basic question (from which mention of the brain can be entirely omitted) whether any sense can be made of experiences' having an objective character at all. Does it make sense, in other words, to ask what my experiences are really like, as opposed to how they appear to me? (Nagel, 1974, p. 448)

Materialist and computational claims abound, but so far none has been able to destroy the epistemic barrier. And we cannot draw any conclusions from the argument "How *else* could it be?" (Nagel, 1986, p. 22), with perhaps the exception of the inference that we lack the necessary imagination to come up with a satisfactory explanation. This problem only becomes apparent, however, if we do not corner ourselves into the abnormal stance of disregarding the subjective character of experience:

> So long as mental states are looked at objectively, in their causal relations to stimuli and behaviour, no special issues arise which do not arise about the physical analysis of other natural phenomena. Even problems of intentionality may seem to be soluble if one puts aside their subjective aspect, for then one may be able to describe certain kinds of computers as intentional systems. What seems impossible is to include in a physical conception of the world the facts about what mental states are like for the creature having them. The creature and his states seem to belong to a world that can be viewed impersonally and externally. Yet subjective aspects of the mental can be apprehended only from the point of view of the creature itself (perhaps taken up by someone else), whereas what is physical is simply there, and can be externally apprehended from more than one point of view. (Nagel, 1979, p. 201)

And here we have, the first division: two legs of the tripod. Davidson then asks how can we know more about the outside world, and the answer is: together with other minds. But I don't

have a direct access to the content of other minds, as I do to my own, and, as we have just seen, minds are not knowable from the outside. His answer, in short, is that the knowledge of other minds depends on my ability to observe their behaviours and interpret them as the result of intentions of someone who has a subjective experience akin to my own. In other words, it depends on our capacity for empathy, even if Davidson never actually uses the word, and it is bounded by the limits of our own experience and imagination. It is worth reading Davidson's take on the teaching of language:

> If we are teaching someone a language, the situation becomes more complex, but more clearly interpersonal. What seems basic is this: an observer (or teacher) finds (or instills) a regularity in the verbal behaviour of the informant (or learner) which he can correlate with events and objects in the environment. This much can take place without developed thought on the part of the observed, of course, but it is the necessary basis for attributing thoughts and meanings to the person observed. For until the triangle is completed connecting two creatures, and each creature with common features of the world, there can be no answer to the question whether a creature, in discriminating between stimuli, is discriminating between stimuli at the sensory surfaces or somewhere further out, or further in. Without this sharing of reactions to common stimuli, thought and speech would have no particular content — that is, no content at all. It takes two points of view to give a location to the cause of a thought, and thus to define its content. We may think of it as a form of triangulation: each of two people is reacting differentially to sensory stimuli streaming in from a certain direction. Projecting the incoming lines outward, the common cause is at their intersection. If the two people now note each other's reactions (in the case of language, verbal reactions), each can correlate these observed reactions with his or her stimuli from the world. A common cause has been determined. The triangle which gives content to thought and speech is complete. But it takes two to triangulate. (Davidson, 2001, p. 212-213)

This gives birth to communication and it is this communication that makes all thought and knowledge possible:

> Communication, and the knowledge of other minds that it presupposes, is the basis of our concept of objectivity, our recognition of a distinction between false and true belief. There is no going outside this standard to check whether we have things right, any more than we can check whether the platinum-iridium standard kept at the International Bureau of Weights and Standards in Sèvres, France, weights a kilogram. (Davidson, 2001, p. 217-218)[29]

The limits of each of these three varieties of knowledge is reflected on the limits of the group: for the tripod to be stable, each leg cannot be longer than the others. Our objective knowledge depends on our knowledge of ourselves and on our knowledge of others; our subjective knowledge depends on our knowledge of the world and on our knowledge of others; our intersubjective knowledge depends on our knowledge of ourselves and on our knowledge of the world. It is perhaps worth restating that by *objective knowledge* I mean *knowledge about the external world*, as opposed to *knowledge attained from the perspective of an object*, a view that, as we should all be acutely aware, is completely inaccessible to us. A disengaged perspective can certainly bring us knowledge of ourselves as objects and of others as statistical abstractions. But those are examples of objective knowledge about human beings or human societies, not of subjective and neither of intersubjective knowledge. As Thomas Nagel puts it:

[29] The comparison to the platinum-iridium standard is no longer up to date, but the point remains valid.

> We can pursue a unified if very etiolated conception of reality by detaching progressively
> from our own point of view. We just have to keep in mind what we are leaving behind, and
> not be fooled into thinking we have made it disappear. (Nagel, 1979, p. 213)

Improving subjective knowledge certainly depends on external factors for triangulation, but it is mostly dependent on an effort to be earnest and authentic with oneself: the ancient maxim *know thyself*, with the caveat that the self is a becoming and thus *know thyself* is always in a delicate balance with a *build thyself*, which brings into greater evidence the dependence on others and the world. But what about our knowledge of others not as objects (human beings), but as subjects (persons with particular minds)? When the knowledge of the other mind stands on the observation of an action towards an object or event in our shared environment, as in Davidson's take regarding the teaching of language, things do not seem that difficult. The problem of intersubjective knowledge lies precisely in what falls within the privileged access of other minds: their own subjective experience, the *what it is like to be them*, the ineffable. We stand a very small chance of relating to the experiential knowledge of another mind, with anything deeper than superficial observations, only if we interact with that person directly and are able to summon the conditions to earnestly empathise with her. In other words, if we are able to build a plausible, authentic and profound theory of mind that enables us to relate to her perspective. Shall we confine our intersubjective knowledge to the scope defined by the small number of loved ones we have authentic friendships with? Or, even worse, to the superficial detachment of handed-down prejudices or codified behaviours?

What if I try to materialise my subjective experience back into the world? Not merely by pointing to *that red*, but by creating a context that invites others to attentively look at *that red* whilst summoning in them a theory of mind that enables them to get a glimpse of what it is like *for me* to vividly experience *that red*? Anyone can see the same red thing, but not everyone can experience it with the same vividness and focus. Pointing to it is useless, as I can direct the attention to the thing but not to the experience of the thing. But if I can experience it with a vividness that is focused on its singularity, if I can find a way to abstract it from the particular facts and if I come up with a way to summon that vividness repeatedly in myself via a carefully designed external stimuli, I can become closer of being able to do the same for others.

This is the difference between, e.g., a simple portrait of my grandmother — one that I display in my house to remind me of her, being close to useless to everyone else — versus a photograph that is able to summon the vivid experience of longing for a lost relationship that helped to form our childhood — one that could be used by everyone to recall their own particular experiences, even if it still consists on a portrait of my grandmother. In the first case, the fact that it is a photograph of my grandmother is the main aspect that triggers my memory of her. If it is a beautiful photograph, that can make me more likely to engage with it and it might even convince others to appreciate it as a beautiful portrait. In the second case, however, something makes the vividness of the experience of longing detach from the fact that it is a photograph of my grandmother, or even from the fact that it is a pleasant one. It is the abstraction of the vividness from the facts — i.e. it transcends the facts, even if it cannot exist without them — that makes the experience shareable. This sharing can extend from *qualia* to feelings, including emotions and the experience of ideas: anything that has a *what it*

is like to experience it or, in other words, experiential knowledge.

I believe that art is the best way we have to give scale to a triangulation of knowledge of other minds, which is essential for both our knowledge of ourselves and, even if it might be less obvious, for our knowledge of the world. Whereas science gives us critical distance from the world, art brings us closer to its singular peculiarities. These peculiarities are not nuisances, but reality checks. Even when doing science, whenever we feel the need to bring vividness to complete a picture of our object of study, we regularly resort to artistic means. Some of the best anthropological reports, e.g., are literary works in their own right and brilliant science communicators do not run shy of using poetic expressions to better convey their astonishment with their object of study.30 But this is not done in a systematic way and calls for an ability that the formal training for science not only does not usually include, but can actually prevent as a result of its promotion of a detachment from the object of study. The scientific world has been emptied of meaning and purpose — of teleology — precisely because it has eliminated the source of all meaning and purpose: the subjective reality of human experience and intent. As Thomas Nagel puts it:

> […] if the way things are for […] subjects is not part of the way things are in themselves, an objective account, whatever it shows, will omit something. So reality is not just objective reality, and the pursuit of objectivity is not an equally effective method of reaching the truth about everything. (Nagel, 1979, p. 213)

We would turn to an astronomer to describe and explain the movements of planets and stars in the night sky, but we would turn to a poet to evoque the seduction that those movements exert over us. The poet can clarify that astonishment with a vividness that can be illuminating even for — perhaps *especially* for — the astronomer. Of course that the astronomer and the poet can be the very same person: science and art are complementary, not contradictory. The dance between science and art can take us closer to the edge of the knowledge we can build as humans: but it takes two to tango.

A practical note on science and art as academic poles

The days when science was still striving to emancipate from philosophy and to gain recognition as an activity as noble as the classics that we came to know as *the humanities* might seem like a very distance past. But not even two centuries have passed since William Whewell carved the neologism *scientist* — out of an analogy with *artist* — to designate the new "students of the knowledge of the material world" that were to receive the baton from the natural philosophers of the past (Ball, 2015). Nowadays, and even if positivist excitement has long been grounded, natural sciences reign as *the* undisputed paradigm of contemporary academic research. In this section, I will look at how natural science fits into Davidson's triangulation of knowledge, using that as a reference point to establish an akin triangulation in art. I do not intend, however, to suggest that there is an unsurpassable chasm between these "two cultures" (Snow, 1993). They are merely opposing polarities of a continuous spectrum that fluidly includes these and many other academic activities. What I will discuss below are idealised takes on both scientific research and artistic creation that, as such, will significantly diverge from applied ones. Notwithstanding, characterising these two abstract polarities can provide a good map to better navigate the real-world continuum that includes

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30 Carl Sagans' famous words — *"We are a way for the Cosmos to know itself."* — are a striking example of that.

both art and science. Let us start with the latter.

Science depends, first of all, on individuals who ask questions and who come up with hypothesis. This is the often understated part of the scientific method: it starts with the creative act of coming up with new questions (or re-enacting old ones), followed by another creative act of conjuring mental models capable of providing plausible answers to those questions. Yet without these creative acts, we would have no science at all. These mental models we first call hypothesis have a subjective existence until they are recognised by someone else, a point in which they gain intersubjective existence as theories. It is important to always keep in mind, however, that they do not have, and they never will have, an objective existence. Science is not after the creation of reality, its business is to create useful mental models that allow us to establish prolific relations with said reality.

In order for a scientist to come up with a new useful hypothesis, she needs to know the current state of the art, to know the problems yet to be answered or the problematic issues of previous ones. After coming up with a viable hypothesis, she has to test that hypothesis against observable reality. No hypothesis that we can envision can both be brief enough to test experimentally and thorough enough to explain the entire reality, so she needs to "isolate her object of study". "Isolation" actually means creating an artificial situation, one that is unlike anything that we could find within the reality we want to study. Instead, we try to make this artificial setting as close as possible to the model we devised: if our model, e.g., does not consider air resistance, we try to create an environment that is as exempt of air resistance as it is feasible with our current technology. This oversimplification of reality is generally a good thing, since it is what enables our limited minds to understand these models and, through the combination of a growing number of them, create an understanding of reality. A scientific model is particularly successful *if* it empowers me with the ability to see reality through it and, for that, it needs to be somewhat simple. But this simplicity can become a problem when we take our models to *be* the reality and begin dismissing anything that doesn't fit the model as a nuisance or a figment of our imagination.

Experimentally testing the hypothesis, analysing the data and communicating the results are the steps that more greatly depend on accepted practices. Since our goal is to create new objective knowledge for the collective, we want to make sure that virtually anyone believes that they would arrive at the same conclusions as we did. There is an intrinsic drive towards a claim of universality within every quest for objective knowledge. We should thus take great care to distance ourselves from the things we are dealing with, which we try to do by adopting standard procedures and terminology, by using the most precise and thorough measurement instruments we can get, by deferring judgment as often as possible to the accepted practices in our field and even by communicating the results with strictly declarative and impersonal language. We then analyse the published documentation of methods and results, looking for gaps that could have compromised the process and — ideally, yet rarely — replicating each other's results and further testing each other's models in order to ratify collective trust in them. Far from relying on empathy with the scientist proposing the theory, a good scientific model is the one that is able to convince even the one who approaches it with scepticism.

One final step is needed, though, to get this contribution positively evaluated. The success of

new mental models depends on them being more useful than our current ones. Mental models are particularly useful if they enable a quick understanding of complex phenomena — hence the value of abstraction —, if they enable us to reliably predict future behaviour — hence the value of observability and the reliance on falsification —, if they do not collide with current models and, finally, if they serve as a fertile ground for future development.[31] An evaluator — both in a PhD jury or in a peer-review setting — has to do more than merely check whether all the steps were taken according to the best practices and whether the contribution is original: she has to be the judge of this usefulness. If, e.g., a scientist comes up with an original theory that has similar experimental results as a given prevailing one, being much more complicated to understand and having no foreseeable advantages over the latter, she will have a hard time getting it accepted and used by the community. If, on the other hand, she comes up with an original theory that has no experimental results to show for itself, but that provides a great mental model with which to survey reality and catalyse further exploration, it can get enthusiastically accepted amongst her pears in a short amount of time. In fact, that is what often happens in scientific paradigm shifts (Kuhn, 1962).

Knowing that all of these models are merely temporary does not prevent us from adopting them as lenses with which to see the world. It is by learning how to see the world through the prevailing lens of a specific scientific field that I can identify further opportunities to expand this field and to develop technical solutions to control and shape the reality it describes. It is no surprise that people looking to the same reality using different lenses can see entirely different (sometimes even incompatible) "realities", since they are not looking at reality itself, but at performances of the models that they learned to use to explain it. Reality is, in a sense, seen as a puppet on strings pulled by the theory and that is how we are able to form a useful understanding of it. But it is important to remember that these models that get us, as a collective, closer to a useful understanding of reality, are the very same ones that distance us, now as individuals, from experiencing the peculiarities of each singular fragment of reality. "Recognition is perception arrested before it has a chance to develop freely," John Dewey reminds us. (Dewey, 2005, p. 54)

In summary, and going back to Davidson's triangle, science is looking for a useful intersubjective agreement on what objective reality is. Its best bet is, therefore, to transform every subject (i.e. each individual scientist) as much as possible into a localised "intersubject" (i.e. an idealised scientist) and every topic of interest into a well-delimited and isolated object that we can use to triangulate. Science has been a remarkable way of gathering knowledge about everything that we can study by distancing ourselves from it. In fact, we can say that science is fundamentally a method of distancing ourselves, as individuals, from our objects of study. However, and as we have seen, there is something that we cannot distance ourselves from without causing its annihilation: subjective experiences that make up the ontologically subjective. For those, we have art.

Every single strategy that we deploy to bridge the epistemic barrier between mind and nature was designed to bring us closer to an utopian "view from nowhere", seeking to make individual subjects capable of reasoning as close as possible to the intersubjective models that constitute their scientific lenses. For enquiring into the ontologically subjective, we need

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[31] As the literature on the philosophy and history of science shows, often these principles come into collision with each other and the water gets significantly muddier than in this simplified description.

an entirely different strategy. We need a training that makes each person even more individualised, more idiosyncratic, more capable of deeper experiencing the particularities of living as her unique self in a given place and a given time. And we need strategies to enable her to project those experiences into the material world in a way that enables the triangulation of experiential knowledge, i.e. in a way that enables others to recognise in those material manifestations an intention of another mind. In other words, an object or action that allows me to form a theory of mind that seeks to explain it, providing me with a perspective that, if different from the ones I already know, can expand my capabilities of relating to others, of understanding myself and of experiencing the world. Without a way to use others to step outside of our own subjectivity and grasp the world out there, we would have no science and no shareable knowledge of observable external realities. Without a way to materialise our subjective intentions and experiences, we would have no art and no shareable knowledge about what it is like to be a human.

As we have seen previously, propositional knowledge can be understood by merely decoding it. In fact, it can often be paraphrased or summarised without loosing its meaning. I can convey, e.g., the same theory about reality with an extensive text in English, with just a few words in Portuguese, with mathematical expressions or with geometry. Experiential knowledge, however, cannot withstand that: it depends on the experience of the actual thing. I can't paraphrase a piece of music, translate a painting into a written text or summarise a poem without significantly changing the experience it affords. If the knowledge that they convey is experiential knowledge, that means that it is precisely what is relevant about it that will be lost in translation. I can certainly revisit a related experiential knowledge in different works — e.g., when reading a poem and a *true* translation of it, in Berger's sense —, but they will nevertheless be different experiences. That is why it is so important to have appropriate conditions to present artworks: if their experience is ruined, they are rendered powerless artworks. Anything that gets in the way of each individual's capability to establish an artship with a given artwork, including the individual's inability to summon in her the appropriate experience, is an obstacle to experiential knowledge.

In practical terms, this means that the academic artist has, first of all, to make sure that she has a significant amount of authentic experiences of herself, of others and of the world that goes beyond her experiences with artworks. As Sophia de Mello Breyner puts it:

> Poetry does not ask for a specialisation because its art is the art of being. Nor is time or work what poetry asks of me. Nor does it ask me for a science, or an aesthetic, or a theory. It asks me instead for the completeness of my being, for a consciousness that is deeper than my intelligence, for a fidelity that is purer than that which I can control. It asks me for an intransigence without hiatus. It asks me to pull from my life that breaks, consumes, corrupts and dilutes a seamless garment. It asks me to live attentively as an antenna, it asks me to live continuously, to never sleep, to never forget myself. It asks me for an unleashed obstinacy, dense and compact.[32]

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[32] Translated from the original in Portuguese: "A poesia não me pede propriamente uma especialização porque a sua arte é a arte do ser. Também não é tempo ou trabalho o que a poesia me pede. Nem me pede uma ciência, nem uma estética, nem uma teoria. Pede-me antes a inteireza do meu ser, uma consciência mais funda do que a minha inteligência, uma fidelidade mais pura do que aquela que eu posso controlar. Pede-me uma intransigência sem lacuna. Pede-me que arranque da minha vida que se quebra, gasta, corrompe e dilui uma túnica sem costura. Pede-me que viva atenta como uma antena, pede-me que viva sempre, que nunca durma, que nunca me esqueça. Pede-me uma obstinação sem tréguas, densa e compacta" (Andresen, 2015, p. 891).

She needs, however, to have a profound knowledge of the state of the art in order to be able to identify opportunities for further clarification. If, e.g., *Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote* (Borges, 1999, p. 88-95) allows me to experience the dematerialisation of the artwork in a way that is clearer than anything that I can write myself, why bother presenting another second-rate artwork to the world? Of course that we can seek to explore nuances, recombinations and reinterpretations, but the opportunities for those only become clear after having profound experiences of other artworks. An artist also has to develop a highly skilled *poiesis* in her medium of choice. Not in the sense of knowing what procedures to follow to achieve a well-mannered output, but in order to achieve a virtuosity that allows her to bring about the experience at hand without any observable deviations from focus: something that I prefer to call a great *eloquence* in the medium.

