

Nothing to be learnt from Socrates? Epicurus on Socrates in love, according to Maximus of Tyre

Não há nada a aprender com Sócrates? Epicuro e os amores de Sócrates, segundo Máximo de Tiro

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Abstract: In the 32nd Oration “On Pleasure”, by Maximus of Tyre, a defence of hedonism is presented in which Epicurus himself comes out in person to speak in favour of pleasure. In this defence, Socrates’ love affairs are recalled as an instance of virtuous behaviour allied with pleasure. In this paper we will explore this rather strange Epicurean portrayal of Socrates as a positive example. We contend that in order to understand this depiction of Socrates as a virtuous lover, some previous trends in Platonism should be taken into account, chiefly those which kept the relationship with the Hellenistic Academia alive. Special mention is made of Favorinus of Arelate, not as the source of the contents in the oration, but as the author closest to Maximus both for his interest in Socrates and his rhetorical (as well as dialectical) ways in philosophy.

Keywords: Maximus of Tyre; Socrates; Epicurus; Favorinus of Arelate.

I. Epicurus was definitely not a thinker prone to accept lessons from any philosopher other than himself, even from those who had been, truly or allegedly, former teachers of his.² In this downright challenge to previous and contemporary philosophy, no exception was taken, not even to Socrates. This dismissive attitude was faithfully pushed ahead with by his disciples. A brief overview of their views about Socrates’ life and teaching is sufficiently eloquent of their critical and dismissive stance on him³.

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² Cic. *ND* 1, 26, 72; S.E. *AM* 1. 3 (= fr. 114 Us.); D.L. 10. 13. Apparently Democritus was an exception, according to Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* Cf. HUBY (1978) 80-86. On the sources for this portrayal of Epicurus as an aggressive polemicist, cf. *infra* note 5.

³ According to RILEY (1980) 56, “there was a fundamental difference of opinion concerning the role of the philosopher and his behaviour towards his students”. LONG (1988) 155 points out some possible lines of convergence, but apparently these lines were not followed; however cf. notes 9 and 10.

However, according to Knut Kleve,⁴ there were two ways in which Socrates fared even worse than other philosophers did at the hands of Epicurus and his earliest disciples: firstly, it appears that nothing could be learnt from him, while in the case of other philosophical antagonists this possibility in theory was not excluded; and secondly, Epicurus and his faithful followers poured scorn on his personal conduct.⁵ All in all, to quote the authoritative words of Kleve, “Socrates seems to have been *the* great antagonist to the Epicureans”⁶.

Against this background of cutting criticism, the evidence concerning Epicurus by the second century philosophical orator Maximus of Tyre deserves more attention than it has merited until now⁷. In the oration 32 “On Pleasure”, Epicurus comes out in person to defend pleasure as the highest end in human life, going against the whole consensus of the rest of the philosophers, who condemned pleasure or, at least, called for it to be strictly controlled in order to lead a virtuous life. In his defence Epicurus presents both Socrates and Diogenes as glaring examples of a behaviour guided by the search of pleasure in a way perfectly according with the demands of virtue (§§ 8-9). In the case of the former, the stories told by

⁴ KLEVE (1983) 231 and 248: “The Epicurean philosopher is in every respect the reversal of Socrates”.

⁵ The main sources for Epicurus’ behaviour in his polemic against his rivals are Plut. *Non posse* 1086 A (= fr. 237 Us.), and D.L. 10. 7-8. SEDLEY (1976) has contested this view in two respects. On the one hand, the evidence for the issue was mediated by Timocrates’ criticism against Epicurus and Metrodorus; on the other, a careful analysis of the terms of abuse used by Epicurus reveals that these had a precise point to make in the philosophical debate he engaged in with his rivals. VANDER WAERDT (1982) considers Colotes as the first Epicurean to make Socrates one of the school’s principal opponents. Epicurus was nevertheless rather critical on Socrates. The former disapproved of Socratic irony (Cic. *Brutus* 85, 292 = fr. 231 Us.), and probably criticized Socrates’ behaviour in banquets (as featured in Plato’s *Symposium*, cf. D.L. 10. 119 = fr. 63 Us.). On Epicurus’ criticism of Socratic ideas on love, cf. note 25. On Epicurean polemics, cf. KECHAGIA (2011) 71-79, who makes a distinction between criticism, polemic, and invective.

⁶ KLEVE (1983) 231 and 244-249.

⁷ We follow the edition by TRAPP (1994). The same author has produced the most authoritative translation into English, along with introduction and notes. For the oration 32, cf. TRAPP (1997) 254-261.

some of the most attached followers of Socrates about his many beloved attest to his devotion to pleasure. In fact, when deciding on the young men that deserve to be spoken to, Socrates' main guide was simply their beauty, and that means for Epicurus the simple pleasure of beholding them. Virtue, then, is not incompatible with the search for pleasure, as the usual philosophical story goes. On the contrary, pleasure sets us on the path of virtue because it is tightly intertwined with the Good, and the example of Socrates and the most rigorous of his disciples are excellent proof of this definitive truth. Apparently, then, Socrates is good company for an Epicurean to keep, and some good lessons about the correct use of pleasure can be learnt from him, once his behaviour is properly understood.

Now, where does this bizarre and unexpected «Epicurean» Socrates comes from⁸? Is it Maximus' invention? Or, could we possibly postulate that some Epicurean tradition exists behind Maximus' rhetorical elaborations? Before hazarding an answer to this question, let us qualify the black-and-white picture portrayed by Kleeve of the Epicurean Socrates.