This eloquence is particularly important because, and despite the regrettably prevalent myth, the artist cannot have a fully formed idea in her mind before starting to actually materialise the work: as we have seen, the vividness of experience requires external stimuli and thus the artist herself experiences the vividness *through* the materialisation artwork. Skilful knowledge of the materials at hand enables one to anticipate what can benefit or ruin the focus of the experience, as well as to work with models that exist in different scales of space and time of the final materialisation. But the process of artistic creation is a process of clarification in itself, not merely a process of communicating a previously clarified idea. The artist completes the artwork not when she reaches the perfect materialisation of an idea, but when she reaches the limit of her abilities to further focus the experience. As Anselm Kiefer puts it, referring to the famous land art studio-estate he built at Barjac:

> Yet, do not think that, by executing Barjac, I have from the start imagined the concept of emptiness […]. These buildings do not express the illustration of an idea, but, conversely, their realisation revealed to me, a posteriori, the concept.[33]

So when is an artist ready to start, e.g., a PhD? In short, when she has, through her actual work as an artist, a glimpse of a possibility to clarify a given experience in a way that is beyond what the state of the art has to offer. Not an idea to put into art, but an embryonic experience claiming for further focusing. This is, in a sense, the artistic equivalent of the scientific hypothesis. It is worth noting that, and as opposed to a common practice in science, in art we cannot have a student solving a problem formulated and formalised by a supervisor. It is only when the problem arises within me as *my* problem — emerging from my artistic practice *as* an artistic problem and not as a problem to be solved artistically — that I become qualified to solve it. The artist then needs to do some further testing in order to see if her *poiesis* is up to the task or if, as it is most likely, she will have to come up with novel skills and slowly embody them until they become natural means of expression, i.e. until she can eloquently use them. Her PhD proposal should showcase these preliminary tests, along with a detailed report on the direct experience of as many related artworks as possible, referring specifically to what she feels to be the deviations of these artworks from the particular focus of attention she is after. In other words, she needs to know what are the elements of these artworks that divert the focus from the one she is trying to impose upon them. If she is able to convince a supervisor or a jury that she is on the right path and, most importantly, if her

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[33] Translated from the Portuguese translation: "Contudo, não se pense que, ao realizar Barjac, tenha à partida imaginado o conceito do vazio […]. Esses edfiícios não exprimem a ilustração de uma ideia, mas, ao invés, a sua realização revelou-me, a posteriori, o conceito" (Kiefer, 2015, p. 15).

medium of choice, skills and knowledge of the state of the art are appropriate for the task at hand, the process begins.

This process can be as chaotic and idiosyncratic as the artist needs it to be: as we will see below, we will not use the method to validate the results, so the reasoning and order of the steps taken is irrelevant. It needs, however, to be entirely focused and earnest regarding the vividness of experience. The artist should spend all her time experiencing the world, herself, other persons and other artworks — both of related and of extraneous media — through the obsessive lens of the focus she is after. In this sense, she might be temporarily incapable of establishing authentic artships with other artworks, because she will be using those artworks as test material for her own momentarily biased sensibility. This obsession is the essential step for the fine-tuning of her sensibility to her object of study: it is by feeling that all available stimuli are unfulfilling that we become capable of identifying glimpses of opportunities to attain rewarding ones. It is important, however, to learn how to let go of these obsessions at some point. There will never be such thing as a perfect artwork, and an artist that is unable to let go of an obsession will most likely become confined to the recursion of a strict approach and unable to relate to artworks that significantly diverge from that approach.

But, if circumscribed, these obsessions provide the critical capabilities for the artist to judge how fine-tuned is the experience that her artwork affords. She has to make many experiments, taking regular step-backs to judge them. As a scientist works on her mental model of reality by regularly framing it against such reality (or, more precisely, against data gathered from selected observations of such reality), an artist works on her materialisation of the artwork by regularly framing it against her own experience of the artwork. This regular step back is one of the key aspects of artistic creation — "the artist embodies in himself the attitude of the perceiver while he works," as John Dewey writes (Dewey, 2005, p. 50) —, and it consists basically on an appreciation of the artwork closer to its natural scale, as opposed to the detailed scale of *poiesis*, and from a more uncoupled point of view. Not a disengaged one, as it requires her fine-tuned sensibility and her ability to establish an emotional connection, but as if the artwork was done by someone else. In other words, it is not a question of connecting with the artwork *as if she was someone else* — which would prevent an authentic artship —, but approaching it *as if she was not its author*, as if she did not know already the how and the why about the unfolding of the experience. As Sophia de Mello Breyner puts it:

> One day, at Epidaurus — taking advantage of the quietness left by the tourists' lunch time —, I took a position at the centre of the theatre and I said out loud the beginning of a poem. And I heard, in the next instant, from above, my own voice, free, disconnected from me.
> Some time latter, I wrote these three verses:
> The voice climbs the last steps
> I hear the impersonal winged word
> That I recognise because it is no longer mine[34]

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[34] Translated from the original in Portuguese: "Um dia em Epidauro — aproveitando o sossego deixado pelo horário de almoço dos turistas — coloquei-me no centro do teatro e disse em voz alta o princípio de um poema. E ouvi, no instante seguinte, lá no alto, a minha própria voz, livre, desligada de mim.¶ Tempos depois, escrevi estes três versos: A voz sobe os últimos degraus / Oiço a palavra alada impessoal / Que reconheço por não ser já minha" (Andresen, 2015, p. 898). The translation of the verses was done according to my limited abilities.

She should present a selected few of those experiments to others, in order to experience the artwork in a public context, i.e. in a context that provides her with the opportunity to observe others having a similar experience. At one point, she will feel that she has reached the current *poietic* limit to summon the focused experience she was after, she will sense that there is nothing that she can add, change or remove to further focus the experience — one that is now made clearer precisely because of that. That is the point when she has reached the end of her project. As John Dewey puts it:

> Until the artist is satisfied in perception with what he is doing, he continues shaping and reshaping. The making comes to an end when its result is experienced as good — and that experience comes not by mere intellectual and outside judgment but in direct perception. An artist, in comparison with his fellows, is one who is not only especially gifted in powers of execution but in unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things. This sensitivity also directs his doings and makings. (Dewey, 2005, p. 51)

A few years after, it is quite possible that she will have better solutions to deal with the same problem, and she or someone else can certainly reopen the quest. Yet I believe that a PhD in artistic creation is finished when we can't envision anything that we can do to further clarify the experience that the artwork affords. Which means that this final artwork is *the* main element — and sometimes even the only element — that is relevant to evaluate a PhD in artistic creation. All other elements should be chosen only insofar as their ability to provide a suitable context for the establishment of authentic artships with this artwork. As David Markson writes in *Wittgenstein's mistress*:

> Once, somebody asked Robert Schumann to explain the meaning of a certain piece of music he had just played on the piano. What Robert Schumann did was sit back down at the piano and play the piece of music again. (Markson, 1988, p. 242)

I do not intend to diminish the importance of both reading and, most importantly, of writing, perhaps best expressed by Michel Foucault's notion of self writing (Foucault, 1983).[35] Acquiring the habit of writing can help the artist to keep herself in check and, after careful selection, its outcomes can provide the jury with a glimpse over the authenticity of the whole endeavour. Perhaps a few years later, the artist — or someone else who in the meantime became interested in her work — can use those writings to provide further context, uncover unconsciously embedded elements or point out rhizomatic connections to other works, artists or social events. But immediately after finishing the artwork, if there is anything that the artist can add to further clarify the experience of learned audience members, that simply means that the work is not properly accomplished to the limit of her abilities, as any academic endeavour should be. It is only in terms of degree, scale or peculiarities of each situation that this process differs for career academics doing artistic creation, PhD or master students,[36] but I am convinced that it can give birth to significant examples of artistic creation in any of those stages.

Only in academia can science pursue its goals freed from the shackles of utilitarian pragmatism, even if that space is in constant risk of shrinking if it is not actively defended.

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[35] This is an article that perhaps every PhD student in artistic research should be acquainted with. This self-writing should not, however, be mistaken with auto-ethnography.
[36] In this article, I make no claim regarding artistic education prior to these levels. In other words, I am writing for artists wanting to frame their activity within academia, not for students who want to become artists.

Ideally, a scientist working in academia should be offered the best possible conditions to pursue original contributions to knowledge with uncompromising seriousness, with that commitment to propositional knowledge and earnestness in regard to facts forming the foundations of the ethics of science. Similarly, only in academia can art pursue its goals freed from the need to fulfil the current trends of one or more niches of the art market. I am convinced that, as with science, that can only happen if the artist is offered the best possible conditions to pursue original experiential knowledge with uncompromising seriousness and if the commitment to experiential knowledge and earnestness in regard to the vividness of experience form the foundations of the ethics of art. And hence arrises the eternal problem of evaluation.

Scientific juries focus on methods and evaluation procedures because those are the elements that enable us to verge on the intersubjective. Established methods provide individual scientists with an escape for their cognitive biases and, in turn, test procedures provide jury members with an external reference for evaluation. By using their best knowledge of paradigmatic methods and procedures, along with their capacity for logic and reasoning, jury members focus their judgment on methods, test procedures and comparison with previous solutions, inferring from those elements the soundness of the work at hand. Using a similar approach for academic art would be not only pointless, but actually seriously damaging.

The method — or, better called, the process — of an artist can certainly provide important clues as to the earnestness of the work and to the consciousness that the artist has of her decisions. But it can offer absolutely no guarantee regarding the vividness and focus of the final artistic experience. In fact, if an artist relies on external methods to guide her process, she will most likely achieve an inauthentic artwork, as the only earnest experience she has to offer in that case is that of following those external methods. Similarly, evaluation procedures and reports stand in the way of the direct experience of the artwork by jury members. And, as we have seen, no authentic artship can be established without unbiased, first-hand experience of an artwork.

It is impossible to overstate that there is no substitute or paraphrase for the direct experience of artworks. The experience of the documentation of an artwork is precisely that: the experience of the documentation. A documentation of an artwork can also be an artwork itself — sometimes even better than the one being documented[37] —, but it will always be a deviation from the focus of the original artwork.[38] Neither an embedded video, nor a small excerpt of a performance as part of a PhD viva can provide adequate substitutes for the complete experience of an artwork.

When evaluating artistic proposals, jury members have to be presented with the best possible conditions to experience the artwork in its entirety. As we have seen, anything that works against the focus of attention can prevent the establishment of artships. Jury members should, if necessary, be presented with more than one opportunity to experience the artwork.

[37] With the dominance of online portfolios in artists' careers, artworks are nowadays being often materialised in ways that are designed to benefit their online documentation over their public presentations. We need to ask at which point does the documentation become *the* actual artwork.
[38] Unless the documentation *is* the artwork being considered, as, e.g., in a PhD thesis on the documentation of opera.

Perhaps an ideal procedure would be to have one experience before and another after reading the documentation and discussing it with the artist. I am fully aware that this poses many problems regarding the possible outreach of the outcomes of academic artistic creation, something that I intend to address in the future.

Finally, and most importantly, there is no escape from the subjectivity of both the artist and the evaluators in academic artistic creation. How could we escape subjectivity if we are dealing with something that has a subjective ontology? Yet, and as I hope that I have been successful in arguing with this article, that does not render academic artistic creation necessarily solipsistic or capricious. Artworks can be original and relevant contributions to our collective knowledge, yet that cannot be evaluated in any other way aside from their capability of affording the establishment of profound, authentic and potentially life-changing artships.

In the end, each evaluator has to be able to step away from her own obsessions as an artist and ask herself a number of questions: does this artwork provide me with a vivid, intense and focused artship? Do I trust that this artist was authentic and entirely in earnest in regard to the focus and vividness of the experience that she is proposing? Is this the experience that I will use in the future to invoke the vividness that enables me to discuss or think about (i.e. discuss with myself) this particular *what it is like*? In other words, can this work become *the* major reference regarding the experiential knowledge it conveys? Is this a work that scouts a broad new area of experience, as opposed to further charting an exhaustively explored territory? And does it set a fertile ground for further exploration of nuances of said experience? If, and only if, the answer to these questions is unequivocally yes — and, after all, the answers refer to a strong subjective experience which either *unequivocally exists* or does not exist at all —, then the artwork has an original contribution of experiential knowledge and is a valid result of artistic research. Even if we should simply call it *artistic creation*.

Conclusion

> But be careful! Because if we attribute a place to art, by assigning it a space from which it should act according to its own criteria, we risk impoverishing it, making it innocuous — the risk of confining it to a space in which, once pacified, it no longer acts with it's own manner; the risk of it ceasing to cause damage, when art has to be subversive. Art has to be damage.[39]

It is perhaps easy to read this text and dismiss it as somewhat conservative take on artistic creation — perhaps even an anachronic one[40] —, or, alternatively, as seeking to provide yet another excuse for artists to carry on capriciously doing art that only they can understand, without ever being asked to provide any further justification. It was not, however, intended in either of those ways, far from it. I have written it as a call to action for artists to reclaim appropriate conditions to elevate their work to its full potential within academic environments.

[39] Translated from the Portuguese translation: "Mas, cuidado! Pois, se atribuímos um lugar à arte ao designar-lhe um espaço a partir do qual deve actuar segundo os seus próprios critérios, corremos o risco de a empobrecer, de a tornar inofensiva, — o risco de ela ficar circunscrita a um espaço e de, uma vez pacificada, já não actuar a seu modo próprio; o risco de ela deixar de causar danos, quando a arte tem de ser subversiva. A arte tem de ser dano" (Kiefer, 2015, p. 15).

[40] After all, who uses such tarnished concepts as *clarified*, *reality*, *knowledge* or *truthful* in 2019? This is something that I intend to address in another article.

Academia is the only safe domain were knowledge creation can be taken to the very best of our individual abilities, without regard for artificially imposed limits or conventions. "Thinking must never submit itself," as Henri Poincaré famously said. One century later, that is an ongoing fight for philosophers, scientists and artists alike.

But artists have an additional fight, which is to reclaim the importance of knowing who we are as subjects, and not merely as objects or statistical abstractions. Particularly, reclaiming the unique ability of artworks to create opportunities for us to experience *what it is like to be a person, living in this world and at this point in time*. Above all, I think of this text as a call to action for artists working in academia to take their work very seriously, and to use the best of their abilities to focus it in a way that extends beyond their caprices, their careers or the current trends of the art market. A call for artists to release themselves from the shackles of a philosophy of art that seems to be more concerned with classifying the phenomenon than with discerning its limits and supplying it with focus.

Academics today are forced to publish whether they have anything relevant to say or not, as I am sure that we are all painfully aware. Several voices have raised against this problem, but few individuals, myself included, seem to have the courage to take upon themselves to actually do something about it. With artworks the problem can be even worse. If in a written article we can read the abstract and skim-through it in order to check whether it is relevant or not, with artworks we either go through them entirely, or we will not get the experience at all. If overwhelmed with artistic production of dubious quality, we run the risk of enduring it all without ever experiencing a meaningful artship. As Ortega y Gasset puts it:

> Reading poetry is not one of my usual activities. In general, I don't think it can be an usual activity for anyone. Both for reading as for creating poetry, we should demand a certain solemnity. Not a solemnity of external pomp, but instead that intimate bewilderment that invades our heart in the essential moments. Contemporary pedagogy has been having a disgraceful influence on proper aesthetic culture, by making art an ordinary activity that happens at fixed-times. Hence we lost the feeling of distance; we lost the respect and fear of art; we approach it at any instant, with the clothing and temper with which it finds use and we got used to not understanding it. The real emotion we today refer to when we speak of aesthetic taste is — if we want to be honest about it — a pale delight, devoid of vigour and density, produced by the mere contact with a beautiful work. […] if [the contemporary man] was honest, he would confess that aesthetic taste is no longer different from the sensation he gets from things that are clean and placed in an appropriate order.[41]

Academic art can have an ethic and we should not run shy from that discussion. And whilst this article is not the proper place to have that discussion, I would start it by suggesting that

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[41] Translated from the original in Spanish: "Leer versos no es una de mis ocupaciones habituales. En general, no concibo que pueda ser la de nadie. Tanto para leer como para crear una poses debiéramos exigir cierta solemnidad. No una solemnidad de exteriores pompas, mas sí aquel aire de estupor íntimo que invade nuestro corazón en los momentos esenciales. La pedagogía contemporánea viene influyendo de un modo deplorable en el orden de la cultura estética al hacer del arte una cosa usadera, normal y de hora fija. De esta suerte, perdemos el sentimiento de las distancias; perdemos respeto y miedo al arte; nos acercamos a él en cualquier instante, en el traje y temple que nos coge y nos acostumbramos a no entenderlo. La emoción real a que hoy nos referimos cuando hablamos de goce estético es — si queremos sinceramente reconocerlo — un pálido deleite, exento de vigor y densidade, que nos produce el mero roce con la obra bella. […] Y acontece que el hombre contemporáneo […] si fuera sincero confesaría que el goce estético no es placer diverso de que producen las cosas un poco aseadas y puestas en buen orden" (Ortega y Gasset, 1964, pp. 248-49).

this ethic should begin by our refusal to show more art than that we can take to the upmost limit of our abilities. Of course that we need to experiment a lot to get anywhere — making art is a daily activity —, and some of those experiments need to be shown to others in order to better grasp their experiential outcomes. For pedagogical reasons, we need to regularly display and discuss the becoming of art in art schools. We might even discover that some of those experiments show great promise and decide to further work on them in order to focus them to their full potential. But I believe that we should form the first layer of selection ourselves by discarding any experiment that doesn't live up to the desired standard.

There is a limit to the number of intense experiences an individual can undergo in a limited amount of time, and our production of artworks should respect that by not presenting more than strictly necessary. The pressure to "publish or perish" has reached art schools, and the results can, to a very great extent, be even more damaging here than they have been so far in science. If an artwork does not afford the vivid experience we are looking for, we should keep our silence and work hard until we can make it do so. To quote what is perhaps the most famous closing remark of all times, "what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" . However, we should keep in mind that, immediately before this sentence, Wittgenstein writes:

> We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer. The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem. (Is not this the reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt that the sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say what constituted that sense?) There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical. […] My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, when he has used them — as steps — to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. (Wittgenstein, 2001, pp. 6.52-6.54)

Art is capable of bringing us closer to a world whose existence lays well beyond our illusion of knowledge and control. Yes, we have great models that enable us to understand and predict the world. Yes, we have a growing myriad of techniques with which we tame matter and energy to make them better serve our needs. But each map and each concept is, at the very same time, an obstacle to our authentic experience of the singularities of the world. Every small deviation from theory in an experiment, even if deemed negligible, is actually reality creeping in to show us how fragile our maps are. Most of the times we don't listen to it. Yet every time we go out of our controlled environments and plunge into the jungle of unnamed and unruly variables, we can't help but to be humbled by the overwhelming power of reality to undermine our claims of understanding it.