In their collection of Herculeanean texts concerning Socrates, Eduardo Acosta Méndez and Anna Angeli have provided evidence that the image of Socrates all along the history of the school was much more complex and nuanced than usually thought⁹. On the same line, a recent overview by Diskin Clay of the references to Socrates' trial and death to be read in the papyri found at Herculaneum provides us with a more balanced view of the Epicurean attitudes to the Socratic example¹⁰. To begin with, Socrates, according to Philodemus, was a virtuous sage suffering, as many others did, from the misunderstanding of his way of life and the suspicion and

⁸ According to KONIARIS (1983) 232, this discourse was an evidence that Maximus could not be considered as Middle Platonic, since for Platonists "it is always open season for Epicureans", cf. DILLON (1996²) 242.

⁹ ACOSTA MÉNDEZ & ANGELI (1992) 103-138 pointed out that this more open attitude towards Socrates is particularly noticeable in Philodemus, but it is not unheard of for Epicurus himself. According to Philodemus (*De morte* IV *PHerc.* 1050 col. I), Epicurus turned to the "Socratic example" in his work *On Lives* ([10.2] Arr.), in order to support his definition of death as "privation of senses", cf. ACOSTA MÉNDEZ & ANGELI (1992) 38-40 and test. 2 A.M-A.

¹⁰ CLAY (2003) 89-100.

hostility it aroused in his fellow citizens. Surely, this positive assessment of Socrates goes together with a critical stance. Epicurus himself would have suffered the same fate were it not for the retirement from all public affairs, which he wholeheartedly recommended and put into practice. Socrates' public performance of his philosophical mission let him exposed to the attack by his enemies, who in the long run managed to condemn him. As Philodemus says: "his virtue was of no use to him"¹¹. It is worth pointing out that Maximus said virtually the same thing about Socrates in his third conference devoted to the topic "Why didn't Socrates defend himself?". Maximus' main argument follows the logic that, in order to be acquitted, Socrates should have taken the moral low ground, as the jury was made up of bad people, likely to remain unmoved by his reasons. Socrates, on the contrary, preferred to abide by his virtue and be silent in the face of the juries¹².

Now, notwithstanding all his preventions, Epicurus came under fire from his philosophical rivals for being an atheist of sorts. Once more, Philodemus found in Socrates some positive inspiration in defence of Epicurus. According to Clay, Socrates' trial became the model for the "trial" of Epicurus brought about by his philosophical adversaries, and the parallelism between Epicurus and Socrates turned out to be quite useful in order to highlight both the similarities and differences between each other¹³. Consequently, thanks to the evidence at Herculaneum, the whole picture of the Epicurean reception of Socrates has become considerably more complex and nuanced.

¹¹ *Rhet.* VII *PHerc.* 1669, col xxxix-xxx (Sudhaus pp. 265-267) = test. 10 A.M.-A.; cf. ACOSTA MÉNDEZ & ANGELI (1992) 114-115 and CLAY (2003) 94-95.

¹² *Oration* 3, 7. Maximus' position is that apparently Socrates did not defend himself at all, i. e., that he remained silent during his trial, thus contradicting the main trend of Socratic literature from Plato onwards. Similar statements can be read in Philostr. *Vita Apol.* 8 2, 2, and in *PKöln* 205, col. iv 114-115, from the IIIrd century CE (= SSR I C 550), which supplies us with extensive fragments of a Socratic dialogue from the Ist cent. BCE. HUNTER (2012) 137-138, and 141, wonders if Socrates' "silence" could mean, either that he did not prepare his defence (cf. Musonius, according to Philostr. *Vita Apol.* 7, 30, 1), or the inappropriateness of the speech provided (cf. Xenoph. *Apol.* 1).

¹³ CLAY (2003) 96-100.

Back to our question, in the present state of our evidence concerning the history of Epicureanism, it is hazardous to conclude with any degree of certainty about when and by whom this use of Socrates' example was put forward. Apparently, there is nothing in Epicurean literature from the Hellenistic period similar to this interpretation of Socrates in love which can be taken as proof for philosophical hedonism¹⁴. However, what really matters in our present inquiry is the evidence for the use of Socrates as a positive model in Epicurean literature. Maximus' "invention" is at least consonant with some trends in Epicureanism by the end of the Hellenistic period.

II. Maximus' *Oration* 32 is the third one in a series of four (30-33) devoted to the topic of pleasure as the end of life¹⁵. Throughout these conferences the moral value of pleasant life is assessed by means of an analysis of human nature, in order to refute Epicurus as the most dangerous defendant of the hedonistic creed. Nonetheless, the set of orations has a basic dialectical articulation. In *Oration* 32 Epicurus is allowed to speak out for his opinion about the natural allure of pleasure and its spontaneous appeal to all kinds of sentient creatures¹⁶. The conference begins with the telling of an Aesopic fable that, Maximus surmises, would be apposite to convey Epicurus' judgement about the hypocritical attitude of those who condemn pleasure (§ 1-2). A doe while trying to escape from a lion hides under the cover of thick bush; the lion in pursuit of her asks a herdsman who happens

¹⁴ It is worth mentioning that in *PKöln* 205 col. III 82-91 (cf. note 12) the interlocutor objects to Socrates that his replies may suit people who think pleasure to be the *telos* of life.

¹⁵ TRAPP (1997) 236-239 surmises (correctly in our view) that the series began with *Oration* 29 "On the ends of Life" and describes the whole series as Maximus' *De finibus*. MUTCHMANN (1917) defended that the series originally embraced *Orations* 30-35, but both KONIARIS (1982) 94-102 and PUIGGALI (1983) 424-445 have contested Mutchmann's proposal, which should nevertheless deserve a second thought.

¹⁶ BIGNONE (2007) 313-329 drew attention to this conference as being evidence relevant to the early debate between Epicureans and their rivals on the value of a pleasant life. According to Bignone, Maximus built arguments into his defence of pleasure, deriving from the writings of Epicurus himself. Some points of Bignone's reconstruction of the debate have been revised critically by BRANCACCI (1999).

to be there whether he has seen the doe, and the herdsman, while answering negatively, at the same time hints by gesture at the place where the doe is hiding¹⁷. Philosophers, accordingly, may waste their words censuring pleasure as being contrary to decent life, but they can't in fact help feeling it, given the very constitution of human nature: their bodies hint at pleasure, regardless their highbrow doctrines.

The use of the fable as an apologetic strategy is noteworthy in at least two respects. Firstly, it reveals a sound knowledge of the cornerstones of Epicurean moral theory, as it proceeds from the statement of the absolute primitiveness of pleasure: there is no need for demonstration of the truth that all sentient beings, from their very first breath, are inclined to accept what gives them pleasure and avoid painful things. The truth of this is not shown through discourses: it is clear to be seen by anyone in the behaviour of all the animals¹⁸. Since reason and art come after pleasure and in fact through it, arguments against the simple and universal evidence are deemed as sophistic and/or hypocritical.

Secondly, the resort to fables as a dialectical procedure is interesting enough, since we happen to have good evidence for the use of them by the earliest philosophers of this school. Thanks to Stobaeus, we know that Metrodorus of Lampsacus (*ca.* 331-278 BCE), one of the "guides" of the school, made use of the story about the lion and the gnat in order to propose the adequate way of sorting out difficulties¹⁹. Geert Roskam has recently shown that, by means of this fable, Metrodorus conveyed a piece of advice to be found in one of the *Ratae Sententiae* of Epicurus²⁰. As Roskam points out, the fragment from Metrodorus improves our knowledge on the history of the Greek fable in the Hellenistic period, and gives us a glimpse

¹⁷ Aesop. 22 Hausrath-Hunger = Babrius, 50. The version known in Aesopus' (and Babrius') collections involves a fox, a hunter and a herdsman. It is interesting to remark that Hermogenes (*On forms of style*) assigns the use of myths to the "sweet" idea, cf. *De ideis* 2. 330-339, and picks out the rhetor Titus Aurelius Nicostratus for his dexterity in the invention of (Aesopic) fables (*De ideis* 2. 407). According to Suda, he was the author of collections of fables (*Polymythia*, *Dekamythia*).

¹⁸ Epicurus, frs. 256 and 398 Us.

¹⁹ Stob. IV 4, 26 = Metrodorus, fr. 60 Körte; Aesop. 267 Hausrath-Hunger.

²⁰ Epicurus, KD 39. ROSKAM (2011) 33-36.

of the use of literature for philosophical purposes by Epicureans. Indeed, the elaboration by Metrodorus of the old Aesopic fable is quite similar to the one Maximus considers hypothetically fitting for Epicurus in the oration under scrutiny. In both cases the plot of the fable is reduced to basic alternatives of moral significance according to Epicurean doctrines.

In the following paragraphs (§§ 3-6) Maximus produces some well-known tenets of the school in defence of pleasure as natural and universal. In his own voice firstly (playing the supporter of Epicurus' doctrines) he asserts that the naturalness of pleasure amounts to its primordial condition: it comes before reason and any knowledge we can derive from experience. Against the criticism of the excesses of the debauchees, he objects that such excesses are in fact the result of the refinements caused by art and reason to our natural drive²¹. In a conciliatory mood, a sort of alliance between reason and pleasure is advocated (§ 3)²². Thereafter, from § 4 onwards, Maximus let Epicurus himself speak for pleasure as the true end of life. Rooted in the body as soon as an animal is born, pleasure guarantees its survival and, for the same reason, pain effects its destruction²³. Against those who reject pleasure because it is not exclusive to human beings, Epicurus retorts that neither the light of the sun nor the air are exclusive to humans, but we appreciate them nevertheless (§ 4)²⁴. Virtue and Pleasure, follows Epicurus/Maximus, are so closely intertwined, that it is impossible to deprive the first of the second without spoiling both, whereas their close association brings about perfect happiness (§ 5).

The last part of the oration (§§ 6-10) presents us with an impressive parade of examples, with the aim of supplying living evidence, both mythical and historical, divine and human, for the practicality of the Epicurean ethical doctrines. Amongst the exemplary figures called out, there is So-

²¹ The text from Maximus corresponds to fr. 443 Us.; cf. Ep. KD 3, 15, 28, frs. 422, 459, 464, 481, and 599 Us., as well as BIGNONE (2007) 313-318 for a detailed commentary of the Epicurean sources in this oration.

²² Cf. Epicurus, *Ad Men.* 132, KD 18 and 19.

²³ Cf. Epicurus, SV 37.