But we don't want to be humbled, we want to be in control. Proud of our intelligence, we yell that "the model is the *real* reality". But we know that to be nothing more than self-deception. And we work harder, vigorously protecting the old model for a while, only to discard it when we finally find a better one. No matter how pleased with ourselves to have reached the top again, we know that it is only temporary and that the rock will soon roll downhill again. Reality

couldn't care less: it merely stays there, in front of us, *existing* and, who knows, perhaps laughing at our efforts.

Until a child or a poet stumbles upon it and accepts it as it reveals itself. Both the child and the poet are wise enough to know that they can never exhaust that reality. Yet they linger, and they play. And, once in a while, they can point their finger and convince others to look to a particular detail of reality in a peculiar way. A look that is not generalisable, pragmatic or even paraphrasable, but instead one that is singular, vivid, transfiguring. A look that won't enable us to understand the world as we want it to be or as we want to make it into, but to experience it through the way it reveals itself to us and through the meaning that we, as humans, ascribe to that particular encounter. A look that is not about the world, nor about the person looking to the world, but about what it is like to be thrown as a person into that particular world and in that particular time. Art begins there, precisely where science gives up.

Acknowledgements

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The Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization of Artistic Research

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Abstract: In the earliest days of developing the discourses pertinent to artistic research, the apparent openness of its territory was vital in order that the varied protagonists engaging with it in the manner of pioneers could each recognise themselves within it while remaining open to the often-divergent needs and natures of others around them. This notionally deterritorialized domain had a utopian quality, serving as an idealized zone in which artists might be able to exist and work on their own terms while contributing to something new: a meta-discourse that would generate new and more inclusive kinds of 'knowing'. Responding to that potential, in 2009, Kathleen Coessens, Darla Crispin and Anne Douglas published *The Artistic Turn: A Manifesto*, an early analysis of the emergent artistic research field, using Gilles Deleuze's and Felix Guattari's metaphorical concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization to point up some of the promises – and pitfalls – to be found within the emergent artistic research field. Ten years after the publication of that book, it seems appropriate to return to the text, to reflect on its analysis of that dualistic approach to territory and to test it against more recent developments. This is also an opportunity to point up some of the 'red flags' around potential disciplinary shortcomings in artistic research – and to make tentative suggestions as to how these might be overcome. The essay proposes a model that emphasises the rhizomic interconnectedness of the territories of artistic research. It argues that the nature of this 'saturated connectedness', free from privileged or marginalised elements and continuously dynamic in its functioning, is as crucial to an understanding of artistic research as is a proper comprehension of the separate identities of the territories themselves.
Keywords: artistic research; territory; rhizomatic; critical reflection

When new modes of thought develop and are gradually incorporated into existing structures, what are the consequences – for societies, for institutions and for individuals? How do those involved deal with the inevitable transformations, reaping the potential benefits, and avoiding the possible drawbacks? Taking Christopher Fraying's 1993 tripartite definition of arts research as an arbitrary starting point, we can now look back across an arc of almost three decades during which artistic research has grown from rather uncertain, fluid and contentious beginnings to the status of a 'field', and perhaps even a 'discipline'. Its projects are now widely funded, teams are set up to explore broad artistic research questions, artistic PhDs are valorised and senior artist-researchers are granted professorships (Frayling, 1993).[2] Alongside this, artists have had opportunities to rethink and reconfigure their professional lives and resituate their work in contexts that interrogate its nature in novel ways.[3]

Informed by insights coming from artists themselves and energized by new imperatives to 'explain' their art, participants in the work initially hoped that the artistic research phenomenon would give renewed urgency to, and a fresh perspective upon, questions of 'why art matters'.[4] There was even a hope that this new way of uniting creative action and creative thought could have wider cultural and social impact, as well as enfranchising artists

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[2] Frayling's categories of arts research work are: 'research into art and design, research through art and design and research for art and design', 5.

[3] Artistic research PhDs are now established across the European space, though not uniformly in all countries, something that creates problems for the field, given that several countries restrict their universities of applied science (where most artistic research takes place) to the first and second cycles, with several other countries struggling to provide sufficient funding for educational and cultural innovation. The programmes that do exist have both regional characteristics and increasingly interwoven quality assurance mechanisms. One of the exciting aspects of the maturation of the artistic research PhD arises when good practices are shared. One example of this is the Erasmus + Strategic Partnership 'Advancing Supervision for Artistic Research Partnerships 2018-2021 https://advancingsupervision.eu.

[4] The title of Chapter One of Coessens, Crispin and Douglas, 2009. Reconsideration of specific themes form the book forms the basis for this essay.

by giving them a new kind of 'voice' and new means through which they might give accounts of their experiences.

In 2009, Kathleen Coessens, Anne Douglas and I published an early analysis of the emergent artistic research field, using Gilles Deleuze's and Felix Guattari's metaphorical concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization to point up some of the promises – and pitfalls – to be found within the emergent artistic research field. Ten years after the publication of that book, *The Artistic Turn: A Manifesto*, it feels appropriate to return to the text, to reflect on its analysis of that dualistic approach to territory and to test it against newer developments and modes of 'progress'. This is also an opportunity to point up some of the 'red flags' around potential disciplinary shortcomings in artistic research – and to make tentative suggestions as to how these might be overcome. In doing so, I would be the first to acknowledge that this critique of artistic research is rather limited both by its delineated conceptual specificity and by my own far-from-disinterested status as co-author of the book on which the critique is based. Nevertheless, I believe there are arguments that mitigate both these limitations.

Concerning the first point, the conceptual thinking of Deleuze and Guattari has proved enduringly – albeit perhaps surprisingly - attractive to many working in the field of artistic research, regardless of the nature of their artistic expertise or their fluency in twentieth century French philosophy. It is therefore apposite to reflect upon this development of a shared, but largely borrowed, conceptual vocabulary in considering the wider question of how research develops its communal meta-languages. Artistic research has given us opportunities to observe this evolution. As to the second point, that which concerns the 'disinterested' gaze versus the partiality of the researcher, self-reflexivity has become both a common mode of thought within artistic research (and even one that has been valorised by the enshrining of the reflective commentary as a component of specific artistic research PhDs). This elevation of subjectivity is a phenomenon that has, with some justification, attracted a certain amount of criticism. Nevertheless, it is an almost inevitable consequence of the bringing together of the sensibilities of the artist and the researcher. It makes sense, therefore, to employ its processes alongside critiquing them, given that this essay makes no claim to be 'objective'.[5]

Some of the artistic research production currently emergent may certainly be said to be suffering from critical shortcomings. What matters here is not merely the means through which art is argued *for*, in words, using language; it is also about the nature of the art itself, its sense of texture, of vitality, and the danger of 'flatness' that comes from the production of large quantities of work in which it can seem that nothing is a stake. Through the interrogation of deterritorialization, it may be possible both to determine whether these shortcomings are real or illusory and, if the former, how they are to be addressed in the decades to come as the field matures, and as the flexibility offered by being a relatively 'young' field gives way to the more rigid structures associated with being an established and

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[5] There is a growing interest in how both auto-ethnography and reflective practice may develop their different yet complementary roles within research in the arts. An informative research project on these interconnected areas, 'Beyond 'mesearch': autoethnography, self-reflexivity, and personal experience as academic research in music studies' is being conducted at the University of Surrey, United Kingdom. Details may be found at: https://www.surrey.ac.uk/department-music-and-media/research/musicology

valorised discipline.

Deterritorialization

> A rhizomatic description of the domains of art and research implies dismantling the frontiers, opening the territories and deterritorializing space from the side of the arts, as well as from the side of scientific research. By borrowing the notions of territory and deterritorialization from Deleuze and Guattari (1980, 1987), we acknowledge the complexity of both realms, as all territories and their centres are shifting and dynamic. The idea of the artistic turn implies and explicit experience and recognition of these shifts.
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> Deterritorialization, for Deleuze and Guattari, means a process that takes the territory away from some previously existing entity, opening the frontiers and enabling otherness and difference. To deterritorialize is to free-up existing fixed relations, exposing oneself to new forms, to transformation. It is not a real escape, but more a departure – sometimes violent – from a given territory.[6]

The emergence of artistic research owed a great deal to political developments related to the funding of higher education through two streams: teaching and research. In such a duopoly, the creative and performing arts needed arguments to justify their access to both streams. Added to this, the harmonisation of European higher education through the Bologna process forced higher arts education right across the continent to adopt the three-cycle paradigm of Bachelor, Master, Doctor, in the final cycle of which research was an essential prerequisite. Responding to these funding imperatives, but also pursuing a certain philosophical ideal, those championing the concept of artistic research proposed a research space in which the artist's queries, dilemmas and exploratory journeys might be problematised as research questions to be explored and solved by artistic peers, both in relation to and through art-making and its ancillary activities. Although this was primarily driven by the need to introduce of degree structures into arts and arts-training institutions and to establish career and promotional paths for artists working in academic environments, this precipitated intense debates around the very idea of 'knowledge' and how it is conceived, preserved and communicated that continue to this day.

The first consequence of the articulation of the concept of artistic research was the claim for a broad conceptual territory that, paradoxically, would be permeable at its boundaries (thus with non-specific frontiers) and as non-prescriptive as possible in its internal nature. In the earliest days of developing the discourses pertinent to artistic research, the apparent openness of its territory was vital in order that the varied fields could each find themselves within it while remaining open to the often-divergent needs and natures of others around them. This deterritorialized domain had a utopian quality, serving as an idealized zone in which artists might be able to exist and work on their own terms while contributing to something new: a meta-discourse that would generate new kinds of 'knowing'. Some of the questions associated with this deterritorialization were articulated in this manner, painting a

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6 Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, as cited in Coessens et. al., (2009, pp. 87-88). The relationship between the work of Deleuze and Guattari and various kinds of artistic research work are explored in a biennial conference series called DARE – Deleuze and Artistic Research: https://dareconferences.org/about/. The open-access archive of the DARE website is a helpful resource both for those wishing to develop a knowledge of how Deleuze and Guattari pertain to the reading of the artistic research field, and how this set of relationships may be generative of new artistic research work.

vision of a fluid disciplinary zone in which artists, and others, may:

> […] wish to explore the wider space of artistic practice and consider how artistic research may inhabit this, in addition to the more traditional research spaces. One effect of this exploration will be a 'deterritorialization' of a range of space which, hitherto, have tended to be more rigidly demarcated and labelled as to ownership. As has been seen repeatedly, artistic do not live exclusively in a secluded 'artistic' world. They partake of the world of ideas and embed it idiosyncratically in their practice (Coessens et. al., 2009, p. 77).

Grasping for terminologies that could effectively articulate some aspects of the essential nature of artistic practices, artist-researchers found that the writings of Deleuze and Guattari offered a means of reflecting upon the morphology and behaviour of the field as resonant because of the process-oriented descriptive nature of the conceptualisations as reflective of the process-driven nature of art-making:

> All art is, in itself, already engaged in continuous deterritorialization, in the sense that Deleuze and Guattari use this term. Artistic activity is intrinsically a 'becoming': it entails movement and the dynamism of change; it is a continuous production of unique events, each participating in its own continuity. Moreover, it operates as a line of flight, starting from a secure centre, but freeing itself from what was before, following a path of change and innovation encountering the other – be it space, symbol, idea or person. These processes imply the creative potential of an assemblage, embedding elements of the broader environment in new and different patterns (Coessens et. al., 2009, p. 92).

So far so good: the territory of art could be seen to be open, non-resistant, enfranchising and freeing for the artist, as well as the possibility opening up that artistic work might become increasingly consequential in the broader domain of research. This optimistic vision has, however, generated two severe problems, which will be the focus for the remainder of this essay. The first problem is that artistic research is extremely demanding of the artist:

> Artistic research, then, requires a new kind of deterritorialization for the artist: a destabilizing movement away from his or her being involved, in a relatively routine manner, in the process; the search for and realization of each new creative assemblage. Over and above the customary dynamics of this movement through the artistic space, it demands a striking out towards different territories, colonized by different expertises. It urges artists to reflect on their own processes, to merge the practices of their artistry with new domains. It is difficult work, implying not only a recovery of the world of practices, but also a translation or an interpretation/re-interpretation of it (Coessens et. al., 2009, p. 93).

The second problem is that the claim for disciplinary territory is not neutral; it impinges upon the space – and resources – of other domains of thought and work, along with the disciplines they generate:

> From the point of view of research, a deterritorialization of the research space also takes place. Not only new knowledge but also new modes of knowledge – and moreover, new actors – enter the stage of research. The territory of research has never been totally fixed or closed, even if some scientists would like it to be. Novel scientific paradigms, new disciplines and fresh discoveries have shaken the foundations of the empire of scientific research more than once…

What will the specificity of artistic research imply for the broader territory of research? In the first place, the scene of research, centred on academic and scientific communities, will encounter new actors who will have to be considered no longer as objects of study, but as inquiring subjects themselves: the artist and the artist-as-researcher. These two interconnected roles are historically embedded in art without necessarily being inscribed within the kinds of institutional practices that are currently dominant within higher education. Secondly, artistic practice as a field of research will not be the sole territory of the scientific research, as in the recent past, but a shared realm, in which different kinds of research can happen: some conducted by scientific researchers, some by artist-researchers, and some by both working together. Thirdly, the artistic manifestation, artefact, performance or intervention will no longer be something to be inserted into a social, aesthetic, interpretation, led by aesthetic and scientific experts in art, but will be embedded in an authentic artistic discourse of research led by practitioners of art. This means that, fourthly, research cultures will potentially be enriched with new narratives, discourses and modes of knowledge including knowledge of making (*techne*) and knowledge of the value systems that inform making (*phronesis*) (Coessens et. al., 2009, pp. 94 – 95).

The reaction to these two realities means that much is at stake in the field as it stands today. If they are to avoid what Deleuze and Guattari term 'overcoding', the freezing up of conceptual freedom of open territory through solidification and thought -processes and 're-territorialization', artist-researchers will need to be nimble and skilled in their conceptions, and tolerant of the conceptions of others whilst developing a more sophisticated criticality than has yet been demonstrated within the field at large. This is its next step toward maturity and, even, long-term viability.

Artistic Research and its Territories

The First Territory: the search for definition

The first, and possibly the most pervasive, re-territorialisation of artistic research is the search for an all-encompassing, unifying and enduring definition. In a sense, this fundamental challenge pertains to another problematic area for artist-researchers: the quest for language. The development of definitions has exposed the faults and fractures that tend to affect all large groups that propose to develop a consequential research thinking; disciplinary, cultural and national differences are at odds with the generation of a truly effective, unifying language. Instead, various subject groups and organisations have tended to develop a range of related but heterogeneous descriptions.[7] In the early years of artistic

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[7] Policy documents concerning artistic research continue to proliferate. Among the most important of these include Mick Wilson and Schelte van Ruiten, eds., 'The SHARE Handbook for Artistic Research Education', accessible at http://www.sharenetwork.eu/resources/share-handbook, Research and Development in the Arts: 1995-2015: Twenty Years of Artistic Research, the Working Group of the Norwegian Artistic Research Programme: Nina Malterud, Torben Lai, Aslaug Nyrnes and Frode Thorsen, accessible under Reports: https://diku.no/en/programmes/norwegian-artistic-research-programme, the Arts and Humanities Council website: https://ahrc.ukri.org/funding/research/researchfundingguide/introduction/definitionofresearch/, 'Key Concepts for AEC Members: Artistic Research: An AEC Council 'White Paper' 2015, accessible on: https://www.aec-music.eu/userfiles/File/Key%20Concepts/White%20Paper%20AR%20-%20Key%20Concepts%20for%20AEC%20Members%20-%20EN.pdf.
Another key document for curriculum development in artistic research is *The 'Florence Principles' on the Doctorate in the Arts (2016-2017)*, accessible on https://www.elia-artschools.org/documents/the-florence-principles, and endorsed by: AEC - Association Européenne des Conservatoires Académies de Musique et Musikhochschulen,
CILECT - International Association of Film and Television Schools (Centre International de Liaison des Ecoles de Cinéma et de Télévision), Cumulus - International Association of Universities and Colleges of Art, Design and Media, EAAE - European Association for Architectural Education and SAR - Society for Artistic Research.

research, these descriptive definitions were evolved to mark out territory, to claim institutional distinctiveness and to meet funding criteria. Partly because of the latter influence, it did not take long for aspects of the work to be seen as being resonant with national character. Compare, for example, the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) outline, with the Norwegian Artistic Research Programme (NARP) definition – or network of definitions:

> *AHRC:*
> The AHRC's definition of research is as follows: research activities should primarily be concerned with research processes, rather than outputs. This definition is built around three key features and your proposal must fully address all of these in order to be considered eligible for support:
>
> 1. It must define a series of research questions, issues or problems that will be addressed in the course of the research. It must also define its aims and objectives in terms of seeking to enhance knowledge and understanding relating to the questions, issues or problems to be addressed;
>
> 2. It must specify a research context for the questions, issues or problems to be addressed. You must specify why it is important that these particular questions, issues or problems should be addressed; what other research is being or has been conducted in this area; and what particular contribution this project will make to the advancement of creativity, insights, knowledge and understanding in this area;
>
> 3. It must specify the research methods for addressing and answering the research questions, issues or problems. You must state how, in the course of the research project, you will seek to answer the questions, address the issues or solve the problems. You should also explain the rationale for your chosen research methods and why you think they provide the most appropriate means by which to address the research questions, issues or problems.[8]
>
> *NARP:*
> Artistic research in Norway takes the artist's special experience and reflection as its point of departure, and, as such, is in line with the category research in the arts. A high artistic standard is a key requirement for artistic research in Norway. This is part of the platform of the Artistic Research Programme and the institutions' research activities.
>
> Artists develop work methods that prove to lead to an artistic result. The methods employed can be individual or specific to each artistic field, such as composition, design or dance. The field of art is experimental in nature, and critically testing, challenging and overturning methods are integral parts of its culture. Questions about and reflection on method are fundamentally interwoven with the artistic work itself. The reflection that is part of artistic practice, on content, process and methods, has a central place in artistic research.[9]

The AHRC definition aims for criteria that can map easily onto other research domains, as befits the organisation's situation within the UK research space, so that its research ambitions resonate clearly within that space in order for its researchers to prosper. The NARP criteria expose the quite different preoccupations of the Nordic approach, emphasising

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[8] As in the Funding section for the Arts and Humanities Council website: https://ahrc.ukri.org/funding/research/researchfundingguide/introduction/definitionofresearch/

[9] Research and Development in the Arts: 1995-2015: Twenty Years of Artistic Research, the Working Group of the Norwegian Artistic Research Programme: Nina Malterud, Torben Lai, Aslaug Nyrnes and Frode Thorsen. Accessible under Reports: https://diku.no/en/programmes/norwegian-artistic-research-programme

interdisciplinarity, social relevance and - to the highest degree possible - the centrality of the artistic production as the articulator of its own research content.