²⁴ It is worth mentioning that this argument is an answer to both the preceding (*Oration* 31, 5) and the following oration (*Oration* 33, 7). The argument from what is unique to humans comes from Aristotle's *Protreptic*, according to BIGNONE (2007) 320-321.

crates, as stated at the beginning of this paper, but he is not alone. The list begins with the exceptional case of Heracles, a most debated exemplar by both philosophers and sophists from Vth century on, whose famous labours turn out to be in Maximus' oration a perfect demonstration of the kind of life advocated by Epicurus. Heracles' behaviour abides by the rational calculus that dictates that great pleasures may demand much suffering and toil to be achieved²⁵.

At the sheer human level, the example of Diogenes was only to be expected. As his mythological pendant Heracles, Diogenes applied a rationale similar to Antisthenes' for leading a virtuous life, according to which the highest pleasures come from contemplating the common ones²⁶. However, the appearance of Socrates as a devoted lover, between Hercules and Diogenes, comes a bit as a surprise. Maximus' choice is, at first sight, an awkward one for a Platonist, since there were some other well-known Platonic passages, where Socrates seemed to endorse straightforwardly an hedonistic position. Besides, there is no much evidence of Epicurean traditions about Socratic love²⁷, so that this hedonist Socrates appears to be Maximus' dialectical invention, which is not without resonances in the rest of the *dialexeis*. In fact, four of them were devoted to "Socrates' Erotic art", where many topics of

²⁵ WOLFSODORF (2008) traces the evolution of the sort of pleasures associated with toil from Hesiod (bodily pleasures) through Prodicus (pleasures of social recognition) to the Socratics, Xenophon, Aristippus and Phaedo. BRANCACCI (1993) 33-55 has corrected the widespread view of Antisthenes as a rigorous ascetic and remarked upon the central role of "pleasures which do not cause repentance". That Hercules' toil may have been a staple of Epicureans in defence of pleasures associated with virtue can be deduced from Cicero's reservation at the end of his argumentation in *De Fin.* 2. 35, 118: *Elicerem ex te cogereque ut responderes nisi vereretur ne Herculem ipsum ea quae pro salute gentium summo labore gessisset voluptatibus causa gessisse diceretur*.

²⁶ D.L. 7. 71, cf. GOULET-CAZE (1986) 206.

²⁷ There is some evidence of Epicurus' criticism against Socrates as portrayed in Plato's *Symposium*. In Epicurus' *Symposium* (frs. 57-65 Us.) Socrates was found at fault with his behaviour because of his talkativeness (cf. fr. 63 Us.) and, possibly, his praise of love (frs. 61-62 Us.). BIGNONE (2007) 884-887 thought that Epicurus was referring to the end of Xenophon's *Symposium*. Philodemus, *De deis* 3, fr. 76 Diels pp. 66-67, took issue with the stoics for giving love the dignity of virtue, and stated that "love is rather close to madness". ACOSTA MÉNDEZ & ANGELI (1992) 37-38, surmise that Philodemus is here recasting arguments Epicurus used against Socrates.

ancient philosophy of love are treated, sometimes in quite an original way²⁸. For our argument's sake, let us focus briefly on an interesting paradox pointed out by Maximus in the heart of his first oration on Socratic love.

According to Maximus, Socrates' erotic stories are dangerous and misleading, specially because of the extraordinary prestige of their protagonist, and at face value they should deserve to be expelled from the ideal republic more than the Homeric ones. Consequently, Socrates erotic behaviour appears to be in desperate need of some allegorical interpretations in order to be given an acceptable face. However, on the other hand, Maximus states that Socrates' love affairs were never under attack at his time²⁹. Socrates, as a matter of fact, has to face up to "today's accusers", for whom those relationships of old have become outrageous and somehow dangerous, precisely by reason of the extraordinary significance of Socrates him-self for any philosophical pursuit. Apparently, then, Maximus is taking issue with some current uses of Socrates' erotic stories³⁰. These could be read, as some by Homer were already since long, as if promoting a life devoted to irrational love; consequently their interpretation should be tackled by the very same procedures already applied to the old Homeric stories³¹. Those dangerous stories that may require a charitable exegesis in order to be made morally acceptable become an hedonistic lesson in Epicurus' mouth.

III. As far as we know, Maximus is the only author in Antiquity who has given Socrates' erotic stories an Epicurean reading³². In the present

²⁸ TRAPP (1997) 159-169 and SCOGNAMILLO (1997).

²⁹ *Oration* 18, 6, a statement difficult to double check, in the state of our evidence, but cf. SEGOLONI (1994) 140-148.

³⁰ Luc. *Vit. Auct.* 15; *Ver. Hist.* 2. 17; Ps.-Luc. *Amores* 24. Cf. ROSKAM (2014) 24-25. See also Philo, *De vita contempl.* 57, 59-63 and Heraclitus, *Alleg.* 77-78.

³¹ Cf. *Oration* 18, 5. Maximus interprets Socrates' "ironies" (*εἰρωνεύματα*) as "riddles" (*αἰνίγματα*, a term much used for allegorical encoding in Maximus' *Orations*), in order to apply to Socrates the hermeneutic applied to Homer. To answer the Socratic "riddles" Maximus summons the whole choir of voices from Socrates' disciples (*ὁμόφωνοι*), headed up by Plato, Xenophon and Aeschines.