As this example illustrates, it soon became obvious that the delineating specificities of bodies at national level might have a levelling and even inhibiting effect upon the expansion of the field; the initially locally territorialized definitions and terminologies became subject to modification by international bodies, such as subject associations, with the aim of making their collective valorisation more persuasive to stakeholders who held influence over international policy and the way its purse strings might be opened. From the broad scope of the European Union to the voices of member organisations related to it, this internationalisation process was a prominent feature of the early years of the century's second decade. An example of this kind of work with definitions came in 2015 with the 'White Paper on Artistic Research', drawn up by the Association Européenne des Conservatoires, Académies de Musique et Musikhochschulen (AEC) which devised the following definition and checklist of distinctions:

> Artistic Research may be defined as a form of research that possesses a solid basis embedded in artistic practice and which creates new knowledge and/or insight and perspectives within the arts, contributing both to artistry and to innovation.
>
> Artistic Research commonly displays all, or most, of the following features:
> · It is usually conducted by the artist-researcher or through the collaboration of artists within a research team
> · It promotes critical dialogue within the artistic field, with other relevant fields of knowledge and between the scholarly and professional domains
> · It is supported by critical reflection on the content and/or context of the research topic
> · It articulates and reflects on methods and work processes
> · It shares relevant professional knowledge with the wider artistic community and disseminates it in the public sphere to the enrichment of cultural understanding[10]

While the debate concerning definitions and criteria has formed a vital part of the early evolution of the field, what has perhaps been most important is the strong engagement of varied disciplines, institutions and interest groups in the search for answers, from which, examples such as the above have emerged as nodes of good practice. Overall, these groups have energetically championed the adoption of ever-evolving and inclusive definitions that share a number of important characteristics:

1) The relation of the evolution of artistic research to the generation and validation of study programmes, mainly at third-cycle level, but also with an increasing focus upon second-cycle work and the possibility of foundation studies at first cycle;

2) The promotion of interdisciplinarity within artistic research projects, both through having artists in varied fields working in teams, and, in some institutions, by promoting the inclusion of scientists;

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[10] 'Key Concepts for AEC Members: Artistic Research: An AEC Council 'White Paper' 2015, accessible on: https://www.aec-music.eu/userfiles/File/Key%20Concepts/White%20Paper%20AR%20-%20Key%20Concepts%20for%20AEC%20Members%20-%20EN.pdf

3) The establishment and development of international networks as a means of supporting and promulgating the goals of artistic research, e.g. the Society for Artistic Research - https://societyforartisticresearch.org;

4) The generation of peer-reviewed, online platforms enabling multi-media presentation of artistic research work - e.g. JAR (the Journal for Artistic Research) - https://jar-online.net, Ruukku (Finnish Journal for Artistic Research) - http://ruukku-journal.fi/en, ÍMPAR – Online Journal for Artistic Research - http://revistas.ua.pt/index.php/impar, and VIS (Nordic Journal for Artistic Research) - https://www.visjournal.nu;

5) The argument for artistic research as a practice capable of generating fellows and professorial staff with viable career progression possibilities and with professionally-relevant skills.

This evolution of these logical practices and procedures has finally removed some of the urgency to find and fix upon all-encompassing definitions, moving questions instead toward the more complex development of distinctive methodologies and creating new territorial frontiers within artistic research itself. Following the lead of Deleuze and Guattari, it is noted in *The Artistic Turn* that 'a rhizomatic description of the domains of art and research implies dismantling the frontiers and deterritorializing space from the side of the arts, as well as from the side of scientific research' (Coessens et. al., p. 87). The implication is that the discipline faces not one but two potentially contentious frontiers and that no single defining position is likely to satisfy all constituencies and interest groups. What is required is a notion of defining itself that, paradoxically, eschews definition or, at the very least, remains resolutely multi-faceted and flexible.

The Second Territory: the illusory primacy of the Self

In research terms, the constructs of artistic research, which foreground the artist as both maker and researcher and necessitate complex, process-driven structures and practices, place its participants in challenging scenarios which they manage with varying degrees of success. One of the questions at the core of this is whether it is actually invariably the case that artistic research work can enhance the quality, merit and relevance of art-making itself. While the claim for benefit seems reasonable enough in itself – *if I deepen my understanding of what I am doing I ought to be able to do it better* - it is not always borne out in practice. Moreover, what constitutes 'better' in the context of artistic research is far from transparent because of the increasingly contentious debate around 'quality' in artistic research. Can first-rate art redeem second-rate research (or vice versa)? Is it enough for a piece of work to demonstrate first-rate art *and* research if the two do not interact in any particularly profound way? Might there actually be a 'third species of quality in artistic research which is neither that of art nor of research? Can the traits that make one a first-rate artist and those that lead to the highest quality research ever truly co-exist in the one individual?

It is arguable that, in their eagerness to consolidate positions in the artistic research sphere, institutions and organisations have yet to develop truly rigorous systems of critical thinking through which to assess artistic research work on its own terms. One of the challenges to developing such systems is that artistic research has its basis in the generation of projects

which articulate the artist's own practice as linked to their own condition and critical stances. This means that artistic research is invariably exemplary to some degree; its criteria must shift with each new instantiation, making meta-level analysis difficult to apply and universalising extrapolations all but meaningless.

In order to develop some contexts that may enable insights within artistic research to be seen from without, some artistic research organisations require a secondary commentary or critical reflection upon a given artistic practice or project, particularly if the work is associated with the granting of a degree or the award of funding. There is ample evidence that this array of requirements combining artistic production and commentary can be disconcerting for those undertaking such work:

> How [do we] put into words the experience of developing an artistic project or doing artistic work? All such attempts at articulation involve the writer […] finding a good and expedient language with which to describe his or her experience, a language that will also make it possible to share this experience theoretically and cognitively. A language that enables not only the sharing of experience, but also the discussion and problematization of the experience, so that the creative practice, filtered through a different medium, also becomes visible to the creative subject. In this perspective, the attempts at articulation are based on an underlying literal interpretation of 'reflection' which can function as a mirror, but also as a contrasting element...(Vassenden, 2013, n.p.)

It is also true that there is, as yet, no institutional consensus around the relative weight of these components, or their ultimate merit within a holistic evaluation process. Many institutions maintain the long thesis element for the granting of a doctoral degree as an important and fair earnest of a linked artistic and intellectual merit, while others have eliminated the thesis altogether, regarding it as irrelevant to both the nature and site of most research knowledge as it exists within artistic practice.

At the centre of this array of contradictory pressures is the artist. And there can be little doubt that many artist-researchers find the forces ranged about them to be generative of anxiety, finding their artistic 'selves' to the challenged and thus, fearing for the preservation of the kinds of artistic flow or fluency they normally possess and are seeking to enhance. But this creates another potential problem. Our contemporary orientation toward 'the self' can colour responses to the requirement for 'commentary'. Oftentimes, what should be an insight into matters that illuminate the nature of art-making becomes a mere glance into the personal world of the artist and author, with the critical potential being scarce or entirely absent. What is still missing, still under-theorised and little discussed, is the means through which we can, with at least some critical distance, interrogate the artistic act in its materiality, process or instantiation, rather than the artist or their personality.

The argument at this point tends to be that the artist and the art are, to some degree at least, inseparable. Yet, this is contrary to the ways in which art itself has been assessed for centuries, and flies in the face of an academic critical tradition that, while often pilloried by artists, has had many skilful and perceptive practitioners. The many contemporary arguments against criticism – its rigid power structures, its enfranchisement of the few, its damage to the vulnerable, its cloaking of corruption - have detracted from its strong aspects:

the detection of genuine talent, the challenge to the artist's privilege, the unmasking of cant, the detection of fraud. It may be true to say that, in a sense, artistic research helpfully problematises the manner in which artistic veneration whitewashes human folly, but it cannot do so in contemporary society without massively boosting its currently tenuous relevance. The search for 'self', for 'voice', in artistic research is necessary, for all that it brings with it doubt and vulnerability; but it is, in itself, insufficient for the generation of a fully consequential, responsive and responsible artistic research work.

Alongside the territory of the 'self' must be the territories of the 'others' whose perceptions matter and whose own reflections point up the potential for a more nuanced, complex receptive space in which it is not the artist as a personality that matters, but the generation of empathic understanding that some of his or her art can offer. Furthermore, consideration of 'the other' within artistic research work has the potential to generate a kind of productive friction, a set of positive resistances that can be helpful to the work's effectiveness but that do not 'belong' to the artist. In a sense, then, one mode of diagnosis for artistic research work is the consideration as to whether there is anything 'at stake', one symptom of which would be that the work is willing to test itself again otherness.

This suggestion is far from a plea for bland acceptance; it is associated with another fair earnest of all research: that it is meaningful, in some way, to a body of peers and, possibly, to those outside the peer environment. Furthermore, for all that it posits a form or rigour, it is also potentially generative of a compassionate understanding, not merely on behalf of the reader but – significantly – on behalf of the artist. This does not mean compromise in the service of softening reception; it is a demand for critical imagination, for development of generative and receptive vocabularies that have yet to exist, for a better understanding of the nature, necessity and dangers of risk. If artists are to highlight their positions vis-à-vis artmaking as vulnerable, then the artist-*researcher,* it may be argued, bears the ethical responsibility inherent in the associated artwork and has a duty to acknowledge that reality for the readers. All this points to the conclusion that artistic researchers do indeed bear both artistic and research responsibility – but the nature of what this means is yet to be fully uncovered.

The Third Territory: the matter of boundaries

If art generates empathic responses and the potential for humane understanding, it is surely from this quality that we derive our enduring sense of art's vitality and relevance. But this opens up further questions around the nature of art-making and the manifold ways in which it is practised. While much art of the past had – apparently – clear boundaries in terms of possession and authorship, much contemporary art is generated precisely to question and upend these notions of ownership, as well as asking serious ethical questions concerning the illusory aspects of past practices. Indeed, these matters are less contemporary than they might seem, going back to a reconsideration of the potentially exploitative nature of much past art production, including the use of unacknowledged artists in collective works or 'schools of'; the borrowing of ideas and techniques with insufficient acknowledgement; and the deliberate infringement of personal space.

Questions around artistic ownership with respect to artistic research demonstrate how utterly

insufficient the standard research apparatus can be in allowing an artistic research project both to press boundaries and (paradoxically) to document its findings through art alone with ethical probity. Some of these problems are so extreme that it may be argued that certain forms of cultural production are hermetically sealed from artistic research practices precisely because of the array of legal mechanisms at work. This has an impact upon artists in terms of its being a professional question that, in turn, is attached to deeper matters concerning identity and status. If, say, the copyrighted professional work is completely closed to research interrogation, then it may be the case that some of the best art cannot be evaluated as artistic research. In this case, which identity is the one that matters? Or why must the choice be made at all? This points up the problem that most artistic research is obliged to exist outside the professional sphere so that the evaluation systems it requires can be enabled; but this really means that the systems themselves are insufficient, since artistic research should surely be able to articulate itself – as art and as research - in its best professional milieu.

Because, in reality, artistic research exists in two milieus – artistic and scholarly – it has both a dual requirement and a dual responsibility. Just as it needs to hold its own in the professional context, it must also display an awareness of the web of related research activity – both artistic and conventionally 'scientific' - into which it is launching itself. Artist researchers bear a considerable responsibility in relation to this problem. For all that artistic research PhDs generally require ample evidence of a knowledge of context, it is sometimes discouraging to see the number of projects that claim originality but instead demonstrate ignorance of context. Scientists based in the arts and humanities have no such luxury; the 'literature search' is the rather exacting requirement that gives evidence that the researcher has adequate knowledge and understanding of past practices and a clear idea of how their current research builds upon it. While some artistic research projects are indeed admirable in their acknowledgement of their debt to the past, far too many are derivative; they are what John Cage might have called a 'Cheap Imitation' (in reference to his piano composition of 1969, which he orchestrated in 1972 and transcribed into a violin version 1977 – i.e. he made his own 'cheap imitations'). Unsurprisingly, Cage's work is often emulated by artist-researchers, but the mechanisms through which one acknowledges the indebtedness of one kind of art-making to another remain problematic in their implementation. The interesting and far more complex matter at work here is the degree to which all creativity has a certain hybrid quality of old and new, and each new artwork has the potential to unmake art by pulling its origins to pieces. Thus, the need for research probity and the sense that art should be able to exist on its own terms are potentially in conflict. The disciplinary roles and responsibilities of the artist-researcher place them at the centre of this dilemma.

Artistic research is in an awkward situation in terms of its current geopolitical traces, the identity problems it poses for its participants and the linked exclusion and potential exploitation of those who cannot fully access its arenas and the advantages they afford. Many artist-researchers within study programmes come to their work with genuine aims to address social problems and various inequalities through their art-making, despite the fact that the discipline as a whole, together with its sub-fields, has suffered from an over-representation of the well-off and the white in all but a few cases. Regionally, artist research remains, for the most part, confined to core locations in the Low Countries, specific centres in Portugal and Spain, Austria (funded by the Austrian Science Fund FWF: Programme for

Arts-Based Research PEEK) the Nordic countries, certain locations in Australia (Queensland) and a few outposts in the Far East, United Kingdom, South Africa and North America. Even as participants in these regions acknowledge the non-representative nature of the artist research community, they generally admit to their PhD and post-doc funded programmes people 'like themselves', not least because of the national pressure to demonstrate the relevance of artist research as a means of articulating national character and concerns, something that is both understandable and potentially dangerous to academic freedom. This means that artistic identities remain a potential ground for negotiation (in itself a potentially dubious matter) while those who wish to challenge norms from 'outside' will rarely gain opportunities to do so.

Can inequality and oppression be challenged by those who gain advantages from those same systems? And, in this age where so much of education is in danger of being instrumentalised, is artistic research and its training not also in danger of being entrained in a series of manifesto-based false promises, thus neutralising its potential for trenchant critique? How is artistic research to be accessed by those outside its privileged areas? And when the 'other' is invited into the artistic research world, how is their identity to be safeguarded in the face of so much privilege? Furthermore, with the institutionalised foregrounding of project groups and interdisciplinarity, how can the gatekeepers of artistic research prevent mere exploitation of one artist by another, and the generative blandness that comes when an instrumental notion (such as interdisciplinarity) takes precedence over the actual nature of the art itself as a fair earnest of quality, or a pre-requisite for a position? All these questions point to the expanding set of dilemmas around artistic research and the identities it generates.

The Fourth Territory: the matter of language

If dangers of cultural appropriation and matters of property and propriety give us pause in relation to the artistic domain, the responsibilities inherent in identifying oneself as a researcher, and developing thought within that environment whilst maintaining an artistic sensibility – whatever that may entail – are often daunting. Research has its accepted ways of working, its demands for sound argumentation and proof. Even so, it is constantly being challenged and destabilised as a result of these pressures. A recent example of this is the 'Sokal squared' or 'Grievance Studies' controversy, exemplified by a trio of scholars who submitted bogus articles to peer reviewed journals in order to test the rigour of the critical apparatus. The disciplines targeted in this scandal, among which were cultural studies and gender studies, have an uncomfortable proximity to some artist research work, and the questions of probity that the scandal revisited need to be raised within artistic research as it matures.[11] While it is possible, in artistic terms, to make 'work' that interrogates the matter of fakery, there is also a real problem about how the field asks itself critical questions, how it will arbitrate for quality or the lack of it, how its degree programmes must mean something in terms of being able to pose critical questions around art. In this context, that which constitutes research 'skill' may be open to question (with the concomitant debate around that

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[11] The 'Sokal Squared' trio in question give their account in James A Lindsay, Peter Boghossian and Helen Pluckrose, 'Academic Grievance Studies and the Corruption of Scholarship' in *Aero Magazine*, October 2, 2018: https://areomagazine.com/2018/10/02/academic-grievance-studies-and-the-corruption-of-scholarship/. Alan Sokal's original scholarly publishing hoax took place in 1996 and can be studied in Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, 1998. *Intellectual Impostures*. London, UK: Profile Books.

which constitutes 'de-skilling'), but the manner of its execution should leave the arbiter with no doubt as to the relevance and viability of the approach.

Artistic research is, therefore, a call to re-examine the nature of 'method' and to scrutinise the apparatus of the research structure and how it is to generate research that has genuine merit. We must keep asking questions around the relationship between artistic research and its sometimes erroneous reading of the 'scientific method' whilst being able to engage in uncomfortable discourses because of the responsibility that comes with holding funded research positions (as is the case with many who are candidates for artistic research PhDs). But these discourses are to be taken up within a field that, as yet, lacks a language that it can fully call its own. The gradual creation of such a language – both in terms of its manifold 'dialects' concerning methods and its 'received version', through which wider dissemination takes place - will take many years to unfold. The components of a language of artistic research - the words, the gestures, the scarcely tangible signs – these are starting to emerge with varying levels of fluency and eloquence and still lack the advantage of a widely-shared familiarity. As the discipline matures, its sub-languages will continue to splinter, reflecting the need to articulate, as clearly and specifically as possible the essential nature of each brand of research work. But this may well have the effect of fracturing the current emphasis upon research groups and creating, once again, the phenomenon of individuals working in silos without a sense of community. This would be unfortunate, given the many years of consolidation that have taken place, and the benefits for the field, in terms of advocacy, attaining of resources and valorisation, that have ensued.

The Fifth Territory: the artistic research sphere as eco-system, sites beyond, and fragile utopias

Artistic research work takes up both physical and cognitive space; its territories are the installation, the staged performance, the temporally extravagant recording, the sculpture, the happening. It calls upon its participants to move, to transcend, boundaries that may be conceptual, national, disciplinary and more. It generates 'stuff'. Artistic researchers have a responsibility to communicate, but that necessitates mobility which, while taken as a sign of virtue and prized within the European Union's definitions of quality within research and education, also present challenges to the physical environment and to the temporal environments of those within its structures. What is to be done about the debris, the criss-crossed flights, the lost time? Can we really argue that all of it is both necessary and environmentally sound? Containment is vulnerable to rupture; decay occurs, whether it is the true stuff of art, or not. Are the gatekeepers for the appropriation of artistic research space always clear in their intentions and conscious of the ecological strains they impose? What is the ecological price of the freedom of the artist, and who is to pay the bill?

Conclusion: A Rhizomatic Pentagon

The answers to these questions lie, in part, in the interconnectedness of the territories of artistic research. The diagram below presents the five territories discussed during this essay as being connected rhizomatically, in that each links directly to the other four. The nature of this 'saturated connectedness', free from privileged or marginalised elements and continuously dynamic in its functioning, is as crucial as the separate identities of the territories themselves.

Figure 1. A Rhizomatic Pentagon

The utopia/dystopia of artistic research is that it postulates new territories of future knowing that have yet to be made, to be explored and then to be kept or discarded. It is a world suspended between that which will become second-hand and that which may be redeemed through being remade. Through all its interwoven territories - the thickets of works that form definitions, the many 'selves' generating work that is paradoxically personal and transpersonal, the frontiers and boundaries that emerge as methodological languages develop – its challenges are multiple and formidable:

> Artistic creativity and, by extension, artistic research focus the possibility of infinite variability within acts of representation and interpretation. If research in general is to deal adequately with human society, it needs to embrace those aspects of knowledge production that deal with human subjectivity and relationships, not as phenomena to be deduced and re-harnessed within human control, but open-endedly, as part of a process of creative construction and interpretation that is relative, specific to context and value-driven (Coessens et. al., p. 180).

All this points to the further potential of the field, but also to the urgency to maintain its ever-transforming territories as viable, even in our uncertain political, social and cultural times and, hopefully, beyond them.

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Art Worlds, Voice and Knowledge: thoughts on quality assessment of artistic research outcomes

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Abstract: This paper discusses the nature of artistic knowledge, and proposes that knowledge production through artistic research takes material and embodied forms. Further, the author proposes that artistic researchers must be clearly situated in an art world, as well as in academia. The assessment of artistic quality must be carried out to a great extent outside academia, by agents identified in the art world within which the project is situated. In the paper, four recent PhD theses produced in three institutions in Sweden are presented and analysed from the socio-cultural perspective of their art worlds. Further, the paper proposes that artistic knowledge can be further accessed through a systematic inquiry into the material and performative forms in which it is manifested. A brief analysis of the emergence of a shared voice between a composer and a performer - through a study of the use of transcription in the working process - aims to further unpack the possibilities of accessing artistic knowledge through multiple methods for documentation and analysis. In the final analysis, the author proposes that artistic research must develop more considered approaches to artistic knowledge, and thereby, also to aim for artistic results that allow artistic researchers to make a difference in their respective art worlds.
Keywords: artistic knowledge; assessment; voice; art worlds

1. Introduction

Although artistic research indeed has become an established discipline in many countries across Europe over the past twenty years, the approaches to several fundamental perspectives, such as publication formats, epistemology and methods remain diverse, as does the question of assessment of artistic quality. As summarized by Henk Borgdorff in an interview in an Australian journal:

> I don't think there is an overall European consensus in that regard. Maybe there shouldn't be one either because the idea that something is fixed in assessment criteria doesn't do justice to a field which is always changing (as science is). As Bruno Latour says it is 'in action'. Maybe it is good that there is no fixed set of criteria for the assessment of artistic research because then we can keep the discussion open. The discursivity or inter-subjective judgement framework should be in place. So, you should endorse or strengthen the debate but I don't think there are any definitive criteria to assess whether this is good or not. (Wilson, 2016, n.p.)

Along similar lines, the aim of the present paper is not to propose a "fixed set of criteria" for the assessment of artistic quality, but rather to contribute to a discussion which will not have a final endpoint. The argument builds on a consideration of epistemological and methodological perspectives, in order to approach the formulation of a framework through which a more considered understanding of knowledge production through artistic research can be created.

2. The art worlds of artistic research

In this paper I will develop an understanding of artistic quality as the result of the negotiation between many actors in a network of human and non-human agents, in a specific socio-cultural context. Howard Becker (1982) refers to such contexts as "art worlds", which are inherently dependent on cooperation, but also and importantly, do not have boundaries

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dividing them from other art worlds. Some agents may only be active within one specific art world while others, say a symphony orchestra, may play substantial roles in many different art worlds. The activities inside an art world are defined by conventions, some of which rest on aesthetic judgement and some of which are conventions guiding activities of a practical nature. Conventions are maintained, carried on, challenged and replaced within art worlds. As such, conventions are important for creating an understanding of how artistic quality is understood in a specific art world. Perhaps to an even greater extent than with individuals and institutions, conventions spread across art worlds, a process through which, their nature also continues to modify.

> Art worlds consist of all the people who are necessary to the production of the characteristic works which that world, and perhaps others as well, define as art. Members of art worlds coordinate the activities by which work is produced by referring to a body of conventional understandings embodied in common practice and in frequently used artifacts. The same people often collaborate repeatedly, even routinely, in similar ways to produce similar works, so that we can think of an art world as an established network of cooperative links between participants. If the same people do not actually act together in every instance, their replacements are also familiar with and proficient in the use of those conventions, so that cooperation can proceed without difficulty. Conventions make collective activity simpler and less costly in time, energy and other resources; but they do not make unconventional work impossible, only more costly or difficult. Change can and does occur whenever someone devises a way to gather the greater resources required or reconceptualizes the work so it does not require what is not available. (Becker, 1982, pp. 34-35)

However, when institutions grow strong in an art world, change can become less and less likely. In 1995, Becker returned to the question of stability and change, looking specifically at western classical music. He notes how "one of the remarkable things about that world is how stable it is. Things change, but not much. Orchestras of the same size have been playing the same repertoire, with occasional additions, for almost a hundred years, on instruments not very different to those used almost a hundred years ago" (Becker, 1995, p. 301). The theoretical problem he wishes to address here is "how to understand the narrowness of our choices of how to make music when there are so many possibilities" (Becker, 1995, p. 302). In Becker's return to the role of conventions, he identifies the source for the inertia in "classical" music in the hegemony of this "package", and if you choose one piece, all the rest in the package follows automatically. This analysis is helpful when considering the structure of an art world, and it may be decisive for the appropriate qualities of artistic action within this context. While the art world within which a PhD project is situated should, or indeed could, be independent of academic institutions, particular attention must also be payed to the relation between the institution within which the research is hosted, and the possible risk of inertia rather than change through this institutional package.

In sections 2.1 to 2.4 I will consider four recent PhD theses in artistic research carried out in three different institutions in Sweden, Kent Olofsson's "*Composing The Performance*" (2018), Peter Spissky's "*Ups and Downs*" (2017), Sten Sandell's "*Music On the Inside of Silence*" (2013), and finally, Marina Cyrino's *An Inexplicable Hunger: flutist)body(flute (dis)encounters* (2019).

My aim is to analyze how these artists situate themselves in a particular art world, and how

their PhD project eventually impact practice within these contexts. The selection of PhD projects followed a few simple criteria. I wanted to explore projects in which the candidates were from distinctly different art worlds. I selected projects that I already was more or less closely acquainted with, in order to obtain as high a resolution of the observations as possible.[2]

2.1 Kent Olofsson: Composing the Performance

Kent Olofsson is a Swedish composer, whose music has been characterized by great attention to detail in an extensive output of highly demanding works for solo instruments, chamber ensembles and also a number of large scale works for orchestra and choir. When he started doing a PhD at the Royal College of Music in Stockholm in 2012 he had already been teaching electro-acoustic music composition at the Malmö Academy of Music since 1995. He was a well-established figure in the art world of contemporary classical music, wherein the leading institutions had been the Swedish National Radio and Rikskonserter (Concerts Sweden), two important sources for commissions, but also for concert production (Svenson 2007, Österling 2006). Artistic quality is assessed in such institutions by a board, consisting of some representatives from the organization, and some established artists from the field. Similar procedures are employed in the two channels for state funded commissions, through Konstnärsnämnden (The Swedish Arts Grants Committee[3]) and Kulturrådet (The Swedish Arts Council[4]).

Olofsson describes in his thesis, "Composing the Performance: An exploration of musical composition as a dramaturgical strategy in contemporary intermedial theatre" (2018), how the driving force was to explore what we may describe as a different art world, situated in a practice developed by the Swedish independent theatre Teatr Weimar, in collaboration with the Swedish Ensemble Ars Nova, a contemporary music ensemble. In 2008 these two groups produced a first collaborative production which wanted to explore the compositional means of the *hörspiel*, but transformed into staged experimental music theatre. Olofsson saw the premiere of this production, including a Swedish version of Olga Neuwirth's and Elfride Jelinek's *Todesraten* (Dödssiffror[5]) and a new piece, 0308, composed by the playwright Annika Nyman and the composer Erik Enström. Olofsson describes how he found that "the way the amalgamation of the text, partly performed on stage and partly pre-recorded, and contemporary music worked in *Todesraten* had a very special quality, an expression and a form I wanted to explore myself. My experience from that evening with the two staged radio plays, was the ignition spark that would start my artistic work in this specific field of contemporary music theatre, which in turn initiated ideas for an artistic research project. However, both the radiophonic format as well as composing music for theatre with spoken

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2 My relation to the four projects is very different in nature. I was the first supervisor of Peter Spissky's PhD, but incidentally also know Peter since the late 1990's, at a time when he still played the modern violin and was the first violinist of Ensemble Ars Nova, a group for which I was the artistic director between 1995 and 2012. I was the faculty opponent when Sten Sandell defended his thesis in 2013, and I was also asked to review it the year after, a review which I occasionally cite in the present paper. With Marina Pereira Cyrino I was external examiner in her 25% seminar, but did not follow her work too closely in the later stages. In the case of Kent Olofsson's thesis, I had no formal, academic relation to his PhD, but we initiated a long-term artistic collaboration in the early 1990's which has continued to be fruitful, and I was involved in the early stages when he began to articulate ideas for a PhD looking at new approaches to experimental music theatre. Hence, I know the artistic practice from the inside, but have followed his academic work only at a distance.
3 https://www.konstnarsnamnden.se/default.aspx?id=11309
4 https://www.kulturradet.se/en/
5 The translation was made by Jelinek's official Swedish translator, Magnus Lindman

words in any kind of context was rather unknown territories for me" (Olofsson, 2018, p. 36). Although Olofsson refers to the performance he had seen as a "specific field of contemporary music theatre", as the thesis unfolds, the specificity of the field is challenged. While the author attempts to define the field, its aesthetic aims and its compositional and dramaturgical means, what emerges is perhaps better described as a map of many different art worlds, with many points of intersection:

> The radiophonic art as a method and model for a form of new music theatre was a crucial starting point for my research project. However, the performances I have created together with Jörgen Dahlqvist and Teatr Weimar stretch beyond this concept and encompass many artistic directions in performing arts. The works are positioned at the intersections of numerous fields within music and theatre: classical and contemporary art music, popular music, sound art, post dramatic and traditional theatre, new music theatre, Composed Theatre, radiophonic art and video art. Due to the interdisciplinary and shifting nature of the projects as well as the fluidity in the inter play between art forms and expressions, it has been difficult to find a precise definition and a label for the art form we have been working with. The works could be termed Sonic Art Theatre considering the role of sound and music, particularly electroacoustic music. However, while this is an important concept in the works, they also embrace many other directions. (Olofsson, 2018, p. 49)

Olofsson's project is deeply collaborative, first and foremost in interaction with the playwright and director Jörgen Dahlqvist, with whom all productions discussed in the thesis were produced. Teatr Weimar constituted the organizational platform for all this work, which entails the technological development, staging, light design, providing actors, organizing rehearsals and performances, and so on. While in the above citation, the art world seems to have almost no boundaries, seen from a more hands-on-perspective, the art world of the PhD project is very much defined by Teatr Weimar and its relation to institutions and audiences in Sweden and abroad, when productions were brought on tour in Europe. Olofsson notes how it has been "difficult to find a precise definition and a label for the art form we have been working with" (ibid), but here, we are less concerned with the labelling, and rather more interested in who the cooperating agents are. At the same time, references to the practices of Goebbels, the movement of post dramatic theatre, and so on, are also relevant when assessing the artistic outcomes of their work. I propose that in addition to defining and relating to the art world, the assessment of an artistic PhD thesis may need to consult more distant references, as well as examining the interactions within the art world itself.[6] But how can we then identify the key players in the art world around Teatr Weimar and Olofsson's compositional project?

Theatre critics play an articulated role in the first chapter, where Olofsson cites several reviews, articulating the reception of the work of Teatr Weimar and of the new series of "Sonic Art Theatre" launched in 2008. Theatre critics, and the newspapers and other media that they represent, are integral to the art world, and are part of defining artistic quality within it. In fact, Olofsson cites a critic explicitly discussing the artistic quality of Teatr Weimar's overall contribution to contemporary Swedish theatre, who eventually concludes that "in this small theatre company there is a solid core of quality, as noticeable in the visual and psychological details of the individual play as in the awareness about the political and

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6 Just as in any other academic practice, the research needs to be situated in a wider field, and there should be a contribution to this wider field of research. However, the role of the art world in the assessment of artistic quality in a piece of artistic research is a perspective which is particular to artistic research.

philosophical whole" (Karlsson, n.d.).[7] But what is the role of theatre critics in the assessment of quality? Historically, theatre and music critics emerged with the new forms of public performance in the 18th Century. The musical Salon, and the public performances in theatres and operas created a "persistent fear on the part of the Academie that the criticisms of a parterre-like public, that is one dominated by the rowdy and unreflective, would come to control the content of the exhibitions. Contemporary characterizations of the public contained both negative elements, describing the mass-like features of the crowds in the Salons, as well as positive elements describing the surprisingly refined judgments emerging from varied perspectives [from the sensitive fishmonger, or the keen-eyed baker]. A key to stabilizing the judgment of the public, and to preserving the practice of producing artworks, was a core of reasonable attention to the work itself [the autonomous work of art] represented by well-founded critical interpretations" (Neufeld, 2012, p 96). The professional art critic emerged out of such attention to the preservation of the musical work, and involved both an educational perspective and the role of representing the public. However, Neufeld observes how "after the "great divide" of modernity, the role of critics became one granted and played by the public – criticism was and continues to be fallible and taken to be "good till countermanded" by further, better reasons. Though critical practice has, of course, become organized and institutionalized, it is all merely well-informed lay judgment and so has the character of one voice among others in public while at the same time guiding discourse" (Neufeld, 2012, p. 98). In the field of music, the relation between what Levinson (1993) calls "critical" and "performative" interpretations of music has been central to the discussion of the interpretation of musical works. The distinction between the two rests on the relation between verbal interpretation as an act of translation, which characterizes "critical" interpretation, while a "performative" interpretation takes shape within the artistic domain and therefore evades translation. Neufeld argues that an essential difference, which has been understated, is the degree of authority which critical and performative interpretations have. He observes how, even though critics "historically have had enormous influence on how artworks are viewed and understood" there is a difference in kind between the authority of a critic and of a performer: "having influence or offering advice is not the same as issuing an authoritative decision concerning how the laws are to be preserved and developed. The distinction is analogous to that between a legal commentator and a judge. As influential as the former may be, only decisions of the latter are authoritative and give expression to the law. Only judges make law and obligate the audience in the very act of interpretation" (Neufeld, 2012, p. 98).

We will return to the agency of performers below, for now, it suffices to first note that critics play an important role in art worlds of theatre and music, and certainly do so in the art world in which Olofsson's thesis is set. The exact nature of their agency will be further unpacked below, but we first need to consider the structural foundation for art criticism.
The cultural capital[8] in art criticism lies not only in the word on the page, but just as much in

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7 Cited in Olofsson (2018, pp. 27-28), in the author's translation from the Swedish.
8 These art worlds can, drawing on Bourdieu's analytical framework, be seen as containing their own evaluations of cultural and symbolic capital. Bourdieu (1979) describes how a cultural world consists of different fields, each containing their own forms of power and status. These forms of power produce capital that can be used as material and/or ideal value or status symbols. He considers different kinds of capital: economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capital. Cultural capital and symbolic capital are of ultimate worth for the field of art. Cultural capital concerns explicit and tacit elements of knowledge, educational levels, and aesthetic understanding. Symbolic capital refers to the symbolic recognition, articulation, and legitimisation of other forms of capital, offering power, respect, and status. Utterly defined by taste and mentality, but also by education and skill, participants in the field of music, by way of particular lifestyles and habits and aesthetic appreciation and artistic embodied knowledge,

the authority of the publisher. This authority is defined by the art world, as noted by Brennan (2006) in a paper based on interviews with professional performers in popular music. The cultural capital of daily newspapers and specialized magazines is completely reversed in a comparison between independent rock and jazz, hence the "press hierarchy for the independent rock field finds glossy music magazines at the top and broadsheets roughly at the bottom of the list. But this hierarchy is reversed in the jazz sector: quality dailies become the most desirable form of coverage, while jazz magazines are relegated to the bottom" (2006, p. 225). In contemporary theatre, the leading daily papers (Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet in Stockholm, in Malmö where Teatr Weimar is located, Sydsvenska Dagbladet) are important players. It should be noted then that, while Teatr Weimar indeed has attracted strong attention from the leading dailies, the review cited by Olofsson is from a small local newspaper, Hallandsposten. In other words, the cultural capital to be drawn from this otherwise very positive review is less than is immediately communicated. The next review which Olofsson cites refers to the first production in the Sonic Arts Theatre-series, by Martin Nyström, a central music reviewer at Dagens Nyheter in Stockholm:

> The radio play (Hörspiel) is a genre that is associated with the radio, electroacoustic music and experiments of the 60's. The Malmöbased groups Ensemble Ars Nova and Teatr Weimar now take this form of music drama into the 00's and onto the stage.
> In the staged premiere of *Todesraten* we meet both the voice of a young deceased athlete who worshipped Arnold Schwarzenegger and the voice of Death who claims to be 'the widow of itself.' She exercises her favourite sports amidst the bodies of others – which Death makes more efficient than the most perfect housewife. A twisting dialogue between two narcissistic poles in the battle for supremacy over the body that the music by Olga Neuwirths gives jagged resonance to. The idea by Ars Nova and Teatr Weimar – to provide space on stage for the hörspiel's concentration on the word and sounds – is both exciting and promising. (Nyström, 2008, n. p.)[9]

This review contributes to setting the ground for the artistic research project that Olofsson is about to discover. In the new series, the next commission is a piece composed by Olofsson to a libretto by Dahlqvist, Indy 500, and the creation of this piece becomes the very starting point for this new direction in Olofsson's compositional practice, and thereby to the research project which became his PhD.

Again, critics do play a role in this art world, but, just as argued by Neufeld above, they do not have the authority to define where the art world will go, but can only voice their opinion of how they find a particular performance or composition. Still, they have agency when it comes to attracting audiences and funding. Hence, while their role appears to be that of judging quality, their impact in the art world has a structural function more related to the foundations

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obtain consideration, privileges, mythical appreciation, and marks of distinction. Cultural capital can be subdivided into three forms: an interiorised or embodied form, relating to practices of the body and aesthetic knowledge; the art objects themselves as an objective form of cultural capital; and, finally, the diplomas, educational degrees, prizes, and critiques of the artistic field as an institutionalised form. The embodied cultural capital, reflected in the difficult and demanding acquisition of the skills and techniques of performing, is the primary tool for acceptance in the field of performers. However, there is a need for broader acceptance in society and redefinition of the legitimacy of the field—the institutionalised and objective aspects of cultural capital. This happens through participation in the culturally defined trajectories of artistic education and artistic output and the necessary appreciation by critics and public. Artists therefore reproduce cultural structures in the form of durable and adapted dispositions, doing so within the limits of socio-historical conditions (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 96).