³² It is a bit surprising that Colotes does not appear to mention this facet of Socrates' career in his book against *Lysis*, one of the most titillating of Plato's "Socratic"

study, though, we are not searching for the “source” of Maximus’ invention, but trying to set the literary and philosophical context from which this invention could arise. In modern scholarship the usual backdrop for Maximus’ *Dialexeis* has been the history of Platonism, where he is considered rather modestly amongst the authors of the so-called “Middle Platonism”. In this context, the import of his work depends on the evidence it eventually provides to the currency and evolution of philosophical doctrines of the age prior to the rise of Neoplatonism³³. However, there are some other aspects of his orations that call for other perspectives to appreciate them more fairly. For instance, the frequency of Socrates’ appearances in his *Dialexeis*, something which is remarkable in the context of Middle Platonism, can be adequately explained in connection with a previous generation of authors where rhetorical and philosophical concerns went hand in hand.

Indeed, Maximus composed his orations at the end of an age when Socrates had featured prominently in philosophical literature. Since the end of the first century CE several authors of different philosophical schools and literary interests had regarded Socrates as a key figure in their respective philosophical projects. For them, Socrates was not only a character in Plato’s dialogues, but a philosopher in his own right, whose place in the history of philosophy was open not only to interpretation, but also to invention³⁴.

Amongst those authors inclined to «socratize» in the first centuries CE, Favorinus of Arelate deserves special attention for several reasons³⁵.

dialogues. The poor condition of the papyrus, however, does not allow many conclusions about the whole range of passages discussed in it, cf. KECHAGIA (2011) 55-62.

³³ Cf. DILLON (1996²) 399-400. Fortunately enough for Maximus’ appreciation, recent scholarship is more sensitive to the rhetorical dimension of the *Dialexeis*. Cf. HAHN (1989) 86-99; SANDYS (1997) 92-130; TRAPP (2007a); LAUWERS (2009); and FOWLERS (2010).

³⁴ The book by DÖRING (1973) is up to now the most comprehensive study on Socrates’ reception during the Imperial age (on Maximus’ Socrates, cf. pp. 136-138), but his interests are focused on the rather vague concept of “popular philosophy”. More recently, the overviews by TRAPP (2007b) and LONG (2010) have proved to be useful. The collection of letters attributed to Socrates and his followers, believed to date from the first century CE, is a clear example of Socratic “fiction”, cf. SYKUTRIS (1931) col. 981-987, who calls the second group of letters (nº VIII-XXVII Hercher) a “Briefroman” (col. 984).

³⁵ FOLLET (2000) 418-422. We follow the recent and profusely annotated edition by AMATO (2005) and (2010). Also useful is the edition by BARIGAZZI (1966). Favorinus’

First of all, his interest in Socrates' love has since long been pointed out as the closest precursor to Maximus' orations on the same issue³⁶. A work entitled *On Socrates and his Art of Love* was attributed to him, although no texts can be assigned to it with any degree of certainty³⁷. Nevertheless, some fragments attest to Favorinus' curiosity about this controversial aspect of Socrates' life. Two of them, both preserved by Stobaeus, deserve a brief mention here. According to one of them, Alcibiades' beauty could be compared with Socrates', but whereas the beauty of the former left him "already in his life" (καὶ ζῶντα), Socrates is said to remain handsome "still now" (ἔτι καὶ νῦν Σωκράτης καλός)³⁸. The second one is more difficult to assign to any of Favorinus' known works. In this fragment visual beauty is said to accresce the powers of the spoken word, and, as such, we listen more pleasantly to handsome youngsters (Antilochus or Alcibiades) than to more eloquent elders (Ulysses and Nestor)³⁹.

Equally indicative of Favorinus' Socratic interests is a rather surprising piece of information provided by Diogenes Laertius, according to which Socrates and Aeschines were the first to teach rhetoric. Diogenes Laertius says that this detail in Socrates' biography is to be found in Favorinus' *Miscellaneous History*, as well as in the work by Idomeneus *On the*

extensive interest in Socrates was pointed out by his admirer and disciple Aulus Gellius, NA 2. 1, 3: *Quam rem cum Favorinus de fortitudine eius viri ut pleraque disserens attigisset* (= fr. 102 Amato).

³⁶ A heavy reliance of Maximus on Favorinus was defended by BARIGAZZI (1966) 162-163, but it was contested by PUIGGALI (1983) 71-77, and most recently by AMATO (2010) 87-89.

³⁷ Suda, s.v. Φαβωρίνος, (φ 4 IV 690, Adler) = Test II Amato. None of the fragments assigned to this work by BARIGAZZI (1966) has been accepted by AMATO (2010) frs. 18 B (= 24+111 A); 19 B (= 13 A); 20 B (= 12 A); and 21 B (= 112 A).

³⁸ Fr. 12 A. AMATO (2010) 61-62 gives good reasons for adding this fragment (and fr. 13 A. as well) to those of Favorinus' *On old age*.

³⁹ Fr. 112 A. Once more AMATO (2010) 392-393 rejects both the assignment to *On Socrates*, and the connection with Maximus, following Puiggali's analysis of the sources (cf. note 35). As a matter of fact, in fr. 112 A. the main idea is the importance of beauty in the philosophical relationship, which is precisely the point Maximus was trying to make in *Oration 32*.

*Socratics*⁴⁰. The significance of the passage is twofold. Firstly, the appearance of Aeschines as a close companion of Socrates deserves some attention. Aeschines was highly appreciated because of his characterization of Socrates as someone specially concerned with the tight bonds between love and education, an issue of extraordinary interest in Socratic literature since its very beginnings. Maximus knows both Aeschines' canonical place among the first Socratics as well as his erotic concerns, as we can conclude from some other *Dialexeis*⁴¹.