9 Cited in Olofsson (2018, pp. 35-36) in the author's own translation from the Swedish.

for the funding structure. I would argue that, in order to incorporate the aesthetic judgement in media when assessing the artistic quality of an artistic PhD thesis, such texts cannot be taken at face value but must be understood from a contextual analysis of the art world. Other important factors in the art world of theatre are actors, light and set designers and technicians. In a group like Teatr Weimar, technicians and light designers are all part of the artistic collective, an environment which also invites interdisciplinary collaboration and experimentation.[10] The central group of actors, like Linda Ritzén, a founding member, have a very strong say on artistic quality. This Any script will be negotiated with the actors until there is agreement on its qualities. Dahlqvist's style of directing is also highly inclusive, and aims to bring the most out of each individual. This also was the outcome of his experimentation with dramatic texts, which meant that "the actors that performed in these plays, Linda Ritzén and Rafael Pettersson, were forced to find new methods in order to perform them. Traditional training in acting needed to be supplemented with new methods" (Olofsson, 2018, p. 29). This development of new methods have been developed by Ritzén throughout the years in the context of Teatr Weimar, but also tested in her teaching at the Malmö Theatre Academy. Her writings on the subject are also discussed in Olofsson's thesis. Hence, the artistic development in the collective of Teatr Weimar is defined in a rather flat structure in which the playwright, director, or for that matter the composer, does not have the only say. As described by Olofsson in his thesis, the collaboration within the group intensified over the years, and the forms of collaboration became increasingly integrative:

> The creative process revealed an interesting pattern: there was a continuous movement between working all together to working in pairs to individual work; this was a cycle that went on throughout the work. For example, when I worked with Linda Ritzén recording all the prerecorded voices for the performance we were both directing. In some sections where there were a strong interplay between her and the music, she often 'directed' me in the compositional process. In similar ways Ritzén and Dahlqvist worked with the video material and I composed the songs together with Zofia Åsenlöf. Each participating artist transgressed his/her area of practice and expertise and became an integral part of the dramaturgical work. Consequently, the expected and traditional roles of the artists involved in a production change and expand. This calls for new artistic methods and deepened, mutual understandings for each other's practices and art forms. (Olofsson, 2018, p 248)

To summarize, the art world with which Olofsson's thesis engages is defined by the cooperation of a rather limited number of agents, where the central actants are found in the collective of Teatr Weimar, but also in other institutions in Sweden, and some abroad, and as discussed at length above, also among theatre and music critics and their institutions. Artistic quality then is first defined within this collective, by the decision of the artists involved to produce one piece after the other, but also of their reception in the institutions that define the art world.

2.2 Peter Spissky: Ups and Downs

Peter Spissky's thesis *Ups and Downs: violin bowing as gesture* (2017)[11] represents a rather

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10 This cross-disciplinary approach appears to be a strong reason why Olofsson's practice as composer and improviser with electronics was so smoothly incorporated in the group.
11 Spissky's thesis draws extensively on analysis of gesture in video documentation of performances and rehearsals. The central results are discussed in video essays, and the entire thesis is contained in a website, and therefore there are no page references. The thesis is found at www.upsanddown.se

different perspective. Here, a violinist who identifies as a baroque specialist seeks novel approaches to musical interpretation, by adopting a perspective based on embodied music cognition (Leman 2008). Hence, we are not looking at the creation of new artworks in a contemporary subculture, rather, it is a matter of the preservation and renewal of the performance of central works in the canon of western art music. Another difference is how Spissky's research is not only related to his practice as concert master of several professional baroque orchestras, but also to his practice as a teacher in several Scandinavian academies of music. Hence, the findings in his research are developed and tested in professional ensembles as well as in educational contexts. In his thesis he describes his situatedness in the early music movement as follows:

> Historical performance practice went through a major 'ideological' shift towards the end of the 20th century. This new spirit was manifested as a decisive turn towards 'musicking', performativity, and an embodied approach to historical information (Small, 1998; Butt, 2002). Such tendencies are also reflected in my performing and teaching activities. My artistic practice generates invaluable material for my research. […] The research project brings my artistic and pedagogical practices together, and comprises my work with some of the leading Scandinavian baroque orchestras (Concerto Copenhagen, Camerata Øresund, Finnish Baroque Orchestra etc.) as well as workshops and concerts with my students at the Malmö Academy of Music and the Royal Danish Academy of Music. I am also regularly invited as a so-called 'baroque expert' to direct modern orchestras when they perform baroque programs (Tallin Chamber Orchestra, Ostrobothnian Chamber Orchestra), and thus my artistic practice is not strictly limited to the early music environment. (Spissky, 2017, n. p.)

The art world of Spissky's thesis is centered around Concerto Copenhagen, although they are indeed not the only ensemble to appear in the documentation of the project. The assessment of the activities of this ensemble is mainly carried out by the festivals that program their performances, as well as the critics that review their concerts. But, while much of the music they perform are canonical works in the western art music tradition, their art world is only partly linked to the largest concert halls and festivals. Again, historically informed performance started out as an underground movement, which very soon was strongly supported by historical musicology, and eventually developed into a movement also supported more largely by the music industry in the last decades. As described by Spissky in his thesis:

> A very particular cultural agreement, and one that has resulted in a number of specific styles of musical interpretation over time, is known today as Historically Informed Performance (HIP). It is a movement which started in musicology in the middle of 20th century, and that has had as its 'holy grail' the unattainable goal of the realization of 'historical authenticity'. The ambition to play historical music in the same way that it was played when first created produced the concept of 'authentic performance practice'. I myself am very much a part of this cultural agreement, but, as can be noticed in this thesis, the word 'authentic' does not occupy my thoughts very much. It is however, and most certainly was, such an important concept in Historically Informed Performance, that I feel the need to address it, albeit briefly. (Spissky, 2017, n. p.)

Also non-human agents have impact in art worlds, and musical instruments have strong agency in any musical community. Alperson (2007) argues that, although acoustic instruments indeed immediately appear to be material objects, musical instruments are indeed "objects whose creation and whose musical capabilities are infused with information

and conceptual structures that reflect the history and styles of musical sounds" (p. 41). What is understood as a musical instrument is thus dependent not merely on its physical features but also on the specific cultural definitions of music and with what means music is made. In a recent review chapter, Sarah-Indriyati Hardjowirogo (2017) suggests a number of parameters of the "instrumentality" of an object, which contribute to defining it as a musical instrument. The first parameter is an ability for sound production. She continues by noting, second, how the emergence of digital instruments has increased the complexity in this understanding, since the sound-producing device may then typically be distinct from the physical interface.

This second point identifies both the maker's and the performer's intentions as necessary for defining instrumentality, a perspective which also can be referred to McCaleb's (2014) discussion of performer intention as essentially decisive for when a turntable, or similar borderline object, is deemed to be instrumental or non-instrumental. Third, the object's learnability and possibilities for virtuosity (Jordà, 2004) defines instrumentality through the relative impact of practicing, which Jordà refers to as its efficiency. At this point, Hardjowirogo arrives at more complex and interwoven perspectives, where effort, corporeality, and interaction come into play. Here, effort and resistance (Evens, 2005; Östersjö 2008 and 2013) are of particular importance, and the relation between the poles of efficiency and effort will be explored below through the notions of resonance and resistance (Östersjö, 2013). These perspectives entail the relation between expressivity in musical performance and the degree of perceived effort that is projected to an audience. Spissky (2017) discusses the role of the instrument in his artistic practice, by observing how, as a baroque violinist, he employs playing techniques based on historical performance practice on a historical instrument. Here, the relation between the performer's body and the instrument are again highlighted, now through the application of historical knowledge to the interaction with the instrument:

> Apart from the obvious difference in sound between the modern and baroque violin, there is another distinction that is more relevant to the present study: the specific kinaesthetic affordances of the baroque instrument (Boyden, 1990; Gibson, 1986). The baroque violin is held without a shoulder rest and chinrest, which makes the violin grip freer and more flexible in comparison to that of the modern instrument (Tarling, 2000). This allows for greater freedom in body movement, and it might have some implications on the role of the body in the interpretation and performance of baroque music. When I started to play baroque violin back in Bratislava in the late 1980s, I accepted the awkwardness of the playing technique as relevant information in itself. The instrument, being authentic, was to dictate all aspects of phrasing, articulation, dynamics, and, most importantly, the sound. The way the instrument 'decided to sound' was accepted as historical information. […] In this respect, my baroque beginnings were all about finding a sound which is different from the traditional aesthetics that I had grown up with. The instrument was the main source, and the awkward 'chin-off' technique (i.e. without fixing the instrument under the chin) became the crucial means of achieving this sought-for difference. Looking back from the perspective of today, the kinaesthetic advantage of freeing the body from a fixed grip that is afforded in the baroque violin, was simply neglected. Only later, like my childhood beginnings with the modern violin, did my finding of the sound trigger the curiosity of what is behind the sound, leading to a discovery of movement, dance, and poetry. (Spissky, 2017, n. p.)

These are strong examples of how instruments can be highly resistant objects, and that this

resistance can either be material or cultural.[12] The agency of the instrument was indeed central in the early days of historically informed performance, as in the practice of Arnold Dolmetsch. Through the use of original instruments, or copies that aimed to reconstruct the affordances of the original instruments, Spissky notes how "it was assumed that, for instance, an authentic baroque sound could be reconstructed. But such assertions are obviously problematic. The final sonic product – built on descriptions of playing techniques and the reconstruction of the historical instruments in the sources – can never be compared with the actual original sound of the past. Thus the assessment of the result must allow criteria such as possible, logical, and plausible" (Spissky, 2017, n. p.).

In the art world of Spissky's thesis, the agency of the historical instruments is indeed strong. Further, it is important to stress the impact of historical musicology on the field still today. In the case of Spissky's art world, the agency of this research field is lessened by his particular approach to historical repertoire, and the historical instruments, through what he calls "embodied interpretation" (Spissky, 2017), a concept which constitutes the central outcome of his PhD. To summarize, music institutions and media have strong agency in the assessment of artistic quality, but the quality of Spissky's findings, and the entire research output, is also assessed through his extensive pedagogical activities.

2.3 Sten Sandell: Music On the Inside of Silence[13]

Sten Sandell is one of Sweden's foremost improvisers with an extensive international career. His thesis is titled *Music on the Inside of silence – a study* (2013).[14] It is a complex product comprising a box containing a triple cd, a book and further material on Sandell's website. On the three cd's are three major works by Sandell, all with clear conceptual links to the aims of his PhD. The book is a mottled affair that takes in many different linguistic levels, ranging from poetry, via discussions of a more theoretical nature, to transcriptions of dialogues between musicians at work. The thesis is an artistic exploration of the relationship between sound, text and images, and specifically what happens in the interplay between these different forms and practices. Hence, the project takes off from a context of free improvisation in which Sandell is deeply rooted. The book itself also starts out in that end, perhaps as a method for situating the project. On page 19-29, the reader is presented with two verbatim transcriptions of a dialogue between Sandell and the guitarist David Stackenäs, with reflections on their long-term artistic collaboration, and other little comments and reflections, in between the playing. This dialogue holds some moments outspoken positioning, wherein free improvisation is contrasted with performative interpretation of scores, and Sandell observes in his first comment on page 19 how the improviser can be free to respond to everything that happens in the room, in the here and now, in contradistinction to when performing a pre-prepared interpretation of a composed score, in which it is assumed that the aim is always to stay as near to this pre-conceived interpretation as possible.

One can trace the artistic roots of Sandell's project to the early Modernism of Marinetti and Kurt Schwitters, or Öyvind Fahlström in terms of a Swedish tradition, and the latter is

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12 For a further discussion of cultural resistance in musical creativity, see Coessens and Östersjö (2014).

13 Parts of this section are built on an earlier review of Sandell's thesis, commissioned by the Swedish Research council, see further Östersjö (2014).

14 It should be noted that while the other three theses are in English, Sandell's is in Swedish, and the original title is "På insidan av tystnaden – en studie" (Sandell, 2013).

significant. Sandell's text is peppered with quotations from the poetry of Bengt-Emil Johnson and the artistic aims of the project are closely aligned with the development of text-sound composition, bringing together concrete poetry and sound art, a direction of which Johnson was one of the leading proponents. It is hard to believe that Sandell's study would have taken on the same form without these precursors. This connection is not discussed in the thesis, but just as with the ways in which the work of composers like Heiner Goebbels or Georges Aperghis certainly are reference points in Olofsson's thesis discussed above, the art world of Sandell's thesis is indeed informed by these precursors.

But also Sandell's art world is strongly shaped by the agency of his instrument, in this case the piano, and the parts of his writing that approach the phenomenology of piano playing strike a note which is indeed not so remote from the approaches to an embodied interpretation, suggested by Spissky above:

> When I strike a key on my piano, I hear the hammer hitting a string that starts to vibrate. From my actions, I register that the mechanics of my piano work. But when I listen to the note I've just played, I hear a fundamental and a series of over-tones that already tell me something sonorously. Now I become interested in where this is going. Will this note immediately be followed by another or will there be a pause, will it be followed by a rapid succession of notes that might also form a chord, polyphony? Composer Morton Feldman describes this by saying: "All activity in music reflects its process."[15]
>
> I look at the piano, turn to the audience and say: I exist in a space. My body is part of that space. Inhabits the space. Experiences the space as I move and play in that space. 'As such we cannot say that the body is in the space, nor is it in the time. It inhabits the space and the time'.[16] (Sandell, 2013, p. 50)

There are indeed many attempts to explore the space between sound and words, between music and text in concrete poetry and in other *fortspinnung* of established forms within text-sound composition The poetry by Sandell, together with Fredrik Nyberg and Bengt-Emil Johnson, is woven like a fabric through the book, with many of these texts also forming a springboard for works that combine recitation and instrumental music These encounters are perhaps Sandell's greatest contribution to the field of text-sound composition. Acoustic instruments and instrumental music were never at a premium among forerunners such as Sten Hansson, Åke Hodell and their ilk. When Sandell approaches text-sound composition from a pianist's perspective, this brings many new qualities to an old Modernist tradition.

The variety of textual levels is one of the assets of the thesis, with one reservation. In her thesis, journalist Kristina Widestedt (2001) points to a tendency towards increased use of metaphors in contemporary music criticism, which she reads as a paradigm shift away from a more initiated target group towards a broader audience. In Sandell's thesis there are several examples of how his texts about his own music verge on evaluative statements of the same character as review prose, a linguistic level that comes across as particularly problematic when such statements are written by the performer himself.[17]

There are several similarities in how Sandell's project is designed as compared to Olofsson's

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15 Morton Feldman, Give My Regards to Eighth Street (Exact Change 200), p 65, quoted in Sandell 2013
16 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, Swedish translation by William Fovet (Daidalos 1997), p 102, quoted in Sandell (2013).
17 See e. g. this sentence: "Together with my vocal comments in the form of breathing sounds, overtone singing and exclamations, this forms an apparently obvious organic unit, where the confinement is clear" (Sandell 2013, pp 139–140) ["Tillsammans med mina röstkommentarer i form av andningsljud, övertonssång och utrop, bildar detta en tillsynes självklar organisk enhet, där instängdheten är uppenbar"]

thesis discussed above. Also here, a well-established artist embarks on a project that wishes to explore new territory. There are differences too. While Olofsson struggles to define this new field he is exploring, Sandell pays very little attention to predecessors and earlier modernist traditions with which he appears to have strong sympathies. Further, while collaboration is the central method, and the practice which is explored in Olofsson's project, such interaction play a much more limited role in Sandell's project. Hence, while the art world was rather small, and clearly defined, in Olofsson's project, in Sandell's thesis, the art world is not so clearly described.

However, within the book's constant shifts between different linguistic levels and material, the analytical sections come across as strong statements: the parts of the text where Sandell draws on models for understanding from Nancy and Foucault, for example, are intimately bound up with the music at the heart of the thesis, in the box of three cds. The ability to move between different forms of knowledge is a factor in artistic research that remains in its infancy, but it is clear that there need be no contradiction in this movement. Perhaps one can understand Sandell's book as a series of experiments, a collection of études that in various ways occasionally succeed and sometimes fail in achieving this meeting of parallel worlds.

By this, I mean that all these different approaches have a function in a cohesive whole. But without a convincing artistic statement, such an endeavor would be doomed to failure. It is indeed also a strength with the thesis, how it makes itself dependent on the artistic outcomes, such as represented by the cd recordings.
Sandell quotes Nancy in his thesis, and in his words captures the core of his own project: "to be listening is always to be on the edge of meaning" (Nancy, 2007, p 7). This listening is also a fundamental precondition for artistic research. The generation and communication of knowledge often takes place in the space between academia and art, where the artist can move freely between discursive thought and the way of the hand, applying the art of listening to the creation of knowledge in this borderland. In my reading of the project, "Music Inside the Language – the trio" stands as the key outcome, a piece of music for three musicians that moves seamlessly from text to voice to music, inhabiting the spaces in between that the thesis evokes. In collaboration with singer Sofia Jernberg and double bass player Nina de Heney, Sandell has created music that gives perfect form to a movement between text and language, sound and silence. A blazing review was published in "All About Jazz", an online journal clearly situated more in the art world wherein the project took off, rather than in the novel domain which Sandell set out to explore. The reviewer, Eyal Hareuveni, appreciates how Sandell "investigates his musical language and attempts to formulate it anew, from a fresh perspective, without any attachment to conventions, routines or approaches" (Hareuveni, 2013, n.p.). Further, he finds the trio CD to be the most accessible expression of these aims, a project in which

> [a]ll three deconstruct and reconstruct their shared language—the musical and the verbal—into a series of mutated alphabetical, phonetic syllables, interrupted poetic lines and emotionally charged song-like sonic articulations, within a loose grammatical framework, creating a sensual and emphatic interplay that introduces more and more surprising and inventive dynamics and sounds. The sensitivity of all three musicians, their immediate responses and instincts, the telepathic understanding and endless flow of ideas, is exemplary. This chapter [of the cd-box] and this resourceful trio offers the most intriguing realization of Sandell's musical language (Hareuveni, 2013, n.p.)

Again, it is worth noting that the project with this group is one of the artistic outputs that is most clearly grounded in the art world wherein Sandell initiated the research. Sandell's experimental approach is important for the inquiry, but perhaps the assessment of artistic quality can still best be carried out in the art world in which the project took off. This, I believe, is not the case in the fourth PhD project we will study.