Our second point regards the way Favorinus handles the rich tapestry of Socratic traditions in circulation at his time. It seems that Favorinus, a self declared Academic, not content with the common lore of the school about Plato's master, subsequently pushed his enquiry towards other traditions (sometimes hostile) of Socrates' life. In this case he gets to grips with the first Epicureans, whose aggressive stands have been already dealt with above. It is generally accepted that Idomenus was uncomplimentary regarding the rhetorical teaching of Socrates and his pupil, but all the same it is clear that for Favorinus, on the contrary, this very piece of information could be accepted as complimentary of Socrates career. In fact, Favorinus pushes forward an Academic tradition which sees rhetoric as an expertise to be taken into account seriously by philosophers, not only as practi-

⁴⁰ D.L. 2. 20 (= fr. 67 A.). Idomenaeus, fr. 24 Angeli, cf. ANGELI (1981) 58-61. This is not the only accusation against Socrates by Idomenaeus of a rhetorical penchant (cf. D.L. 2. 19 = Idomenaeus fr. 25 Angeli). On the other hand, Aeschines was not the sole follower of Socrates associated with rhetorical teaching, cf. Antisthenes, frs. 11 and 12 G. On the rhetorical training and practice of Aeschines, cf. D.L. 2. 62 = fr. 13 G.

⁴¹ Cf. *Orations* 6, 6; 7, 7 (fr. 42 G.); 12, 6; 13, 6; 18, 5 (fr. 31 G.); 22, 6 (fr. 31 G.); 38, 4 (fr. 61 G.). Aeschines belonged to the "canon" of Socratic writers, since at least the late Hellenistic period, cf. D.L. 2. 47. At the same time his dialogues were considered by Panaetius as "truthful", along with those of Plato, Xenophon and Antisthenes, cf. D.L. 2. 64 = Panaetius, fr. 145 Alesse. The tradition of his closeness to Socrates (cf. D.L. 2. 60 = fr. 3 G.) had probably some influence on the valorisation of his writings. Stylistically, his works were highly regarded in the Imperial period, cf. Demetrios, *De eloc.* 205, 291 and 297 and Hermogenes, *De ideis* 2. 406-407. To this day, Aeschines is the only "minor" Socratic whose dialogues have been preserved significantly in the papyri: *POxy* 1608 (*Alcibiades*, fr. 48 G.) from the late second century, and *POxy*. 2889 and 2890 (*Miltiades* fr. 76 and 79 G.), from the second/third century.

tioners, but also as teachers of it⁴². The meagre notice by Diogenes provides us with some interesting evidence of Favorinus' ingenuity in reworking (and reversing) Epicurean material in order to produce an unusual image of Socrates, consistent nonetheless with his own philosophical interests⁴³.

Favorinus' Socratic concerns are, consequently, very close to Maximus' ones. However, we could say that Maximus is even closer to Favorinus when it comes to the strategy he supplies to Epicurus for his defence. Maximus has given him the opportunity of taking issue with critics of hedonism by means of a manoeuvre that affects Socrates' image in one of his most remarkable moments. As such, we can describe this procedure in two complementary ways. On the one hand, the appearance of Epicurus *in persona* is a clear example of the rhetorical figure known as *ethopoiia*, a device much cherished by teachers and practitioners of rhetoric of his age⁴⁴. On the other hand, the strategy of letting Epicurus himself defend his own thesis against the detractors of pleasure can be interpreted as a means to a dialectical end. Maximus takes on himself the task of arguing in favour of Epicurus, which is a clear instance of a dialectical procedure tightly associated with the Academy from the time of Arcesilaus onwards.

As stated above, Favorinus declared himself a follower of that Academy which excelled at the practice of dialectics as a means of pursuing

⁴² Cf. the detailed treatment of the issue by BRITAIN (2001) 296-343.

⁴³ Other Favorinus' fragments pertaining to his treatment of Socrates (and revealing his leaning towards divergent traditions about him) are: fr. 40 A. (from his *Memorabilia*), where Socrates is said to have made a trip to the Isthmus; fr. 41 A. (also from his *Memorabilia*), where the authenticity of Polycrates' *Accusation against Socrates* is rejected; and fr. 67 A. (from his *Miscellaneous History*), in which Favorinus defends that it was Polyeuctus (otherwise unknown) who delivered the speech of indictment. Socrates features largely as an exemplary figure in the oration *On exile*, preserved in a long papyrus (PVat 11): col. ii 14, 21; col. xxi 31; col. xxii 28, 30, 36; col. xx 55. In the discourses belonging to the corpus of Dio Chrysostom, cf. *Cor.* 32 and *Fort.* 17; 18; 25.

⁴⁴ On the exercise and genre, cf. HEUSCH (2005). The exercise is usually applied to historical and fictional characters; exceptionally Maximus used it for philosophical purposes, cf. *Oration* 16 (Anaxagoras plays Socrates), and *Oration* 38 (*Logos* himself speaks!). This technique has Platonic ancestry, see Plato, *Prt.* 361a-c; *Tht.* 166a-168c; *Phdr.* 237b-241d and *Lg.* VII 817a.

a sustained research on uncertain issues⁴⁵. According to Favorinus, the distinctive dialectical method of the Academy, appreciated mainly for its didactic virtues, was that described as to “argue *pro* and *contra*” (*in utramque partem disserere*)⁴⁶. This procedure (at least according to one of the possible interpretations of it) would require from the student the ability of arguing for and against the same thesis, in order to exhibit their persuasiveness. However, this rather formulaic expression does not reveal at first sight its “genealogical” implications in the history of the Hellenistic Academy. In this context, it encapsulates a pivotal connection with Socrates and Plato, the founding figures of the school. Both of them were conceived as proponents of a style of philosophizing appropriate to their deep awareness of the limitations of human capacity for knowledge and certitude.