2.4 Marina Cyrino: An Inexplicable Hunger: flutist)body(flute (dis)encounters

Marina Pereira Cyrino is a Brazilian, classically trained, flutist. Already in her master thesis (which she obtained in Piteå School of Music, at Luleå University of Technology), she explored a space outside of the classical flute techniques. Her master thesis, titled *The Vocal Flute: Creative Uses of the Flutist's Voice in a Collaborative Context* (2013) was concerned with how she could develop techniques for a singing flutist in a series of collaborative compositional projects. Here, she describes how collaborations with composers had been a part of her practice as a performer already for many years. She describes how, in 2004, she "participated in the creation of a student experimental chamber group in the town of Belo Horizonte, Brazil. During four years we worked with improvisation and collaboration with composers, focusing on classical contemporary music. These years reinforced my passion for new music and showed me the importance and benefits of working directly with composers" (Cyrino 2013, p. 4). It appears that this experience signals a movement outside the art world of western classical music, and the search for an identity in a different space. Her PhD thesis, titled *An Inexplicable Hunger: flutist)body(flute (dis)encounters* (2019) starts out by articulating a critique of the culture of western art music, and its institutions. She cites the French composer Jean-Charles François, suggesting that "the matter of expertise lies at the centre of the questions musicians have to face today: if the twentieth century called into question the notion of virtuosity, either by denying, violently, the craft of the artist, or even by denying art itself, or by multiplying virtuosities and adapting them to increasingly specialised contexts, still the division of roles perpetuates a norm inside music institutions – even if some eccentrics have permission to mix music with other art modalities. Meanwhile, in other artistic fields, mixture has become a fundamental practice" (Cyrino, 2019, p 24). The notion of creating a mixture of the roles of interpretation, improvisation and composition, constitutes the initial response to the institutional demands for specialization and fragmentation, in the name of efficiency or excellence. She turns to Becker's analysis of system inertia through the institutional packages of conventions as a model for understanding also the role of teaching institutions in this development:

> This form of globalised standardisation is not a new phenomenon but lies at the heart of modern utopia, of the imperialist enterprise. The almost absolute exclusivity that is evident in the standardisation of the musical practices performed inside institutions of higher education belongs to the European model of the conservatory, on a global scale. François points to the way in which the phantasmagorical threat of the disappearance of the European "classical" music heritage and an ensuing generalised amateurism is destabilising the conservatoires and institutions of higher education at present. The ensuing fear, though, simply reinforces the slogan of "maintaining excellence", of a disciplinary practice, of a certain accordance with a systematic, intensive and unquestionable practice, imposed as "tradition", which hinders the opening toward a diversity of marginal and experimental practices.
> Musicians who for one reason or another do not work inside what sociologists have named the "system of *package*" – and there are many – have difficulties accessing institutions of higher education in music. François traverses a dilemma: either they can

accept rules that will deeply modify the conditions of their own practices, or they can prefer to remain outside institutions, or to create their own institutions, separated, in the margins of the official circuits. (Cyrino, 2019, p 25)

Hereby, she turns the critique not only toward the institution hosting her PhD studies, but also toward the discipline of artistic research: "what does artistic research, made inside the same institutions that standardize, have to say? After all, here am I, inside the music academy, proposing a form of mix-me-other-arts as a method of artistic research" (Cyrino 2019, p 25). Her method of creating a mixture of practices is fundamentally an act of resistance to the system of package, an attempt to destabilize the value system and breaking out of its standardizing procedures. Instead of the efficiency of specialization, her method evokes questions like: "How to practice *un-goals*? How can the relation between the body of a musician and the body of a musical instrument be understood as a space for the practice of *un-goals*?" (Cyrino, 2019, p 25). The art world that unfolds through this collaborative practice is fragile and local, seeking different institutional connections, beyond the conventions of concert hall culture. Cyrino describes how "mixture-as-investigation began, timidly, as an opening towards musicians and artists nearby; it was essential for my research to begin with artist-neighbours and their practices" (ibid). But it is through the unfolding of this novel practice, and the encounter with audiences, that the ethical nature of this artistic research project, which enacts a certain resistance, not only against the institutional package, but also against gendered stereotypes in contemporary concert cultures. Through a collaboration with the composer Mansoor Hosseini on a solo work for flute titled Cass…andra (2015), several political dimensions of Cyrino's practice emerged. First, in the engagement with Ellen Waterman's gender analysis of Ferneyhough's classical flute solo Cassandra's Dream Song (1970), but also through a reading of Adriana Cavarero's philosophy of voice. However, the political nature of the piece is most of all drawn from Hosseini's approach to composition through bodily gesture, and the composition becomes an articulation of a body politics, which can only be experienced through performance. As argued by Cobussen and Nielsen, "a musical ethics can only come into existence on the basis of a contact with a perceiver—that is, through the act of listening. Thus, ethical moments can only be understood as strategies of engagement, through receptive interpretation, affected and formed by both doubt and astonishment" (Cobussen & Nielsen, 2012, p. 166).

> When does the audience start listening? When I ululate a nonsensical breathing language or, finally, when I show my face and my skills as a flutist, an acceptable knowledge, an expected knowledge? Where is the truth, the knowledge, the prophecy? Is someone going to believe that I am a flutist, a musician? During most of the piece I am estranged from my knowledge as a flutist, from the usual relation flute-body- flutist, from the usual relation flutist-body-audience. I estrange the flute from myself by playing a disassembled instrument assembled through my body-breathing. The assembled flute, as a "complete" musical instrument, appears at the end, as a revelation, tying up *Casss...andra*'s story: Does anyone believe? The audience? The 'I' performing? Why did we not listen in the same way in the beginning, if we did not?
> Cassandra-in-me takes the form of a double question, a double contamination. What can Cassandra do to my body- flutist? Through *Casss...andra*, I encounter ways of working around standardised forms of flute playing, standardised forms of hearing a flutist on stage, and new forms of artistic presence. What can my body-flutist do to Cassandra? If *Casss...andra* retained aspects of the exotification of a tragic silencing of the female, I tangle and twist depictions of Cassandra, stealing her out of her context. By speaking and playing at the same time, I mix Cassandra with *Casss...andra*, with the song of the flute, with the doing of academic research, in order to question the nature of her curse. In order

to contaminate her tragic voice with breath, movement, suspension. In order to reclaim the auditory dimension of her gift. Cassandra-in-me continues: *Listen, sound touches in between!* (Cyrino, 2019, 85-86)

This ethical engagement with the constraints of the body-politics of the institutional package of western art music is an important quality articulated in the art world formed through Cyrino's PhD project. I will in the next section argue that the artistic knowledge articulated through artistic research, in performative or material forms, can only be fully understood through an analysis that combines perspectives of embodied cognition and a socio-cultural perspective.

3 Artistic knowledge and the performer's voice

The central argument in this paper is that artistic knowledge takes shape both in the materiality of an artwork and as performative knowledge embodied by the artist. Further, this knowledge is situated in a particular art world, and can only be analyzed and evaluated through an understanding that builds on a combination of these perspectives. This entails several forms of "thinking-in-art" (Merleau-Ponty 1964) and "thinking-through-art," where the latter suggests a further communication across artistic, embodied, and discursive domains (Östersjö 2017).[18] The analytical model of a musician's voice presented below has been developed and tested within a research cluster at the Orpheus Institute, primarily in a sub-project with the composer David Gorton and two musicologists at IPEM, the centre for systematic musicology at the University of Ghent, Esther Coorevits and Dirk Moolents.[19] Art worlds produce performance practices, constituted by the repetition "with difference" characteristic of the citational practice of performance (Bolt 2016). Building on theories of material thinking, Mikkel Tin observes how "this forming process involves my body and is performed as a bodily practice. But even as a bodily practice it requires training, and certain kinds of professional making require a long and comprehensive training. Still, the practical skill that results from such training is bodily rather than conceptual. The training and transmission of making skills take the form of practical experimentation rather than theoretical explanation" (Tin, 2009, p. 1). Artistic research holds the possibility of gaining access to the knowledge forms specific to the practice, within any given art world. Art worlds develop their specific interpretative models for evaluating artistic quality across the domains of material artworks, as well as of performance. An epistemology of artistic research must embrace, and seek to further deepen, these forms of interpretation within the art world, which entails knowledge claims related to the performative (Haseman, 2006) and the material domains of artistic production. Gorton and Östersjö (2019) argue that

> The truth claims within the performative paradigm are not related to repeatable testing, as with the other two forms of knowledge, but are instead situated within a specific context

18 When thinking-in-art, experimentation with materials forms the process, rather than the conceptual explanation. A further possibility is suggested by Sarat Maharaj (2005) who introduced the notion of thinking "through" the arts. Such "thinking-through-music" (see Östersjö 2008 and 2017) necessarily presupposes thinking-in-music but additionally introduces the possibility of a translation from the artistic, "through" an understanding of art also as process, towards a translation into a verbalisable articulation of knowledge.
19 The cluster is headed by Catherine Laws, and within the cluster I have also carried out one project with the composer Bill Brooks and audio engineer Jeremy J. Wells, and another looking at the work of my Vietnamese/Swedish group The Six Tones in collaboration with Nguyễn Thanh Thủy. This research cluster has used processes of artistic research to explore how subjectivity is instantiated and embodied in performance, and has explored various forms of documentation and analysis in order to approach a more robust understanding of how subjectivity is indeed an embodied and socio-culturally defined phenomenon (See further Laws et al., 2019).

and validated through measures of force and effect (Bolt 2016). Performative knowledge belongs to the sphere of tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1967), taking shape within the context of a specific artistic event and remaining as embodied knowledge, sedimented in the artist's body. This raises the fundamental question of how such knowledge can be accessed intellectually and communicated, beyond the recognised performative and demonstrative situations of rehearsal, concert performance, and instrumental teaching, and to what extent, and with what methods, this tacit knowing can be translated into discursive knowledge. (Gorton & Östersjö, 2019, p. 38)

The "long and comprehensive training" that Tin refers to above is essential in the formation of a musician's embodied knowledge.[20] As discussed above in section 4.2, with reference to the agency of historical instruments in the art world of HIP, in order to fully embrace the character of these learning processes, the agency of technological tools, like instruments and scores, must be considered. Naomi Cumming describes such an experience of agency in her encounter with a new violin as a teenager: "When I began to play it, the sound of this new violin seemed to draw from me something I did not know I possessed. It was as if the violin had the potential to become the voice I lacked. This was quite a discovery, not made fully in a moment of time but over a couple of years" (Cumming, 2000, p 3). What is essential to our discussion here is how these interactions with the instrument give rise to what she calls a subjective voice. Further, she describes how she begins to make sense of what this "voice" is, and how it relates to her instrument through lessons with the leader of the second violins in the Melbourne Symphony Orchestra: "What he sought, somehow, was an identification of his students with the sound of the violin as a voice that could be expressive of their own passion, and yet a cultivated distance that would allow them also to draw out the best in the violin's tone, in a critical stance that recognised it as more than a projection of their subjective states" (Cumming, 2000, p. 4). Gorton & Östersjö conclude that "for Cumming, her subjective "voice" is therefore a result of both a bodily and emotional relationship with her instrument, but also something separate, that can be listened to with critical detachment" (Gorton & Östersjö 2019, p. 39). Importantly, as can be seen in Spissky's discussion above of the learning process of embracing a historically informed playing technique, finding voice is not merely about producing the intended sound, but just as much to do with "what is behind the sound, leading to a discovery of movement, dance, and poetry" (Spissky, 2017, n.p.).

Similarly, the formation of a composer's voice is shaped through the interaction with the technology of musical notation, as well as through the interaction with musicians and their instruments. In chamber music performance, the negotiation of a shared voice constitutes a fundamental aspect of artistic quality.[21] Gorton & Östersjö (2016) observe how, through

20 The philosopher Helena De Preester notes how "in performance, the body abruptly and explicitly comes into visibility and resists forms of objectification that may put it to rest, to clarity and obviousness" (De Preester 2007, 352). Any analytical engagement with performative knowledge must therefore develop methods to overcome this resistance. The distinction between body image and body schema is helpful in understanding the multi-layered human body. The body image may be thought of as the explicit understanding that we have of our own bodies. It is an intentional state made up of several modalities: perceptual experiences of one's own body; conceptual understandings of the body in general; and emotional attitudes towards one's own body (De Preester, 2007, 355). On the level of the body image, performative knowledge may be accessible through introspection and reflexive research methods, such as is common in autobiographical forms of artistic research. The body schema, on the other hand, involves "a system of motor capacities, abilities and habits" (Gallagher & Cole, 1995, 370) and is thus often unintentional or subconscious in character.

21 I am currently part of a research cluster with David Gorton, Mieko Kanno, Deniz Peters, Åsa Unander-Scharin, Jessica Kaiser (artistic PhD student in Graz) and Kerstin Frödin (artistic PhD student in Piteå School of Music), within which a series of studies of the formation of voice in duo performance is being carried out, and the first

composer-performer collaboration, a "discursive" voice, can be an identifiable outcome of such interactions. Further, in a forthcoming book chapter drawing on a more extensive analysis of qualitative and quantitative data, they argue that in this study, the composition discussed - Austerity Measures I for 10-string guitar - points to how the identity of a score-based composition can also be performative, and not merely situated in the materiality of the artwork, an observation which is true of all such works, but is underlined by the malleable structure which characterizes Gorton's composition:

> The performative identity of *Austerity Measures I*, which appears to be primordially linked to the sessions in which its initial materials were developed, suggests that the function of the score is not to define the identity of the 'work,' but rather to instigate a negotiation of 'discursive voices.' In the creative process leading up to the first performances, such a 'discursive voice' emerges from the collaborative process. Here, the composer has direct access to the performer's instrument, and the performer has direct access to the composer's notation (at various stages of development), with the guiding and moderating performance and compositional practices shared by both. (Gorton & Östersjö, 2019, forthcoming)

The emergence of voice is situated in a musician's embodied interaction with technological and psychological tools, but also in a socio-cultural context. Importantly, an analysis of such processes will bring greater focus to the material and embodied interaction, and provides further insight into perspectives such as suggested by Sandell above, in his phenomenological observations of piano playing. For the assessment of artistic quality in the longitudinal and transformative format of an artistic PhD, the negotiation of voice, either in direct interaction with other human agents resulting in a discursive voice, or as a transformative development of a singular voice, constitutes a fundamental analytical perspective. In the next section we will look at an example of how such a negotiation of voice, wherein musical transcription plays the role of a methodological tool, which serves to unveil some of these processes in which performative and material artistic knowledge is articulated.

4. Musical Transcription as negotiation of voice

Musical transcription has historically been a practice with the dual possibilities of exploring the affordances of instruments, as well as the technology of musical notation itself.[22] Luciano Berio embodied this practice, and transformed it into a central tool in his compositional methods. His approach to transcription is also a beautiful example of how the preservation of tradition always holds an element of transformation, and he observes how "musical transcription, seen from a historical perspective, implies not only interpretation but also evolutionary and transformational processes. The practice, the possibilities, and the needs of transcription were an organic part of musical invention" (Berio, 2006, p. 35). The move from transcription to composition can be observed in the cycle of transcriptions of his cycle of solo works (Sequenza) into compositions for soloist and ensemble (Chemins). He further argues that there is an immediate connection between interpretation and analysis in the act of

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written outcome is a chapter in a book publication at the Orpheus Institute, to be published in winter 2020.
22 A historical example could be Bach's transcription of Vivaldi's concerto for four violins, and its transformation into a concerto for four harpsichords. Here, it can be observed how he improves the counterpoint, increases the number of parts where this seems to be called for, extends slow movements by extending the existing contrapuntal structure. By also making further notation of the ornamentation, Bach's transcription has also given us further knowledge of the performance practice of the time (Aldrich, 1949).

transcription, and points to how the third movement in his Sinfonia 'is the best and deepest analysis that I could ever have hoped to make of the Scherzo from Mahler's second Symphony' (Berio, 2006, p. 40).23 Feruccio Busoni makes some even more far-ranging and illuminating observations regarding notation in his essay "Sketch of a New Esthetic of Music" (Busoni, 2010), as a precursor of Ricoeur's hermeneutic philosophy of the act of writing:

> 'Notation' ("writing down") brings up the subject of Transcription, nowadays a term much misunderstood, almost discreditable. The frequent antagonism which I have excited with 'transcriptions,' and the opposition to which an ofttimes irrational criticism has provoked me, caused me to seek a clear understanding of this point. My final conclusion concerning it is this: Every notation is, in itself, the transcription of an abstract idea. The instant the pen seizes it, the idea loses its original form. The very intention to write down the idea, compels a choice of measure and key. The form, and the musical agency, which the composer must decide upon, still more closely define the way and the limits. (Busoni, 2010, p. 18)

Historically speaking, a musical transcription can either expand the instrumentation of a composition, as in an orchestration of a piece for a solo instrument, or reduce the number of parts, as is found in versions of Schönberg's Chamber Symphony op 9 by the composer himself for two pianos, or, perhaps more importantly in Anton Webern's two differently scored versions for quintet, created with an articulate conviction that the true identity of the work was more intimate than the original version suggested, and must have the "character of a chamber music composition".24 But the original could also constitute the material for a rather independent new composition, like in Liszt's paraphrases of Chopin's songs.25

As part of the musicological study of folk music and extra-European music, a different form of transcription emerged in the 19th Century, which entailed the translation of orally transmitted music to western notation. In the 20th Century these methods were further developed in ethnomusicology, first with the use of audio recordings, and after 1950, also with the use of new technologies and computing to create analysis and representations of these data in other forms than in standard western notation (Nettl, 2005).26

I will in the following turn to a brief analysis of how different forms of transcription can be a source for identifying the negotiation of voice between a composer, a performer, a specific instrument and several compositional systems, using documentation of a collaboration between myself and the British composer David Gorton as material. The piece we eventually created through these collaborative processes is titled *Forlorn Hope*27. It is a composition for

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23 In Bach's time, the practice of transcription was an essential component in the study of composition. But it also had a very pragmatic function, as a means to efficiently respond to the demands for new works and performances.

24 Cited in Muxeneder (2018, n.p.). Obviously, Schönberg's Chamber Symphony is indeed a rich example when it comes to arrangements and questions of instrumentation, since the composer's own intuition obviously was contrary to Webern's and, following the premiere in 1907, he created a series of versions that expanded the instrumentation, until the premiere 1936 of op 9b, scored for full orchestra.

25 For a discussion of these transcriptions, see Charles Rosen's book The Romantic Generation (1995) where he points to how even the more extensive reworking of materials, as in the intertextual coupling between Chopins Nocturne in Db major Op 27, no. 2 and the mazurka, Meine Freuden (Op 74 nr. 5).

26 For a literature review of the development of methods and software for such analysis, see "Automatic music transcription: challenges and future directions" (Benetos, et al., 2013).

27 The title refers to one of John Dowland's most complex solo works for the lute, the Forlorn Hope Fancy. I will discuss below how transcription played a series of roles in the compositional process, and Dowland's fancy constituted one of the sources here (discussed further below). Forlorn Hope is recorded on CD, together with my transcription of John Dowland's Forlorn Hope Fancy, in a portrait CD with David Gorton's music on Toccata Records, London (Gorton, 2017).

11-string alto guitar, an instrument which was originally developed to allow the performance of renaissance lute music on a guitar, without compromising the composed structures. Hence, the instrument is tuned a minor third higher than the guitar, as a renaissance lute, and it has a theorbo-like construction, although it differs from such lutes by also having frets for the extended bass strings, a difference in the affordance structure of the instrument which has urged the development of different right hand techniques in order to master the extended possibilities of this particular instrument. I have indeed used this instrument to record the lute music of J.S Bach,[28] but, for me, it has primarily functioned as one of many experimental guitars on which to create new music.[29] The alto guitar was a central instrument in the first working sessions with David Gorton at the Inter Arts Center (IAC) in Malmö in 2010. Over a period of three days we tested a series of tuning systems that David had prepared. They are reflective of a core feature of his compositional practice, which entails the creation of harmonic structures, specifically designed for compositions for string instruments, by retuning each instrument using procedures built on the affordances of the seventh harmonic. By using this natural harmonic, which is 31 cent lower than the seventh step in an equally tempered scale, as a building block in the tuning procedure, a particular alteration of the internal pitch structure of the instrument(s) is generated. Hence, the harmonic structures in Gorton's music is not built on a microtonal system which is imposed on the instrument, but instead, the microtonal harmony is immediately drawn from the affordances of the instrument(s) when tuned to such a scordatura. Gorton had prepared three tuning systems and we worked on each of them, going in between, comparing their individual characteristics, and considering whether they would be more suited for one particular instrument rather than another. Figure 1 shows the first of the three tuning systems, eventually selected for the piece for 11-string alto guitar. This scordatura illustrates the general principle: here strings 2 and 4 are tuned one-sixth of a tone flat so as to bring them in tune with the seventh harmonic of strings 7 and 11 respectively; and strings 6, 8 and 10 are tuned one-sixth of a tone sharp by bringing their seventh harmonics in tune with string 1, which is at "normal" pitch.


Figure 1. Scordatura for the 11-string alto guitar in David Gorton's *Forlorn Hope*.

For the purposes of this paper, it is important to consider how this collaboration was documented and analyzed. The first working sessions at the Inter Arts Center were recorded on video, and initially analyzed by Gorton and Östersjö, in stimulated recall sessions, set up

28 Also in the performance of Bach's lute music, the extended fretboard, and a right hand technique which allows for fingering parts of the counterpoint on the lower bass-strings, is essential in order to avoid compromising the structure of the more intricate movements. See further Östersjö (2003).
29 Among early recording projects, André Chini's solo work "Skål Khayyam!" (recorded on Östersjö, 2001) and Kent Olofsson's concerto for guitar and chamber ensemble, "The Garden of Earthly Delights" (recorded on Östersjö, 1997) were of particular importance.

in immediate sequence after the recordings. This provided a first analytical overview of material produced, and of some important interactions between the two protagonists. However, we then contacted Eric Clarke, Heather professor of Music at Oxford, and agreed to include this project as a study carried out with him and his assistant Mark Doffman, as a part of the then unfolding CMPCP-project. All documentation that we produced, videos of rehearsals, compositional sketches, as well as email conversations, was handed over to Clarke and Doffman, and analyzed in a second round, independently of the first. Eventually, the four researchers then again met for a final round of joint analysis which led to the publication of a jointly authored book chapter (Clarke et al., 2017).

Here, the project is discussed as situated in an art world of contemporary classical music, in which a division of labour between composer and performer remains the rule. While they find that the project provides clear evidence of artistic practice in which the traditional roles of "composer" and "performer" become fluid, they also suggest that these examples "may do little to shift or break those boundaries in any dramatic manner; but in more implicit and procedural ways they help to carry forward the long process of dismantling the still persistent myth of the autonomous-genius composer and his or her helpful and accommodating interpreter–performer" (Clarke et al., 2017, p 134). I will return to this problem of inertia below. In the final analysis, the four authors make a series observation regarding the initial working sessions, in which they find

> Östersjö and Gorton behaving almost as a single agent distributed between two individuals, in which Östersjö generates the material while Gorton sits alongside as an interactive listener, asking, suggesting, commenting, responding—with frequent, quite lengthy periods of quiet attentiveness. The process starts with a diagnostic phase, in which Gorton and Östersjö investigate ways to get to grips with the tuning systems: what they sound like, what sort of resonant qualities they have, how the pitches of the strings relate to one another across the frets, and the sonic outcomes of typical fingering patterns that are now transformed by the new tunings. By extension, this diagnostic phase then becomes manipulative, driven by the tacit question: If the strings sound like that, what happens if we try this? And a third phase is more directly performative: once Östersjö has gained sufficient familiarity with the tuning system, he is able to improvise with it for extended periods. These improvisations confirmed the sense that the first tuning in particular brought out specific dynamic and dramatic qualities in the eleven-string guitar, with the resulting decision that this system would be used for that instrument in the first piece of the project, and that the other systems would be used in later pieces on the ten-string and six-string guitars. (Clarke et al., 2017, p.122)

The chapter provides several detailed examples of how material which was created in these sessions were incorporated into the final composition. I will not discuss the detail of how these can be identified, but rather the significance of the process of transcribing parts of these video recordings, with the intention of either literally citing them, or for recomposing them.

But first we need to look at the next impulse towards transcription: the idea of using John Dowland's Forlorn Hope as a reference, and as a material to cite, in the piece. The first impulse was related to an earlier project of mine, a duo collaboration with the composer and improviser Natasha Barrett. Culminating in a CD released in 2009 (Barrett & Östersjö, 2009), we had developed a shared voice as a duo, aiming at the exploration of materials from John Dowland's lute songs – or in fact, only one song, "Can She Excuse My Wrongs" – through two compositions for guitar and electronics by Barrett and a series of improvisations for

guitar and electronics with the duo. Gorton was familiar with the CD and was interested in connecting to the project. We decided to use a different piece from Dowland as a source material. Since I had just been making a transcription for 11-string alto guitar of Dowland's Forlorn Hope Fancy, we quickly agreed to work from this composition. We decided that the first step must be to transcribe the piece for the scordatura we had agreed on for the new composition.

We met at the Royal Academy of Music (RAM) in London for this second stage of the work. We agreed to use my existing transcription as a point of departure, and make annotations with new fingerings in my score. We additionally agreed on a set of "rules" for how to go about making the new transcription: (1) the tonal structures of the original fancy should always remain recognizable, even while sounding "out of tune"; (2) the tonal structures should sound as if coming '"in and out of focus"; (3) "out of focus" moments should predominate, so that the "in focus" moments are rare; and (4) technically idiomatic solutions on the instrument should be prioritized. This entailed on the one hand a pragmatic approach, but also a focus on attentive listening to the minute detail of the many different options in the "retuning" of the Dowland, through Gorton's scordatura. By using my transcription as point of departure, and exploring the affordances of Gorton's tuning system as applied on the alto guitar, the process of creating the transcription put the voices of both performer and composer in interaction also with the voice of John Dowland, as a lutenist and as a composer. In the liner notes to the portrait CD comprising Forlorn Hope and other works engaging with historical voices in similar ways, Gorton observes how there are several reasons for his interest in "working on the edges of transcription, arrangement and composition" (Gorton, 2017, p 4). He finds that there are micro-levels of signification that come to the fore, specifically through such negotiations of voice:

> It is a common practice to classify a composer's style in relation to his or her harmonic, rhythmic or aesthetic concerns and, where these considerations might change over a lifetime, to divide someone's output into distinct stylistic periods. Yet questions of style run much deeper than that and are influenced by the kinds of choices made by a composer on a note-by-note basis: the voicing of a chord, the pacing of materials, the dovetailing of a line between instruments, the idiosyncrasies of instrumental writing. Usually these small-scale choices become subsumed or obscured by the more obvious stylistic considerations, but when working with borrowed materials they come to the fore. The compositions on this album therefore represent a process of discovery for me, in which I have found new facets of my compositional "voice" through that of another (Gorton, 2017, p. 4).

Interestingly, in the initial stage, in the working sessions at RAM, a parallel negotiation of voice - between the two protagonists in the room and the voice of John Dowland, through the score - took place. Once this annotated score was completed, Östersjö recorded the transcription, as a reference for Gorton. Gorton then took the annotated transcription and created a new score which properly represented the sounding pitch with all its microtonal fluctuations. This second score served as a basic working material when Gorton hereafter gathered the entire material created so far - the improvisations in the working sessions at IAC, the qualitative analysis of the working process, the transcription in its different versions – and returned to the traditional role of the composer, working out a score for the composition.[30] As mentioned above, Clarke et al (2017) develops a comprehensive analysis

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30 This was by far the longest single working period, and took place between March and September 2011.

of the relation between materials found in the sessions at IAC and the finished score. However, for the purposes of the present paper, we are more looking for the type of observations made by Gorton and Östersjö (2016):

> In the case of Forlorn Hope the notation of the existing Dowland material afforded many possibilities once transferred into the microtonal tuning system. But at the same time notational conventions provided resistance when it came to writing out the fluid glissing/tapping/trilling material that had been developed in the Malmö sessions. The opening bars of the Almain section shows the meeting point of these two types of notational engagement; the undulating scalic shapes of the Dowland can be seen in the contours of the material, combined with a kind of tablature notation that indicates separate right and left hand movements. It is through this conception of notation that the voice of the composer emerges from the complex entanglement of Östersjö's improvisations with Renaissance counterpoint (Gorton & Östersjö, 2016, p. 590)

Forlorn Hope contains seven movements, titled in a Dowlandesque manner, with references made to dignitaries, in this case not all too popular British politicians. There are three longer movements, whose titles make reference to Renaissance dances. They use material from one third each of the Dowland transcription, divided in the following order: *The Right Honourable David, Minister of State for Universities and Science (attending Cabinet), his Galliard; Dr Cable's Pavan*; *Mr Hunt's Thing, Almain.31* Hence, the Almain uses material from the third part of the transcription, which is characterized by quickly undulating figurations. With the material which was transcribed from my improvisations at IAC, a complex web was created of often independent figurations in the left and the right hand, generating a diffuse after-image of Dowland's composition, but at the same time capturing characteristic elements of the voices of both Gorton and Östersjö (see figure 2).


Figure 2. Bars 54-59 of Mr Hunt's Thing, Almain

A bit further into the Almain, the connections with the Dowland Fancy become even more obvious, as can be seen by comparing bars 56-59 of Forlorn Hope (Fig. 2) with bars 28-29 of the transcription of the Dowland (Fig. 3).

31 The title of the Almain refers to Jeremy Hunt who was Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport 2010-12 and thoroughly unpopular in this role. The other two partes are dedicated to David Willettts, who introduced the new higher fees structure within UK universities, and Dr Vince Cable, who at the time was Secretary of State for Business, Innovation, and Skills (which housed higher education). Hence, these three between them were responsible for UK art worlds and academia, unpopular as they may have been, they were indeed popular enough to have been elected!

Figure 3. Bars 28-29 of Gorton's and Östersjö's transcription of Dowland's Forlorn Hope Fancy. Note the structural correspondence between bars 56-59 of Forlorn Hope and bars 29-29 of the transcription.

The practice of musical transcription may be understood as situated in between the material identity of a finished score and the performative identity of and improvisation or a performance. As a practice, it also destabilizes the notion of a single and definite musical work, and instead emphasizes the performativity of the act of writing, as well as of the strong agency that musical instruments have on the identity of any piece of music. Given the role transcription had in the genesis of Forlorn Hope, it may serve as an illustration of how artistic outcomes and materials, whether of a largely performative or material nature, are constitutive of musical voice. All of these manifestations of artistic knowledge can be studied and analyzed through multiple perspectives, and taken together, should serve as the grounds for the assessment of the knowledge production in any piece of artistic research. But in order to allow for such in-depth assessment of artistic knowledge, in its material and performative forms, the field must engage in further development of multi-method design and forms of analysis.

5 Discussion

In my understanding, there are two central perspectives that should guide quality assessment of artistic research output. First, that artistic quality in any artistic research project must be understood from within its art world, and further, that a substantial part of the assessment must be carried out within this art world, and not in academic institutions. Following Barbara Bolt, quality in artistic research can be identified through its performative force, "that is, its capacity to effect 'movement' in thought, word and deed in the individual and social sensorium. These movements enable a reconfiguration of conventions from within rather than outside of convention" (Bolt, 2016, p. 130). But again, as I have argued above with reference to the role of critics in the art world of theatre (with reference to Kent Olofsson's PhD thesis), an assessment of the quality of artistic research outcomes through an art world must also be based on a contextualizing analysis. It remains a challenge for the community of artistic researchers and institutions hosting research programs and projects to

develop formats for how such assessment can be best carried out.

Second, while any music institution is built on practices of internally assessing artistic quality, starting in the admission process and continuing throughout the curriculum, the method development within artistic research—and, in particular, the possibilities inherent to the notion of artistic research carried out using multi-method design—allow for an even more thorough assessment of the knowledge production. The development of methods within artistic research, entails an articulated understanding of the possibilities and limitations of documentation, as well as a critique and development of the use of introspection and reflection (see further Wong 2008, Östersjö, 2017). As suggested in section four, artistic research can engage with many different traces of artistic process, and hereby construct a more complete picture of the emergence of voice through research processes in which we are engaged. The four theses discussed in the present paper provide such data to a greater or lesser degree, and I believe that we may do well in considering in further detail what forms of documentation and representation, as well as what forms of analysis, are best suited for providing a reviewer the necessary materials for a review of artistic quality in an artistic PhD.

Further, I would argue that this demands a holistic understanding of how artistic knowledge is embodied and situated in an art world, and a keen awareness on the side of both researcher and reviewer of the difficulties embedded in the task of accessing the tacit domains of artistic and embodied knowledge.

However, the power of inertia (Becker, 1995) is also a factor to consider, when the force and effect of artistic practice within an art world is to be assessed. As concluded by Clarke et al., (2017), looking at the evidence of the fluid practices of Gorton and Östersjö (2019), also in the more radical field of classical contemporary music

> these socially constructed designations are not given up or laid aside lightly—and it is easy to see why. Quite apart from their psychological function as markers (and more than just markers) of people's sense of identity, from a wider perspective these identities acquire specific meanings as cultural capital in the social field of the art world. In all too tangible terms (reputation, employment, remuneration) it means something to be either a composer or a performer, and while in popular music these distinctions have been changed and challenged quite significantly by singer–songwriters, re- mixers, producers and DJs, in classical music there is less evidence of change of an equivalent kind. (Clarke et al., 2017, p. 133)

The challenge then is to define methods for the assessment of artistic quality which is situated both in the art world (where the force and effect of an experimental and developmental project may, or may not, be immediately apparent), as well as through the scientific study of the artistic practice. Frisk & Östersjö (2013) identify four fields of gravitation[32], arguing that the political potential in artistic research lies in the creation of an awareness of the socio-political situatedness of the artistic researcher: "The contextualization of art as artistic research is in itself a politicization, but it is also the placing of the artistic work in the light of a particular social, theoretical, cultural, or philosophical framework that makes the political dimension surface. Such awareness may constitute a foundation for artistic production and research that is responsive to the four gravitational fields discussed above – the subjective, the experimental, the academic, and the field of the art world" (Frisk & Östersjö, 2013, pp. 59-60). If we adopt a sociological perspective on the

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[32] Further discussed in Östersjö (2017).

academic field, along the lines of Latour's classic analysis of the Salk Laboratory in *Laboratory Life* (1986), perhaps we could think of the two central poles as an art world and a "science world", wherein the latter is similarly constituted of many agents, then the space for embodied and material interactions can be represented by the subjective and the experimental (see figure 4).[33] Art worlds and science worlds interact also outside of the context of artistic research, as discussed above with regard to the role of research on historically informed performance in Spissky's project. If the science world can actively engage with the analysis of the subjective and experimental dimensions of artistic research,[34] new tools can be created for the assessment of central artistic outcomes.


Figure 4. Four Fields of Gravitation. Adapted from Östersjö (2017).

In section two, I made an attempt to define the art worlds within which each of these PhD projects are situated. One of my aims was to show how several successful PhD projects have started out, firmly situated in one art world, but intentionally challenged the boundaries of the PhD student's individual practice. Hereby, we can see how artistic research has the possibility of creating change inside art worlds, but experimental projects can also cause individual transformations that instead bring the artist into new contexts, outside of the art world in which the project was initiated. While this appears to be a possible outcome of a successfully experimental project design, it also poses particular problems in the assessment

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[33] The nature of the "science worlds" of artistic research is beyond the scope of the present paper, but a further analysis of how such science worlds are constituted in academia in Europe is indeed a pertinent research topic.
[34] As suggested above, a scientific engagement with subjectivity in musical creativity, entails a multimodal approach to the embodied and material forms in which artistic practice takes shape.

of artistic quality. Again, the outcomes of Olofsson's and Spissky's projects are assessed by key players within the art world, ensembles and individual artists, concert halls, theatres, festivals, as well as by critics. I suggested above that the assessment of Sandell's thesis may similarly be best carried out in the art world where the project was initiated. But through Cyrino's experimental approach to her practice as a classical flautist, a more radical movement away from the art world of classical music is instigated, and therefore, it may be necessary to assess such a project from a wider perspective, not through its immediate effect in an art world, but instead as a piece of artistic experimentation wherein the quality is assessed to a greater extent in the science world, and specifically through a thorough examination of artistic process.35   But, at the same time, this assessment must necessarily build on a robust understanding of the art world which the project wishes to challenge. Additionally, it may be concluded from the above that an artistic PhD thesis should provide the reader with a substantial presentation of the art world in which the project is situated, in order to facilitate the assessment of the artistic knowledge production.

Artistic research, and indeed each artistic researcher, must be situated in a liminal space between the academic institution where research is carried out, and the art world within which their practice is situated. Therefore I think of artistic researchers as nomads, seeking new knowledge and new forms of expression by oscillating between different "modes of existence" (Latour 2013). Hereby, the promise of artistic research is to, on the one hand, create formats through which artists can be allowed to experiment with and challenge the practice within their art worlds, and on the other hand, to constitute a critical voice, and a factor for change and innovation, within academia. Marina Cyrino's project is clearly driven by such aims, and she notes how

> Academic research is beginning to incorporate research that is not only thought on music, but is lived and thought through music. But there are still ways to go in order to decentralise the logic of the finished artwork (as well as the hegemony of the big Surnames) and give space to the mediations that precede or follow the work, or all the different forms of practices that do not claim the status of an artwork in the modern sense of the term, names without dazzling brilliance, bodies-musicians who neither claim nor succumb to the position of stars. There are still ways to go in order for the musician's voice to bring academic writing out of tune, contaminating it, in fierce joy, with chant, breath, drool and grunt. (Cyrino, 2019, p. 26)

But such a vision is unlikely to be realized unless the artistic research community delivers artwork which has impact in the art worlds where they are situated. Certainly, such impact may be gradual rather than immediate, and artistic innovation is not always greeted with immediate success, however, the growing community of artistic research practitioners and institutions must develop a more grounded practice of assessing such qualities, and indeed, also become more devoted to the production of artistic outcomes that make a difference.

Acknowledgements

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35 The history of experimental music in Europe does suggest that some forms of artistic experimentation have been strongly supported by an engagement with science worlds, and this is a factor which should be further explored, but goes beyond the scope of the present paper. Through such an analysis, it might also be suggested that the experimental potential in Sandell's project could have been expanded through various forms of expanded engagement with a science world.

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