Arcesilaus was pictured by his defenders as the philosopher who restored the Socratic ways of enquiry that had been long forgotten since the death of Plato⁴⁷. Other sources attest to the importance he attached to

⁴⁵ Fr. 33 A (from *Plutarch*). Regarding the Academic stance of Favorinus, cf. GLUCKER (1978) 280-293, IOPPOLO (1993), OPSOMER (1998) 213-240, and BONAZZI (2003) 158-170. All of them remark on the idiosyncrasy of Favorinus’ Academic position.

⁴⁶ LONG (1986) 446-449 set apart Arcesilaus’ method (*contra omnes disserere*) from his successors’ since Carneades (*in utramque partem disserere*), but the distinction is not universally accepted, cf. GÖRLER (1994) 796-797. Many other schools (not to speak of sophists and rhetoricians) could lay legitimate claim to this procedure, most of all Aristotle and his disciples, cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 2. 9; *De fin.* 5.10, and *De orat.* 2. 80; however, Arcesilaus’ aim was not to discern the plausibility of each side, but to lead to *epoche*, cf. IOPPOLO (1993) 188-190. By the time of Cicero the teaching method seemed to be a mitigated way of debating *pro* and *contra*, where (Socratic) no commitment to any doctrine was still highly appreciated, cf. Cic. *De fin.* 2. 1; *N.D.* 1. 1; *Tusc.* 2. 9; *De fato* 1. TARRANT (1996) 191-192 thinks it probable that the doxography on pleasure quoted by Aulus Gellius, *NA* 9. 5, 8, comes from Favorinus.

⁴⁷ Cic. *De fin.* 2. 2: *qui mos (sc. Socratis) cum a posterioribus non esset retentus, Arcesilas eum revocavit instituitque...*; *N. D.* 1. 11, 79: *ut haec philosophiae ratio contra omnia disserendi profecta a Socrate, repetita ab Arcesila...*; *De or.* 3. 67: *quem (sc. Arcesilas) ferunt (...) primumque instituisse, quamquam id fuit Socraticum maxime, non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id quod quisque se sentire dixisset, se <dis>putare*. The causal connection between Arcesilaus’ scepticism and his interpretation of Socrates was defended by LONG (1988) 156-160. Cicero presents as evidence for Socrates’ philosophizing both Plato’s writings and other Socratics’ as well (much probably Aeschines’ dialogues are to be considered

Socrates in order to legitimate the direction he steered the Academy towards⁴⁸. Yet, the Socratic leaning of Arcesilaus was probably not exclusively dialectical. The Academy Arcesilaus knew and aligned himself with had the philosopher Polemo as head. According to Tarrant, under Polemo's heading a new "school culture" of philosophical love was developed, where Socrates and his ways of helping youngsters to improve themselves in a very special educational relationship were a very important issue⁴⁹. In fact, Arcesilaus' access to the Academy as told by Diogenes Laertius, was granted through the (reciprocated) affection of his master Crantor, with whom he lived for a long while⁵⁰.

In conclusion, what is distinctive in Favorinus' Academic observance is that his abiding by the dialectical methods of the Academy goes hand in hand with a vigorous and fresh "socratism"⁵¹. At least two basic ingre-

here, cf. LONG (1988) 157). As IOPPOLO (1995) 94-95, pointed out, in Arcesilaus' view Socrates was an independent philosopher and the main source of his own method, but regarding his "sceptic" position, he owed it *both* to Plato and Socrates. COOPER (2006) 169-187 has pressed the point of Arcesilaus' socratism, and is followed by THORSRUUD (2009) 40-43.

⁴⁸ As shown in the picture provided by Plutarch, the main charges adduced by Colotes against Socrates were *a*) the oracular response declaring him the wisest, *b*) the inconsistency between his words and his actions derived from the rejection of the experience of the senses, and *c*) his self-confessed ignorance of himself. Socrates also featured amongst the philosophers who supported *ἐποχή* and *ἀκαταληψία* (*Adv. Col.* 1121 E; cf. Cic. *Acad.* 1, 12, 43-46 and *Luc.* 2, 14-16 and was introduced by Arcesilaus in order to legitimate his position, cf. IOPPOLO (1995) 97-106.

⁴⁹ TARRANT (2013). The importance of Polemo, Crates, and Crantor for the formation of Arcesilaus' Socratic character was already pointed out by LONG (1986) 440-441 and (1988) 159.

⁵⁰ D.L. 4. 29. The erotic life of Arcesilaus features prominently in his biography as an important part of his merry demeanour, which starkly contrasts with Lacydes', his successor as the head of the Academy.

⁵¹ Cf. BARIGAZZI (1966) 76: "La figura di Socrate unisce idealmente tutta l'attività di Favorino, dal problema della conoscenza alla attuazione etica nella sventura". Nevertheless, it is important to underline that there is no evidence in Favorinus' fragments of the dialectical side of Socrates. IOPPOLO (1993) 212: "In fact it seems possible to conclude that Favorinus definitely followed Socrates and not Plato, also showing by this choice a degree of autonomy with regard to the attitude then current among the Platonists". Given the present state of our evidence on the issue, it is rather difficult to draw any

dients of Arcesilaus' philosophical stance, Socratic love and a dialectical kind of teaching able to entertain an enquiry that goes on despite uncertainty and doubt, stand out in Favorinus' Academic heritage⁵². As such, both of them are at the root of Maximus' Socratic invention. Maximus undertakes, in an Academic stance, the defence of Epicurus by letting him speak on his own behalf in an oration carefully fleshed out with a good deal of Epicurean doctrines; by means of this figure he states the case for the "other" side of the debate regarding pleasure, a fundamental one to those who want to be initiated in philosophy. Besides, at the centre of the oration, Socrates himself appears compulsively in pursuit of beauty, nonetheless able to unite pleasure and virtue. Furthermore, the source for this hedonistic Socrates were those dialogues in which he involved himself in dialectical enquiries with handsome youths for the sake of education. All things considered, Maximus has given Epicurus his due, to the point of making of Socrates an Epicurean of sorts, someone from whom much can be learnt. At the same time he seems to have an inkling of those heirs to Plato who also thought themselves to be heirs, sometimes even contemporaries, to Socrates.

conclusions on the evolution of socratism in the Academy *after* Arcesilaus. According to BONAZZI (2003) 118-129 and p. 131 note 106, Socrates loses prominence in the late Hellenistic Academy and progressively becomes nothing more than a piece of evidence in the debate about the interpretation of Plato's writings. IOPPOLO (1995) 107-115 contends that the weakening of Socrates' autonomy is due more probably to the Neophyrronians. Antiochus' view of Socrates' place in the history of the Academy is presented differently by Cicero in the two known versions of the *Academic Books*. In *Ac.* 1, 16-17, Socrates is separated from Plato, whereas in *Luc.*, 15, both of them are considered together. SEDLEY (2012) 8, remarks on the "seeming modernity" of the first reading and considers Antiochus its only proponent. GLUCKER (1997) 72-74 discusses different proposals to explain Antiochus' contradictions regarding the Socrates-Plato link, to conclude that "neither Philo nor Antiochus were over-anxious to be declared heirs to Socrates."

⁵² A rather similar mix of love and dialectic is to be found in Plutarch, *Plat. Quest.* 1, cf. OPSOMER (1998) 127-161, and SHIFFMAN (2010).

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Resumo: Na 32ª Oração “Sobre o prazer”, de Máximo de Tiro, apresenta-se uma defesa do hedonismo em que o Epicuro aparece, em pessoa, a defender o prazer. Nessa defesa, os casos amorosos de Sócrates são relembrados como exemplo de conduta virtuosa aliada ao prazer. Neste artigo, será explorado este estranho retrato epicuriano de Sócrates como exemplo positivo. Argumenta-se que, para compreender esta descrição de Sócrates como amante virtuoso, deverão ser tomadas em consideração tendências anteriores do platonismo, particularmente aquelas que mantiveram viva a relação com a Academia helenística. Mencionar-se-á, em especial, Favorino de Arles, não como fonte do conteúdo da oração, mas como o autor mais próximo de Máximo, quer no seu interesse por Sócrates, quer nos processos retóricos (e dialéticos) da sua filosofia.

Palavras-chave: Máximo de Tiro; Sócrates; Epicuro; Favorino de Arles.

Resumen: En la Disertación XXXII, “Sobre el placer”, de Máximo de Tiro, se presenta una defensa del hedonismo en la que el propio Epicuro aparece personalmente para abogar por el placer. En esta defensa, se recuerdan los amores de Sócrates como ejemplo de comportamiento virtuoso ligado al placer. En este artículo examinaremos este extraño retrato epicúreo de Sócrates como ejemplo positivo. Sostenemos que para entender esta descripción de Sócrates como un amante virtuoso se debe tener en cuenta algunas tendencias anteriores del platonismo, sobre todo aquellas que mantuvieron viva la relación con la Academia helenística. Se hace especial mención a Favorino de Arlés, no como fuente del contenido de la disertación, sino como el autor más próximo a Máximo, tanto en su interés por Sócrates como en los procesos retóricos (y dialéticos) de la filosofía.

Palabras clave: Máximo de Tiro; Sócrates; Epicuro; Favorino de Arlés.

Résumé: Dans la 32^{ème} Oraison “Sur le plaisir”, Maxime de Tyr défend l’hédonisme, Épicure y apparaît en plaidant pour le plaisir. Dans cette défense, les liaisons amoureuses de Socrate sont remémorées comme un exemple de conduite vertueuse alliée au plaisir. Dans cet article, cet étrange portrait épicurien de Socrate sera exploré en tant qu’exemple positif. On soutiendra que, pour comprendre cette description d’amant vertueux de Socrate, il faudra prendre en considération des tendances antérieures au platonisme, plus précisément celles qui ont maintenu la relation avec l’Académie hellénistique en vie. On mentionnera en particulier Favorinos d’Arles, non comme source du contenu de l’oraison, mais comme l’auteur le plus proche de Maxime, en ce sens qu’il portait de l’intérêt à Socrate et aux processus rhétoriques (et dialectiques) de sa philosophie.

Mots-clés : Maxime de Tyr ; Socrate ; Épicure ; Favorinos d’Arles.